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Y MEMORANDUM
Summer List 23, Sheet 1
No. 79-97

Cert to Cal. Ct. App.
(Reynoso; Puglia, Evans, cone.)
Association

California

v.
Mid cal

Timely

State/Civil

Petr

contends

that

Calj fornia

cou rt s

wrongl y

h e ld t h at a state-sanct1one
H
.
d resa 1 e pr1ce
.
.
. ..
ma1ntenance
sc h erne for w1ne
( 1)

does

not

fall

----

:;;z:::.

within the state action ex emp tion to the Sherman

2.

2.

FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW.

sale of wine

California law prohibits

from licen'(ses to retailers at . a

the price contained

in a

price different

posted price schedule or

in a

fair

the
from

trade

contract. Calfironia law also prohibits the sale of wine to consumers
at a price below the price set in a price schedule or in a fair trade
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, Div. 9, Chap.

contract.

§~

II

24682, 24866.

Resp sold a retailer 27 cases of Gallo wine at a price less than the
posted price schedule,
existence

of

a

and sold other wine to retailers without the

fair

trade

contract.

The

state

Department

of

Alchoholic Beverage Control alleged that resp had violated state law
and sought a suspension of resp's license or imposition of a monetary
penalty.
The state court of appeal declared the state regulations to
be

violative

authority

of

to

regulate

Amendment was
First

the

provides

importation

into

States

delivery

Act,

alchoholic

insufficient

Amendment

for

Sherman

support

in

part

use

stated

beverages

to

any State,
or

and

the

that

Terri tory,
therein

that

under

the

the

Twenty-First

regulation.
"[t]he

The

Twenty-

transportation

or possession of
of

state's

intoxicating

violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.

the

of

United

liquors,

in

The court based

both of its holdings upon the state supreme court decision in Rice v.
Alchoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board.
In

Rice

the

court declared

that similar state regulations

controlling the sale of distilled spirits were invalid under federal
law.

The court found that the retail price maintenance operation was

an invalid restraint of trade pursuant to the Sherman Act,
not contested by petr.

a

point

The court further found that the regulations

3.

could not be sustained under the state action exemption established
in Parker v. Brown,
Arizona, 433

noted that

341

( 1943).

See Bates v.
------- --

v.

Virginia,

U.S.

421

773

--- --

The

( 1975).

court

in Parker and Bates state action immunized conduct that

otherwise would have violated the Sherman Act.

In Parker the state

adopted a plan to regulate the sale of raisins.
given

State Bar of

350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.

( 1976) ; _ Goldfarb

579

I

u.s.

317 U.S.

number

of

producers

in

a

geographical

establishment of a marketing plan.

If a

The plan allowed a

area

to

petition

for

satate commission approved

formulation of a plan, then a committee of producers set a price. If
the commission approved or modified the plan,
upon
( :- '

the

approval

of

the

area producers.

it would be effective

In Bates

a

rule of

the

Arizona Supreme Court prohibiting attorneys from advertising was held
to be within

the

state court was
practice of
state

deemed

the

law,

policy,

examination"

state action exemption.
ultimate

The Court noted

body wielding

state

that the

control over

the

that the rule represented a clear articulation of

and

that

by the

the

rule

state court

significant

that

the

was

subject

to

"pointed

in enforcement proceedings.
state

policy

"is

so

re-

It was

clearly

and

affirmatively expressed and that the state supervision is so active."
433

u.s.

at 362.
The state court emphasized

that

in Parker

the prices were

set by a state commission, and that in Bates the rule was subject to

•

1

"point e d re-examination" by the state ·court.

Becaus e the substance

of

prices

the

California

bev erages ,

were

regulations,

set

by

private

that

is

parties

the
th e

court

for

alchoholic

believed

the

regulations differed sufficiently from Parker and Bates to bring them

4.
outside of the state action exemption.
The

court

recognized

the

state's

authority

to

regulate

alchoholic beverages under the Twenty-First Amendment, but held that
"[w] hen

a

statute

enacted

conflicts with an

pursuant

to

enactment based on

balance the policies

furthered

the

the

by each

Twenty-First

commerce

Amendment

clause,

we must

in order to determine which

should prevail." In support of its use of a balancing test, the court
relied

upon

its own precedent,

see Sail'er Inn Inc.

P.2d 529 (1971), and upon this Court's decisions, see
429

U.S.

tanto

190,

repeal

protection
( "
'--"'

206
the

'be

(1976)("the
Commerce

considered

Craig~

Twenty-First Amendment does

Clause,
in

::.:._ Kirby,

the

but
1 ight

merely
of

requires

the

other,

485

Boren,

not pro

that
and

in

each
the

context of the issues and interests at stake in any concrete case.'"
(quoting

Hotstetter

v.

Idewild

Liquor

Corp.,

377

u.s.

324,

332

(1964))).
The

court

found

that

the

state

regulations

inpinged

free

competition as guarenteed by the Sherman Act because it allowed both
horizontal and vertical retraints of trade.

The court specifically

noted the remarkable similarity in the prices set by competing brands
as

evidence of

the

price schedules.
regulations
promoting

potential

for

price-fixing

based on the posted

The court examined evidence showing that the state

served

neither

temperance

and

of

the

protecting

purposes
small

behind

the

statute--

businesse

from

predatory

competition.
3. CONTENTIONS.
so

completely

on

the

Because the court of appeal decision relied
decision

in

Rice,

petr

has

directed

arguments toward the two grounds supporting that opinion.

its

5.

( .
Petr contends that Rice construed the state action exemption
too narrowly. Petr argues that Park er itself was a case where private
parties

exerted

regulation,

considerable

since

producers

control

both

over

initiated

approve the commission's decision before

the

content

proceedings

of

and

the

had

it went into effect.

to

Petr

emphasizes that the state regulations sanction the price maintanence
of wine,

and

that

the

state

enforces

any violations.

Because

the

conduct of resale price maintenance is required by state law, petrs
conclude that the regulations fall within the Parker exemption.
Petr also argues that use of a balancing test is incorrect
in the circumstances of this case. First, petr argues that balancing
is only appropriate when, as in Craig

~

to

the

Twenty-First

Amendment

~

Boren, state action pursuant

conflicts

with

the

exercise

of

fundamental rights. Second, petr contends that the Court's expression
of

a

balancing

test

in

Idewild

is

inapplicable

because

that

case

represented the attempts of a state to regulate liquor use outside of
its
test

territorial
has

been

limits.

Finally,

expressly

petrs say that use of a balancing

rejected

in

lower

court

case

affirmed by this Court. National Rai 1 road Pa sse nger:_ Cor12_.
358

rule
that

F.Supp.

1321

of Hicks
th e

case

v.

(D.Kan.)

affirmed

Mir a nda,

422 U.S.

forms

precedent

414
332,

U.S.
344

inconsistent

948

(1973).

( 1975),

with

summarily
~

Mill e r' ·

Under

the

petr contends
th e

California

decision.
Petr also states that the issues are certworthy because the
state decisions have created uncertainty

and

confusion.

Petr

says

[

that

the decisions hav e spawned needless litig at ion,

th e t

th ey call

into qu esti on the validity of similar laws in other states, and th a t

6.

they place licensees in the unenviable position of having to disobey
California law or face anti-trust liability.
4. DISCUSSION. The California court has cut a narrow line to
avoid application of Parker
inconsistent

with

this

~

Brown,

Court's

but the line is not directly

precedent.

The

California

court

correctly notes that the state involvement in regulation was greater
in Parker or Bates

than

in this case.

In Parker,

for example,

the

state commission could ensure that prices were not set too high. Here
the state does not interfere with the privately chosen price levels.
At the same time the state involvement here is greater than
in Cantor or Goldfarb.

In Cantor the court held that that the state

----

----

~

action exemption did not protect the activites of a utility company
that was the sole distributer of electricity and supplied consumers
with

light

bulbs.

The

charge

for

general charges for electricity.

the

bulbs

was

included

in

the

The rate was approved by the state

utility commission and could not be changed without their approval.
Nevertheless,

the state had not required that the bulbs be provided,

nor did it have an independent regulatory interest in the market for
light

bulbs.

428

U.S.

at

584-85;

604-05;

612-14.

In . Goldfarb

the

Court held that a minimum fee schedule published and enforced by bar
associations did not fall within the exemption because the activities
were not required by the state.

421

U.S.

at 790-91.

In this case,

the activities were required by th e state even though the state did
not require or regulate the particular price levels.
The state court correctly applied a balancing test to weigh
the purposes of the Sherman Act against the ability of the state to
regulate

alchoholic

beverage

under

the

Twenty-First

amendmen t.

7.

(
Although the holding

in Craig

Amendment

does

alter

standards,

the Court

used

when

afoul of

not

'

~

Boren states that the Twenty-First

the

set forth

application
in explci t

state action pursuant
federal

acti0n

Court stated that

to

area.

Rather

the

but

interesection of

protection

dicta the standard to b e

to the Commerce Clause.

created

operation of the Commerce Clause,

equal

the Twenty-First Amendment runs

taken pursuant

the Amendment

of

an exception

to

it did not repeal

the

two

provisions

th e

The

normal

it in this

demands

that

each be considered in the light of the other, with recognition of the
interests

at

stake

in

any case.

429

u.s.

at

206.

Furthermore,

the

Court noted that that the state's interest in controlling importation
of

intoxicants

of

the

state

is "transparently clear."
regulations

do

not

affect

In
its

this case,
abii ty

to

invalidation
control

the

importation of alchoholic beverages.
This case would be a prope r
Parker

issue.

The

parties

have

vehicle for examination of the

stipul a ted

to

all

facts,

and

the

state supreme court opinion entensively analyzes the purposes served
by

regulations

of

the

prices

of

distilled

spirits.

Petr

has

not

suggest e d that regul a tion of wine is distingui s hable from r e gulation
of distilled spirits .
There is a response.
8/24/79

Sal let

Ops.

in petn.

JS

To:
Re: No. 79-97, CRLDA v. Midcal Aluminum

1. QUESTIONS PRESENTED:

(1) May a state compel private

parties to comply with a retail price maintenance plan for the
sale of wine under the state action doctrine of Parker v. Brown?
(2) May a state compel private parties to comply with a retail
price

maintenance

plan

for

the

sale

of

wine

pursuant

to

its

authority under the Twenty-First Amendment?
2. DISCUSSION.
A. The Evolution of Parker v. Brown.

The state action

exemption to the Sherman Act received this Court's imprimatur in
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In that case, a California

2.

~te
J\

authorized
comQe~ tion

restrict
raisins.

The

Commission.
for

the

state

If

ten

the

included

producers

formulated

a

-created

of

petition

of

a

program

that

would

and maintain prices in the distribution of

raisin

establishment

grant

establishment

an

Agricultural

producers

petitioned

a

marketing

and

select

and

processors.

specific

plan,
a

program

Prorate

the

program
The

which

the

Commission

Commission

could

committee,

which

program

the

Advisory

committee

Commission

could

approve, modify, or reject. A program approved by the Commission
would go into effect upon the consent of 65% of the producers in
the relevant aqricul tural area.

The program would restrict the

marketing of raisins and the price at which they could be sold.
The

Court

held

that

the

state

attacked as violative of the Sherman Act.
the

plan

"derived

legislative
Sherman

Act

its

command of
"gives

no

authority
the

state,"

hint

state action or official

and

that

it

plan

was

action directed

not

be

The Court noted that

its

id.,

could

at

efficacy
350,

and

intended

to

by a state."

from

the

that

the

restrain
Id.,

at

351.
In
U.S.

384

preempted

Schwegmann Bros.

( 1951), however,
a

state

price maintenance

v.

Calvert

the Court held

1 aw

that

plan

for

required
1 iquor.

Distillers Corp.,
that

the Sherman

compliance

with

Louisiana had

a

~~
law

that

~

enforced any price-fixing contract against all retailers in

th~v~

state,

The ~

both

signatories of

the

contract

and

non-s iqners.

3.

Court recognized that the Miller-Tydings Act allowed states to
create resale price maintenance plans, but it held that the Act
did not permit the State to force non-signers to comply with the

--

plans.

~

The Court cited Parker

Brown in passing, but it did

not discuss possible application of the state action exemption.
Goldfarb~

In

Virginia State Bar, 421

u.s.

773 (1975),

this Court held that the state action exemption did not protect
a minimum fee
and

enforced

schedule published by a Country Bar Association
by

the

State

Bar.

The

Court

stated

that

" [ t] he

threshold inquiry in determining if an anticompetitive activity
is

state

action ••. is

whether

State acting as sovereign."

the

activity

is

Id., at 790.

required

by

the

The Court found that

promulgation of the fee schedule had not been compelled by the
State acting through its Supreme Court. Although the State Bar
was

a

state

agency,

the

Court

concluded

that

it

"voluntarily

joined in what is essentially private anticompetitive activity."
Id., at 792.
Cantor~

In
the

Court

retailer

considered
of

its

service

charge.

private
against

state-approved

customers

independent

a

lightbulbs

accordance with
to

Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.

and
The

included
Court

regulatory

antitrust
a

private

tariffs,
their

emphasized

interest

action

579 (1976),

brought

utility

by

which,

a
in

distributed lightbulbs

cost
that

within
the

in the market

its

State

for

general
had

no

lightbulbs,

and that the utility had proposed the tariff that included the

\

4.

cost of free
that Parker

lightbulbs.

~

defendants,

A plurality of the Court also stated

Brown was inapplicable to cases involving private

and

that

there

was

no

other

reason

to

preclude

antitrust liablity from attaching to the utility's actions. The
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun concurred in the result,
~

although each would have applied the Parker
You joined in Mr.

Brown doctrine.

Justice Stewart's dissent.

Like the

Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, Justice Stewart would have
applied Parker
was that the
the

state

~

Brown. Justice Stewart's conclusion, however,

utility's distribution of lightbulbs

action

exemption.

Justice

Stewart

fell

argued

within

that

the

utility's proposal of a tariff was protected from the antitrust
laws under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and that the utility's
subsequent compliance with the tariff was protected under Parker
v. Brown.

Reviewing the legislative history of the Sherman Act,

Justice Stewart concluded that the intent of the Act was "not to
intrude on the soverignty of the States." id., at 635, and that,
therefore,
from

the

conduct which
Act.

Because

is compelled by the States is exempt

compliance with

an

approved

tariff was

compelled by the State, Justice Stewart believed that Parker v.
Brown

was

Stewart

applicable.

also

comm ~ e ~

In
on

the

course

of

Schwegmann.

his
He

dissent,

Justice

characterized

that

case as one in which Congress, by passage of the Miller-Tydings
Act, had

altered the scope of the state action exemption with

respect to resale price maintenance plans.

~

5.

The Court unanimously applied Parker v. Brown in Bates

v. State Bar, 4 33 U.S.
violated
Court

state

3 50

( 1976).

disciplinary

distinguished

In Bates two young lawyers

rules

Goldfarb

against

on

the

advertising.

ground

that

The

the

no-

advertising rules in Bates were required by affirmative command
of

the

state

because
court,

( i)

supreme

the

real

court.
party

The

in

Court

distinguished

interest was

the

state

Cantor
supreme

(ii) the State had an independent regulatory interest in

the regulation of bar activities,

and

(iii)

the no-advertising

rules were are "clear articulation of the State's policy" which
were "subject to pointed re-examination by ..• the Arizona Supreme
Court . " I d • , at 3 6 2 .
Finally, the Court applied Parker v. Brown last Term in
New Motor Vehicle Board v. ~rrin Fox Co., 47 LW 4017
5,

The

1978).

Court

reviewed

a

California

(December

statute

which

requires an automobile manufacturer to secure the approval of a

--------------

state

~---------~----------------------------agency before opening a retail

administrative

vehicle

dealership

~

franchise,

within

the

market

area

of

an

motor

existing

if and only if that existing franchisee protests the

establishment

of

the

competing

franchise.

The

Court,

in

an

opinion by Justice Brennan and joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices

Stewart,

contention that

White,

the

Marshall

state

and

Rehnquist,

rejected

the

scheme was violative of Schwegmann:

"The dispositive answer is that the Act's regulatory scheme is a
system

of

regulation,

clearly

articulated

and

affirmatively

6.

expressed, designed to displace unfettered business freedom in
the

matter of

dealerships.

the

establishment

and

relocation of

automobile

The regulation is therefore outside of the reach

of the antitrust laws under the 'state action' exemption." 47 LW
at 4021.

The Court distinguished Schwegmann as a case in which

"the State attempted to authorize and immunize private conduct
violative

of

Blackmun's

the

opinion

antitrust

laws."

concurring

in

Id.

the

You

result,

joined
which

Justice
did

not

discuss Parker v. Brown.

The ~ Scheme

B.
state

appellate

court,

Under Review.

"[u]nder

As described by the

California

and

Business

Professional Code section 24862 no licensee may sell or resell

-

to a retailer, and no retailer may buy any item of wine except

:::..

____........

_...-.,.__,

-

at the selling price contained in an effective price schedule or
No licensee is permitted

in an effective fair trade contract.

to sell or resell to any consumer any item of wine at less than
the

selling

schedule
qrower,

or

or

resale

fair

wholesaler,

price

trade

contained

contract.

in

Under

an

effective

section

price

24866

wine rectifier or rectifier must make

each
and

-

--

prices of wines." Petr for Cert at A-5.
In

Baxter

v.

Rice,

in

which

the

California

Supreme

Court struck down the state resale price maintenance plan for
distilled

spirits,

the

court

emphasized

that

the

price

for

distilled spirits was set solely by private parties. The court

stated that the Department of Alchoholic Beverages Control "does
not

participate

enforces
court

in

the price

recognized

determining

the

minimum

set by producers."

that

Id.

the Department has

price,

at C-9.
the

but

only

The state

power

to

excuse

compliance with the resale price maintenance plan, but said that
it had never
have

the

been exercised,

authority

to

and

set

significant difference []"

that

the

maximum

Department did not

prices.

There

is

between the provisons of the

"no

resale

price maintenance plan for distilled sprits and for wine. Id.,
at A-4.

~

As Goldfarb stated, the threshold question in applying ~1~
Parker

~

Brown is whether the State, acting as sovereign, has

compelled private parties to engage in anti-competitive conduct.

----------------

In this case it is clear that the State does compel! sellers of
wine to engage in price-fixing.

I do not think, however,

that

this threshold question can be the only question. In Schwegmann,
for

example,

resale

the

price

nonetheless

State

"compelled"

maintenance

struck

down.

plans,
The

nonsigners
but

Court's

the

most

to

comply with

State

recent

law

was

reading

of

Schwegmann characterizes it as a case in which the State merely
attempted

to

authorize

or

immunize

private

anti-competitive

conduct.
The necessity of looking beyond compulsion arises from
the perceived danger that a State could "repeal" the Sherman Act
within its borders simply by "compelling" persons to engage in

I
\

8.

anti-competitive behavior.

The Court has developed two methods

of reviewing state action to ensure that it is not tantamount to
"repeal"

of

the

Sherman

Act.

First,

as

the

Court

in

Cantor

suggested, this Court could review each plan to see whether it
actually

serves

an

important

state

interest.

then the state action is not exempt.
approach

is

that

it

allows

the

If

it does

not,

The difficulty with this

federal

courts

to

assess

the

strength of the state interest in economic regulation.
Second, the Court has emphasized the adequacy of state
super ~ is ~ r

state-sanctioned

anti-competitive

practices.

This approach does not review the strength of the state interest
in

regulation,

replaced
state

free

but

it does

That

enterprise.

authority

to

ensure

define

that

is,

economic

the

state

supervision

has

recognizes

the

inappropriate

for

Court

areas

market control, but also recognizes that state supervision must
provide

a

economic
private

real
system.

parties

substitute
Other ise,
to

evade

for

the

state
the

effects

"immunity"

purposes

of

a

may

and

competitive
simply

policies

allow

of

the

Sherman Act. See Areeda & Turner, Antitrust Law§ 213 (1978).
I

believe

that

the

second

approach

is

preferable,

because it respects the federalism principles that allow a state
to decide for
public
between

itself when anti-competitive practices serve the

welfare.
adequate

This
and

Court's

cases

inadequate

aspect of the marketing plan,

illustrate

supervision.

the
In

difference

Parker,

each

including price and supply, was

~

9.

approved

by a

state commission.

In Bates,

the

rules had been

promulgated and were subject to pointed re-examination by the
state supreme court. Under Justice Stewart's view of Cantor, the
utility was following a tariff that had been explicitly approved
by a state regulatory commission.
the

state

franchise

reviewed
would

Schwegmann,
compelled

each

cause

the

maintenance

plans

economic

State

nonsigners

claim

statute
to

drawn

In New Motor Vehicle Board,

that

establishment

harm.
was

On

struck

follow

the

up

private

by

the

terms

of

other
down
of

a

hand,

in

because

it

resale

parties.

new

price

The

state

compelled the nonsigners to follow the terms of the contract,
but

it gave private parties

the

freedom to decide under what

circumstances state compulsion would be employed.
This case is like Schwegmann because the coercive
of

the

state

bargains.

is

Thus,

employed
the

to

state

carry
has

out

the

mandated

terms
a

of

resale

~

pow~~

private
price

~

~
~

maintenance scheme, but private parties set the price at which ~

sales can be made. I believe that the state's failure to set
price, as was done in Parker and Cantor, leads to the
that state supervision is

the ~

conclusion ~~~

inadequate to bring the plan within

the state action exemption.
Of course, Schwegmann can be read, as Justice Stewart
read it in Cantor, as a case that does not directly effect the
scope of the Parker v. Brown exemption. It would still, however,
be relevant to this case.

The alternative reading of Schwegmann

. ., _,

'

i~.f.Lc.

1 0.

interprets it as a case in which the Court deferred to Congress'
specific

decision

to

supersede

the

original

intent

of

the

Sherman Act through the Miller-Tydings Amendment. If so, then it
can

be

argued

protection

of

that

Congress'

resale

price

recent

decision

maintenance

to

plans

end

federal

indicates

that

Congress does not wish such plans to fall within the state acton
exemption.
In

the

Miller-Tydings

Act

Congress espressly allowed fair
Congress

repealed

anti trust

laws.

the

The

federal

and

trade
fair

legislative

in

laws.

trade

the
In

McGuire
197 5,

however,

exemptions

history of

the

Act,

from

197 5 Act,

the
as

recounted in the Amicus Brief of the State of California at 2325, suggests that Congress expected the repeal of previous law
to prevent manufacturers from settinqs prices under fair trade
statutes.

Thus,

I

believe

that

the

197 5 Act

may

be

used

to

support a holding that Congress intends that fair trade laws not
be exempt from the operation of the Sherman Act.
C.

The

Effect

State's Ability to
The

Twenty-First

Twenty-First
importation
United

Regulat~

Amendment

Amendment
into

States

of

any

for

the

delivery

Amendment

On

the

the Price of Alchoholic Beverages.
repealed

provides
State,

Twenty-First

that

Prohibition.
II

Territory,
or

use

rtl he
or

§

2 of

the

transportation or
possession

therein

of

of

the

intoxicating

liquors in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
If the state regulation of wine is not exempt under the Sherman

11.

Act,

and,

assuming

that

the California price-fixing scheme is

illegal under the Sherman Act, then it must be decided whether
the

Twenty-First Amendment precludes enforcement of the

anti-

trust laws.
The petitioner argues that the Twenty-First Amendment
creates

an

exception to

the

Clause and limits federal

normal operation of

the

Commerce

intervention to those cases in which

state regulation runs afoul of other constitutional provisions,
or in which the state attempts to regulate liquor that is not
consumed within state borders. The respondent argues, however,
that

the

interests of the State must be balanced against the

interest of Congress

in enforcing the Sherman Act pursuant to

its Commerce Clause power.
The petitioner's theory has the potential for creating
a rather large gap in federal law because it would hold that any
state

act

regulating

the distribution of alchoholic beverages

would prevail over any inconsistent federal statute based on the
Commerce Clause.

Presumably this would allow a state to mandate

that persons working
federal

minimum

in

wage.

the

1 iquor

On

the

industry need

other

hand,

not be paid

the

realistic

potentional for such conflict may be small.
Review of the history of the Twenty-First Amendment is
not particularly illuminating. For example, the Brief of Amicus
Virginia

Wholesalers

Association

argues

that

the

Congress'

rejection of a proposed section 3 to the amendment demonstrates

\

1 2.

the breadth of state authority.
that

"Congress

prohibit

the

premises

shall

have

sale of

where
with

a

Prohibition

was

to

concurrent

intoxicating

sold."

consistent

Section 3 would have provided

be

liquors

Therejection

narrower

power

of

the

regulate

or

to be drunk on the
section

congressional

ended,

to

3

purpose.

Twenty-First

also

is

Although

Amendment

was

designed to allow each state to decide whether it would be "wet"
or "dry." Section 3 was inconsistent with that principle insofar
as it would have allowed Congress to decide whether alchoholic
beverage would be sold within each state.
essential purpose of

§

Under this view, the

2 of the Twenty-First Amendment was to

allow each state to decide whether alchoholic beverages would be
imported for consumption within each state. State regulation of
price,

but

not

consumption,

of

alchoholic beverages

therefore

would be entitled to less consideration.
The Court's recently has stated that "the Twenty-First
Amendment does

not

pro tanto repeal

the Commerce Clause,

but

'

merely requires that each provision "be considered in light of
each other,

and

in the context of the issues and interests at

stake in any concrete case." Craig
( 1976),
377 U.S.

quoting Hostetter v.
324,

332

(1964).

~Boren,

429

u.s.

190, 206

Idewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,

Although members of this Court have

expounded a more expansive view of the Twenty-First Amendment in
the past, see United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324
293,

300-01

(1944)(Frankfurt, J., concurring),

it

u.s.

is difficult

1 3.

~
to
perceive

~

the

____

interests

interpretation
of
---.._._
the

exclusive

that

would

the Twenty-First Amendment

power

to

control

the

served

be

by

that gave

price

of

an

?

States

alchoholic

beverages.
Of course, a State like Virginia that controls the
--.._.,
distribution of alchoholic beverages within its borders is
acting within the central purpose of the Twenty-First Amendment.
Assuming

that

a

balancing

of

state

interests

is proper when price alone is at

reluctant

to disturb

that

state

the

interest 1 s

price-fixing

interest

in

interests

of

free

of

are

not

substantially

this

State

in

federal

I

would be

view

in Rice

furthered

by

the

On the other hand, it is clear

sort

competition.

the

issue,

state supreme court 1 s

resale price maintenance scheme.
that

and

runs

afoul

Therefore,

fixing

the

I

of

the

suggest

prices

of

federal
that

the

alchoholic

7
;

beverages in this context by the reach of the antitrust laws.
3. SUMMARY. The state resale price maintenance program
does

not

fall

within

the

Parker

v.

Brown

exemption

from

the

Sherman Act because of the failure of the State to supervise the
private choice of the prices at which wine
California.

Where

a

distribution

of

Twenty-First

Amendment

state

alchoholic

controls
beverages

demands

that

is

to be

not

state,

the

interest

be

price,

within

its

state

in

but

the

the

sold

balanced against the federal interest. In this case, the federal

JS

1/14/80

To:

Mr. Justice Powell

Re:

No. 79-97, CRLA v. Midcal A1uminum

The SG has filed an amicus brief, and petr has filed a
reply brief.
The SG contends that the state resale price maintenance
(RPM) plan violates the Sherman Act and is not protected by

~

of

the

the

Sherman

Twenty-First

Amendment.

Act

is

question
~he

Memorandum.
actions

that

Parker and

fall

Bates,

SG

contends

within
and

similar

the

act ion

The
to
that

state

SG's

the
the

reasoning

analysis

in

on
my

distinction

action

that does not,

exemption,
as

2

Bench

between
as

in

in Schwegman,

turns on the existence of state supervision or control over the

2.

substance of

the

restraint.

The

SG argues

that

the state

RPM

plan does not exert sufficient control because it allows private
parties to select the prices at which wine must be sold. The SG
derives

the requirement of control

from the need

to reconcile

the purpose of the Sherman Act with the interests of the states
Aggregations of economic power subject to

in a federal system.
the

control

of

the

state

do not

pose

the

same potential

for

abuse as private anti-competitive action, but state enforcement
of private decisions allows private anti-competitive activity to
flourish

beyond

the

control

of

either

the

federal

or

state

government.
The SG argues
First

Amendment

was

that the purpose of
to

guarentee

the

§

2 of the Twenty-

States

the

power

to

regulate liquor in a manner that would otherwise interfere with
interstate

commerce,

powers

be

which

gives

1 imi ted

more

the

transportation or

there

but

than

States

exclusive

import at ion"

two

years

Amendment.

The

after

by the

that

Congress'

langauge of

authority

over

of alchohol ic beverages.

~

2

"[t]he
The SG

Federal Alchohol Administration

congess ional

Alchohol

intent

no

required

notes that Congress passed the
Act

was

passage

Administration

of
Act

the

Twenty-First

imposes

federal

labeling and consignment sales requirements. The SG states that
the debate on that Act demonstrates Congress'
federal
Amendment.

regulation

is

consistent

with

belief that such
the

Twenty-First

Furthermore, a decision that the States have plenary

3.

control over all aspects of the liquor trade would allow States
to

insulate

their

liquor

industries

from

the

reach

of

such

federal laws as the National Labor Relations Act, the Securities
Acts, and the requlatons of common carriers under the Interstate
Commerce Commission Act.
I believe that the SG 1 s theory is slightly broader than
my

Bench

Memorandum.

The

SG asserts

that

any

State

law that

regulates liquor, but not its distribution, is preempted by any
contrary
control

federal
over

the

law.

I

suggested

distribution

of

interests must be balanced against

that

States

liquor,
the

but

federal

have

that

plenary

the

interests when

the State regulates other aspects of the liquor industry.
SG 1 s theory would be easier to aoply,

State

The

and would not appear to

constitute an overborad reading of federal power so long as this
Court emphasizes that the States have exclusive control over the
distribution

of

alchoholic

beverages,

and

that

States

may

prohibit the sale of liquor, regulate the number or location of
liquor licenses, operate liquor stores itself, and levy taxes on
alchoholic beverages.
The petr 1 s reply brief adds little. On the state action
issue, petr emphasizes that liquor distirbutors are required by
the

State

to

interpretation of

set
§

prices.

The

petr

disputes

the

SG 1 s

2 of the Twenty-First Amendment, contending

that the States have broad authority.

The petr also notes that

Congress, when it repealed the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts

4.

in 1975, expressly noted that States may enforce RPM laws under
the Twenty-First Amendment.
Resp raised the
Court,

although that

issue of mootness in a motion to this

issue was not discussed

in resp' s

brief.

Petr explains that the California courts have struck down the
RPM plan for spirits, and for wine sales to cunsumers, but had
not, prior to this case, dealt with price retraints on the sale
of wine from wholesaler to retailer. Thus the case would not be
moot

even

if

a

previous

state

court

decision

could

bar

this

Court from considering a constitutional issue. Because I do not
believe that a state court can evade the command of this Court
by

claiming

reliance

upon

an

earlier

unreviewed

state

court

decision, I don't believe there is a real mootness issue in this
case.
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2/7/80
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

David

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 7, 1980

79-97 Midical
I commend you first on the promptness with which
you have prepared a first draft.

It also reflects your usual

quality of work.
My comments are as follows:
In the introductory paragraph, would it be helpful
to identify Midical as a private wine wholesaler?

Perhaps

something along the following lines might do:
"In a private state court action instituted by
respondent - a wine producer - California's resale
price maintenance and price posting statutes for
the wholesale wine trade were held to be violative
of the Sherman Act. The issue presented on this
appeal is whether, etc., . . . "
Your part I is fine, although it might be well to
identify Midical a little more specifically.
Part II is excellent.

I suppose we need not say

that the California pricing scheme would be a per se
violation of the Sherman Act.

On page 7, where you cite

Schwegmann (which, of course, is the most relevant case) I

?

think it would be helpful to cite additional Sherman Act
cases supporting the invalidity of this type of price fixing.
As you have pointed out, Part III - the 21st

2.

Amendment issue - is a bit more difficult.

It is not easy to

identify, on the basis of prior authority, a consistent and
coherent line of analysis.

You end up balancing competing

state and federal interests.

I can think of no better

approach.
Yet, I do have the impression that we may
overemphasize the weight to be accorded state interest.
discussion begins on page 20.

The

The first point made is the

relative indifference of California to this particular case.

O~

I really do not view this as significant.

Our decision would

be the same regardless of the the state's enthusiasm so long
as it kept the statute on the books and enforced it.

Perhaps

we could move this reference to a footnote.
You then rely primarily on the view of the
California statute taken by California courts.

This is more

relevant, but again would not be controlling with me in terms
of deciding whether the state interest is sufficient to
outweigh the federal interest.

-----

Customarily, we look to the

brief of the State Attorney General for the state interests
served by legislation.

I have not checked his brief, but if

it identifies state interests you might rely on him for these
and on the California court's rebuttal to show how
insubstantial they are.
While I certainly would not foreclose the

3.

possibility of state interests outweighing a federal commerce
clause interest in a case involving alcoholic beverages, it
is difficult for me to imagine such a case involving the
Sherman Act and where the state action is not protected in
any event under Parker v. Brown.
In sum, take another "swing" at the final five
pages (commencing at page 20 of the draft) with the foregoing
thoughts in mind.
Without rechecking the draft and accompanying
notes, I do not believe you have been quite specific enough
in making clear that under the 21st Amendment a state may do
as Virginia does:

exercise a state monopoly on the

importation, distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages.
This would be protected both by the 21st Amendment and Parker
v. Brown.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

I
February 15, 1980

Re:

79-97 - California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association v. Midcal Aluminum

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~ltp't'mtt <lfcnrl cf

ffrt ~~ ~ta.ttg

~u~ ~.
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

<!f.

2ll&J~'

February 19, 1980

J . BRENNAN , JR.

RE: No. 79-97

Dear Lewis:
Please note that I did not participate in the
consideration or decision of this case.

SIC
Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.:iuprtntt <!fomt ~f t4~ ~~ ~htUs
._Mlfingtlttt. ~. Qf. 2ll~.){.~ '
CHAMI!IERS O F"

February 19, 1980

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLAC KMUN

Re:

/
v

No. 79-97 - California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association v . Midcal Aluminum, Inc.

Dear Lewis :
Please join me.
Sincerely,

---

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.hpt-mu C!Jltltrlttf tlft~b .ihttt.s
..ulfi:ngLttt. ~. ~ 2llb''! ~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

February 20, 1980

Re:

No. 79-97, California Liquor Dealers
v. Midcal Aluminum

Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court.
Sincerely yours,

()s.
I '

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

/

Qj:llutt llf t!ft ~tb j;~g
~agfringbm, ;!0. Qj:. 2.0~,.$

j;u.p:rtmt

/

/

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

February 20, 1980

Re:

No. 79-97 California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn.
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et al.

Dear Lewis:
Although I voted the other way at conference, I shall,
as Byron puts it "acquiesce" in your opinion.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the conference

~ltp:rtmt arttnd

ltf t~t 'J!Uritt~ ~btf.tg

'D'aafrittghtn.19. ar.

2llgt)!.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

February 21, 1980

No. 79-97 - Calif. Retail Liquor Dealers
Asso. v. Midcal Aluminum

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

c::J1u
.
•
T.M.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

~tt~ ~o.trrt cf tlrc ~~.b: ~t~ilis
~agJrittgLttt, ~. <!J. 20_5)~~

CHAMBERS OF

February 23, 1980

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

/
Re:

79-97 - California Retail Liquor
Dealers Assn. v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc.

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

.:§u.prtmt <!Jlturlltf t4t ~tt~ .:§~atts
•asfrhtgtltn, ~. <!J. 20~'1~
CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

February 28, 1980

Re:

79-97 - Calif. Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc.

Dear Lewis:
I join.

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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79-97 California Retail Liquor
Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum

This case comes to us from the California Court of
Appeal.
California has a resale / price maintenance statute
for wine.

Under this statute, a wine producer may set prices

through a fair trade contract.

If this is not done, the
I

wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that
producers brand.

Wine merchants are required to sell to

1\

-

retailers only at prices established in this manner.
Respondent, charged with violating established

prices, successfully challenged the
violative of the Sherman Act.

~~

California system as

We granted cert.

The California statute was defended in this Court
on two grounds:

First, that its program is immune from

federal antitrust laws under the "state action" exception an exception this Court has recognized since

d.
"

decision

in~

Parker v.

Brown. ~ lvt.f3

~ae

194~

2.

Secondly, it was argued that the 21st Amendment,
that

repeal ~

the Prohibition Amendment, authorized the

states to regulate traffic in liquor.
For the reasons stated in the Court's opinion, we

-

reject both of these arguments.

Neither the state action

doctrine of Parker v. Brown, nor the 21st Amendment,
authorizes a

stat~to

delegate to private partiesj'the right

to fix prices in a manner/ that would violate federal
antitrust laws.

We therefore affirm the judgment of the

California Court of Appeal.
Mr. Justice Brennan took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.
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March 10, 1980

MAR

1 4 1980t

The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice
United States Supreme Court
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C.
20543
Re:

California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., No. 79-97 OT79

Dear Justice Powell:
This letter is written on behalf of my client,
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., respondent in the above case, and
concerns a brief phrase that appears at page 12 of the
slip opinion. With deference, we suggest that a modification of that phrase may be appropriate to minimize any
risk of misinterpretation of the scope of the ruling in
the case. Mr. Rodak, the Clerk of the Court, informs me
that the appropriate way to raise this matter is by letter
to you, with copies to him and to the Reporter of Decisions.
At page 12, the slip opinion contains the following sentence:
"The Twenty-first Amendment grants the
States virtually complete control over
whether to permit importation or sale
of liquor and how to structure the
liquor distribution system."
(Emphasis
added.)
The phrase which is emphasized in the above sentence is the
source of our concern. As explained more fully below,
there is a risk that the phrase might be cited to attempt
to obtain results at odds with the logic of the opinion
as a whole and with the basic antitrust principles upheld
by the Court.

ORRICK, HERRINGTON, ROWLEY
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The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
March 10, 1980
Page Two
At page 8, footnote 9, the slip opinion distinguishes and protects "the approach of those States that
completely control the distribution of liquor within their
boundaries ... The note goes on to cite two provisions of
the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Code, §§ 4-15 and
4-28. These code provisions deal with the operation of
government stores for the retail sale of alcoholic beverages. Footnote 9 leaves little doubt that the States are
free to engage themselves in distributing alcoholic beverages.
Judging by the logic of the opinion and the similarity of the language of footnote 9 ( 11 the distribution of
liquor within their boundaries") and of page 12 ( 11 the liquor
distribution system"), it seems to us that the language of
page 12 emphasized above refers to footnote 9 type situations
in which the State itself conducts various aspects of the
alcoholic beverage business. However, it is possible that
the language of page 12 could be read more broadly in an
effort to defend situations where the cloak of state authorization is thrown over what are in essence private cartels -particularly horizontal market division schemes -- in situations that are logically and legally indistinguishable from
the price-fixing scheme struck down in the California Retail
Liquor Dealers case.

An example may help to illustrate our concern. If
the States have "virtually complete control over • • . how
to structure the liquor distribution system .. (in the literal
language of page 12), could they simply authorize suppliers
and wholesalers, under the guise of a franchise system, to
divide the state up into territories in which the wholesalers
would not compete with each other? This would harm someone
in Midcal's position, if the effect was to prevent it from
selling in new areas. Such a system would be a per se
illegal market division conspiracy if engaged in without a
"gauzy cloak of state involvement, .. and the analysis should
be identical to the analysis of the conduct at issue in the
california Retail Liquor Dealers case. Yet the language of
page 12 of the opinion, referred to above, might suggest
that such a market division scheme, if authorized by state
statute, would be immune from antitrust inquiry. This would
be a result that presumably was not intended, would impinge
upon legitimate federal antitrust interests, and in any
event was not an issue before the Court in our case.

ORRICK, HERRINGTON, ROWLEY
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The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
March 10, 1980
Page Three
One alternative to clear up the problem discussed
above would be to change the phrase "how to structure the
liquor distribution system" to read:
"over those aspects
of liquor distribution within their boundaries which the
States conduct themselves." Another alternative, although
one I think might be less clear, would be simply to append
a footnote to the end of the current phrase. Such a footnote might read:
"See note 9, supra."
Needless to say, I am very pleased with the outcome of the case and with your opinion for a unanimous Court.
I consider it a great privilege to have been able to argue
the case before you.
Respectfully submitted,

B. o~~
ck B. Owens
A Attorney for Respondent,
ideal Aluminum, Inc.
JBO/ljj
cc:

Honorable Michael Rodak
Clerk, United States Supreme Court
Henry Lind, Esq.
Reporter of Decisions
United States Supreme Court
William T. Chidlaw, Esq.
counsel for Petitioner
Lawrence G. Wallace, Esq.
Deputy Solicitor General
George J. Roth, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General
State of California
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

David

DATE:

March 14, 1980

RE:

No. 79-97, California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn v. Midcal

Aluminum, Inc.

I

hope

that

I

am not responding to the Owens letter with

instinctive "pride of authorship," but I do not think his point is
especially well
"The

taken.

Twenty-first

The phrase at issue on page 12 states that

Amendment

grants

the

States

virtually

complete

control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how
to structure the liquor distribution system."

(Emphasis added.)

The

letter's concern is that this language suggests that the State could
delegate

liquor

distribution

authorized

to

in

offered

a

is

engage

to

private

anticompetitive

market-division

arrangement.

parties

who

practices.
Letter,

would

The
p.

2.

be

example
I

have

law.

The

"transportation

and

several problems with the proposal to rewrite the passage:
1)

language

of

importation"
reflect

the

"--------

I

believe
the

the

Amendment

of 1 iquor.
intent

passage correctly states
refers

to

Both terms

that

the

States

the
to me,

the

at least -- clearly

control

the

distributing liquor through mechanisms such as "blue"

methods

of

laws limiting

2.

Sunday or evening sales, sales of liquor-by-the-drink,
1 iquor dealers,
cannot

be

drawn,

I

or

sale of 1 iquor by

the

Twenty-first

limitation on state liquor

Unless

in

Amendment

import taxes,

be

reduced

is

to

a

and I think State control

1 ike

resisted

using

letter.

Indeed, there is no direct need to protect the State-store

the

Pennsylvania

will

this 1 ine

programs

narrower

could

language

of

be

lost.

the

type

That

is

proposed

why
in

I

the

---'"'----

systems

with

observes

the

Twenty-first

in footnote 9,

arrangements.
first

that

Such requlations

the State.

challenged on Sherman Act grounds.
believe

licensing of

Amendment

because,

as

the

opinion

there is Parker v. Brown immunity for such

I would also point out that our reading of the Twenty-

Amendment

California v.

is

LaRue

considerably
in

1972,

narrower

involving

than

nude

that

dancing

offered
in

bars;

in
the

Twenty-first Amendment is not yet the toothless hag that the letter
(and apparently Justice White) would have it.
2)

I do not believe that the dangers seen in the letter are

very substantial.

The language in dispute was drafted with an eye to

the standard distinction in antitrust
"behavioral"

features of a market.

law between "structural"

and

Although the fit is not perfect

between that model and this case, the contrast I hoped to make was
between market "structure" -- public v.
stores

private, saloons v. package

-- and behavioral matters such as price-fixing and,

the letter's example, market-division.

to use

The state's freedom to make

structural decisions is relatively uninhibited, but there is no State
power

to

authorize

anticompetitive

behavior.

The

market-division

hypothetical does highlight a stress point in this analysis.
market

division

be

viewed

as

a

structural

matter?

My

Can't

answer

is

3.
simply,

Once

"No."

the

State

has

resolved

to

permit

the

sale of

liquor by licensed private dealers, it has exhausted its unreviewable
discretion
policies
outline

under

must

the

be

in Part

Twenty-first

reviewed

under

III of Midcal.

Further

Amendment.
the

balancing

regulatory

approach

that

we

The decision to authorize regional

monopolies would be subject to that scrutiny.
3)

Finally, I believe that the general language and holding

of the opinion make clear that the letter's reading of the phrase on
page

1 2 is

incorrect.

Doubtless lawyers will attempt to twist the

language out of context, but the same is true of any number of other
statements in the opinion.
Should you wish to proceed with some revision, I will draft
some alternatives.
statement
change.

to

I

state-run

would emphasize,
1 iquor

stores

though,

that restricting the

is much more

than a

cosmetic

LAW O F FIC E S OF

WILLIAM T . CHIDLAW
A

PROFESSIONA L

CORPORAT I ON

POINT WEST EXECUTIVE CENTRE

March 17, 1980

1455 RESPO N S E ROAD, S UI TE 19 1

SACRAMENTO , CALIFORNIA 95815
(9 16) 920-0202

Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Associate Justice
United States Supreme Court
1 First Street, N.E.
Washington, D. C. 20543
Re:

California Retail Liquor Dealers Association
v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.; No. 79-97

Dear Justice Powell:
This letter to you is prompted by and in reply to a
letter dated March 10, 1980, directed to you on behalf of
Respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc. by its attorney. Upon
inquiry to the Office of the Clerk of the Court, I was
advised that Mr. Rodak had stated that a reply to that
letter, directed to you, would be appropriate. The Clerk's
office further referred me to your secretary to whom I
relayed my intention of replying to the Midcal letter.
Midcal seeks a substantive change in the language of
the opinion which would have the effect of adopting the
position argued by Midcal that the Twenty-first Amendment
simply authorizes a state to prohibit or restrict the importation of liquor into its territory. This limited effect of
the Twenty-first Amendment was effectively rejected in your
opinion both by language in the text at page 9 of the slip
opinion and the reference to legislative history, contained
in footnote 10 also at page 9. The refusal to overrule
earlier cases of this Court (e.g., Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves)
and the rejection of an interpretation that would virtually
emasculate the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on the
power of the states to regulate liquor was made clear in
that language on page 9 where your opinion analyzed the
language of Section 2 of the Amendment in the following
manner:
"
In terms, the Amendment gives the
States control over the 'transportation or importation'

LAW OFFICES OF

WILLIAM T. CHIDLAW
A

PROFESSIONAL

CORPORATION

Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Re: California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn.
vs. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.; No. 79-97

March 17, 1980
Page Two

of liquor into their territories. Of course, such
control logically entails considerable regulatory
power not strictly lim1ted to importing and
transporting alcohol."
(Citing Ziffrin
case with approval.)
(Emphasis added)
It is the position of the California Retail Liquor
Dealers Association that although disappointed in the outcome
of the case insofar as it specifically affects its members,
nevertheless the opinion is clearly written, is consistent
within itself, and is not subject to misinterpretation or
confusion.
The mere fact of change in the opinion in the
manner suggested by Midcal would itself be misconstrued and
misapplied and undoubtedly the significance of the change
itself would be greatly exaggerated in any future applications
of the Midcal decision to state court cases involving state
liquor statutes or regulations.
The purpose of this letter
is not to presume to tell you, as the author of the Midcal
opinion what you meant, but to simply support the proposition
that the meaning is in fact clear, it was carefully thought
out and it does not require interpretation.
This Court has furnished guidelines for future application
of this opinion in the language contained on page 12 of the
slip opinion, and that complete paragraph, from which the
sentence quoted in the Midcal letter is taken, is clear in
its meaning.
The complete paragraph reads:
"These decisions demonstrate that there
is no bright line between federal and state
powers over liquor.
The Twenty-first Amendment
grants the States virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale of
liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regulations, those controls may be subject to the
federal commerce power in appropriate situations.
The competing state and federal interests can be
reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those
concerns in a 'concrete case.'"
(Citing
Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 u.s.,
at 332.)
That the opinion as a whole is consistent with the
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Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Re: California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn.
vs. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.; No. 79-97

March 17, 1980
Page Three

above quoted paragraph regarding the states' control over
"how to structure the liquor distribution system ... " is
illustrated by the quotation from page 9 cited earlier. The
opinion correctly recognizes that the states' control over
the liquor distribution system cannot logically be separated
from its control over importation and transportation of
liquor.
This is exactly what the opinion plainly recognizes
in the above quotation from page 12 in connection with the
reference to "the liquor distribution system."
Midcal argues that the phrase "the liquor distribution
system" refers only to those states that themselves "control
the distribution of liquor within their boundaries" and
cites the example of the state government retail stores in
Virginia.
It is implicit in Midcal's argument that the
suggested change will "protect" those states which themselves
conduct various aspects of the liquor business. The illogic
of the contention is manifest when the whole opinion is
considered. The opinion, in the first section on the meaning
and effect of the "state action" antitrust immunity makes it
abundantly clear that a state, like Virginia, which itself
engages in the liquor business, is not affected by the
decision.
The earlier language of the opinion shows that
the Court was well aware of the situation in states like
Virginia and therefore the only reasonable conclusion is
that the language toward which Midcal directs its suggestion
is not the result of careless draftsmanship, but rather
clearly defines the boundaries between areas to which the
Twenty-first Amendment applies with full force and those to
which the Amendment's role has been reduced consistent with
the holding of the opinion.
It is clear from your opinion that the Twenty-first
Amendment retains vitality, especially in matters involving
importation and/or restrictions or prohibitions relating to
the sale, and in matters involving the liquor distribution
system within a state. It is equally clear that in other
matters, the Twenty-first Amendment still has viability
insofar as bestowing upon a state the power to regulate
liquor but that a state has a lesser degree of power than
under the importation, transportation, and distribution
categories.
If there is any question, in a specific case, about the
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WILLIAM T. CHIDLAW
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Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Re: California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn.
vs. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.; No. 79-97

March 17, 1980
Page Four

effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on a state's power to
regulate liquor it can better be resolved in a future
"concrete case" than by the use of a hypothetical example of
an alleged potential situation that has no relevance to the
opinion in this case and as stated by Midcal at page two of
its letter "was not an issue before the Court in our case."
We would respectfully urge that this suggestion by
Midcal for a substantive change in language be rejected and
the paragraph referred to, on page 12 of the slip opinion,
be left in its original form as one which artfully, carefully
and accurately describes the future effect to be given the
Twenty-first Amendment.
Respectfully submitted,

William T. Chidlaw
Attorney for California Retail
Liquor Dealers Association
WTC:bc
cc:

Jack B. Owens, Esq.
Orrick, Herrington, Rowley & Sutcliffe
Eleventh Floor
600 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Honorable Michael Rodak
Clerk, United States Supreme Court
Henry Lind, Esq.
Reporter of Decisions
United States Supreme Court
Lawrence G. Wallace, Esq.
Deputy Solicitor General
George J. Roth, Esq.
Deputy Attorney General
State of California
Baxter Rice, Director
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control
State of California
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JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL , JR .

March 20, 1980
79-97 California Retail Liquor Dealers v; · Midcal
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Coun s el for the respondent in the above case, by
letter of March 10, requests that we make a change in our
opinion. Counsel for petitioner, in a letter dated March 17,
opposes the request.
I enclose copies of both .letters.
Respondent invites our attention to the following
sentence at page 12 of the slip opinion:
"The Twenty-first Amendment grants the States
virtually complete control over whether to permit
importation or sale of liquor and how · to structure
the liquor distribution - system;" (Emphasis added.)
The critical language in the 21st Amendment uses
the terms "transportation and importation" of liquor. These
terms reflect an intent that the states control the methods
of distributing liquor through mechanisms such as laws
limiting Sunday sales, sales of liquor by the drink,
licensing of liquor dealers, or the sale of liquor by the
state (as in Virginia).
Such regulations well may be
insulated from the Sherman Act by Parker v; · Brown immunity,
but they also fall within the protect1ons of the 21st
Amendment. There may be a better way to make clear that the
states have this sort of authority, although none has
occurred to me. Moreover, I have thought that our opinion in
this case was perhaps a narrower reading of the 21st
Amendment than our decision in California -- v. -- LaRue.
In sum, I am not disposed to recommend that we make
a change.
If there are no contrary views, I will ask Mike
Rodak to advise counsel that the Court is not disposed to
make a change in our opinion.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

March 20,
Ji

79-97 California Retail Liauor Dealers v. Midcal
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Coun~el for the respondent in the above case, by
letter of March 10, requests that we make a chanqe in our
opinion. Counsel for petitioner, in a letter dated March 17,
opposes the request. I enclose copies of both letters.

Respondent invites our attention to the followinq
sentence at page 12 of the slip opinion:

~,

'/

"The Twenty-first Amendment qrants the States
virtually complete control over whether to permit
importation or Rale of liquor and how to structure
the liquor distribution system." (Emphasis added.)
The critical lanquaqe in the 21st Amendment uses
the terms "transportation and importation" of liquor. These
terms reflect an intent that the states control the methods
of distributing liquor through mechanisms such as laws
limitinq Sunday sales, sales of liquor by the drink,
licensing of liquor dealers, or the sale of liquor by the
state (as in Virginia). Such regulations well may be
,
insulated from the Sherman Act by Parker v. Brown immunity, ~~J.~.
but they also fall within the protections of the 21st
,.",,&::'
Amendment. There may be a better way to make clear that the.~~
states have this sort of authority, althouqh none has
occurred to me. Moreover, I have thouqht that our opinion in
this case was perhaps a narrower reading of the 21st
Amendment than our decision in California v. LaRue.
In sum, I am not disposed to recommend that we make
a chanqe.
If there are no contrary views, I will ask Mike
Rodak to advise counsel that the Court is not disposed to
make a change in our opinion.
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 20, 1980

Re:

No. 79-97, California Retail
Liquor Dealers v. Midcal

Dear Lewis,
I agree with your recommendation that counsel
be advised that the Court is not disposed to make a
change in its opinion.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

March

79-97 California Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal

Dear Mike:
I enclose a copy of my memorandum to the Conference
of March 20, together with the letters from counsel referred
to therein.

l•'

' ' The request by respondent to make a change in our
opinion was presented at the Conference today, and you are
now authorized to advise counsel by letter that the Court
is not disposed to make the requested change in its opinion.
Sincerely,

Mr. Michael Rodak, Jr.
lfp/ss
Enc.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 19-97
California Retail Liquor Deal.. ) On Writ of Certiorari to the
ers Association, Petitioner,
Court of Appeal of Califorv.
nia for the Third Appellate
District.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et al,
[February -, 1980]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
a wine distributor, presented a successful antitrust challenge
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting statutes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is
whether those state laws are shielded from the Sherman Act
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317
U, S. 341 (1943), or§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.

I
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Profes- ~
sions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, ,ti rectifiers must ~~_....,
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules.1 If
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade contract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that
The statute provides:
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and
rectifier shall:
"(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made
by the person who owns or controls the brand.
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or
consumers.'
1

79-97-0PINION
2

CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALERS v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM

producer's brands. ld., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair
trade ~ntract.... " Id., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979L.--...fTl
or administration onne wme pricmg progra /[le State (jJ
is divided into three trading area
smg e fair ra e co tract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all wholesale transactions in that brand within a given trading area;.
5to.. M~r\s
wM(e.s~ -ja., §§ 24862, 24864- 24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similarly,=th--e-t~~ -h..~
-===----~r-w-:-ii..:..,e..;..;,p_,n.._ces-posted by a singiCt!" * "bu*"t' within a trading area
bind all wholes.alers in that area. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v.
Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983-984, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762
( 1979). A licensee selling below the established prices faces
' fines, license suspension, or outright license revocation. Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 24880. 2 The State has no direct control
over wine prices, and it does not review the reasonableness of
the })rices set by wine dealers.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine
· in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27
cases of wine for less than the prices se.t. by the effective price
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also
alleged that Midcal s9ld wines for which no fair trade contract
or schedule had be~n filed. Midcal stipulated that the allegations were true and that the State could fine it or suspend
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midcal then
IV\ L -~~~~~~~-~l~·ftdaStat ' W8 ~iigiDg syi!t8nt , ii!h a writ
of man a e
the California Court of Appeal for the Third
'='
.fVt_
:1Jlpellate Distric .
o-.s i~
d..V\ rle Court o Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme
1 "'Fdicn\. a.~r)S
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C.
-lk.. ~{"c:;._.JrQ's w-11-\l
§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rlrse

~ ~'"\1Cl<Zw\

2 Licensees that sell wine below the prices specified in fair trade contracts or schedules also may be subject to private damage suits for unfair
competition. !d., § 24752.

79-97-0PINION
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Appeals~'

Cal.~31, ~

v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
21
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court
s uck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors.
In t at ca ,
~ourt
that because e
State played only a passive part in...-pricing, there was no
rker v. Brown immunity for the program.
"In the price maintenance program before us, the state
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The
prices are established by the producers according to their
own economic interests, without regard to any actual or
potential anticompetitive effect; the state's role is re·
stricted to enforcing the prices specified by the producers.
There is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the
state to insure that the policies of the Sherman Act are
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486.

t-,~l&

Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pric·ing policies were protected by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which insulates state regulation of intoxicating liquors
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion
.of temperance and the preservation of small retail establishments. The court emphasized that the California Jal!li!l!•r---+-_.___
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed
at identical prices. 8 Referring to congressional and state
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price main3 The court cited record evidence tha.t in July 1976, five Jea.ding bra.nds
of gin each sold in California for $4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and tha.t
five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for either $8.39 or $8.40 a. fifth.
Rice v. Alcoholic B ev erag e Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, a.nd
nn. 14, 16, 579 P. 2d 476, 491-492, and nn. 14, 16 (1978).
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or
small retail stores. Sees;( , infra.
In the instant case, the State Court of Appeal found the
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984,
153 Cal. Rptr., at 760. The court ordered the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade.
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from.
this Court, did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, an intervenor. 5 The California Supreme Court declined
to hear the case, and the Dealers Association sought certiorari
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979),
and now affirm the decision of the state court.

II
The threshold question is whether California's I r
for
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled
OQ.llSistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains
- - - - + - --rt-:-r...:ia"'re-.""""'Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co. 220 U. S.
373, 407 ( 1911),
that sucfi arrangements are
"designed to maintain pnces ... , and to prevent competition
among those who trade in [competing goods]." See Albrecht
v. The Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 ( 1960); United States v.
~,] Schrader's Son, Inc., 452 U. S. 85 (1920). For many years,
---....!..~._ ._.the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the States
to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. The
goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect small

1

..

./' -

4 Tho State aJso did not appeal the decision in Capiscean Corp. v.
"7!looholic Bevemge Control Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App . 3d 996, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 492 ( 1979), which used the analysis in Rice to invalidate California's

resale price maintenance scheme for retail wine sales to con umers.
5 The California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, a trade association
of independent retail liquor dealers in California, claims over 3,000
members.

Gi l't-w=-

!rs-
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retail establishments that Congress thought might otherwise
be driven from the marketplace by large-volume discounters.
But in 1975 that congressional permission was rescinded. The
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, repealed
the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation. 6 Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price maintenance
now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity.
' California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see
Albrec t v.
e er ld Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram&: Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. Parle & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competition among wholesalers and retailers as effectively as "if they
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same
restric ons ... by agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at
oreover, there can be no claim that the California
program is simply intrastate regulation beyond the reach of
the Sherman Act. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp.,
supra; Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
The congressional reports accompanying the Consumer Goods Pricing
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that Wfepeal of fair trade autnonfy
would not alter whatever power the States hold under the Twenty-first
Amendment to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 94--466, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 2 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-341, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, n. 2
(1975). We consider the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on this
case in Part III, infra.
7
In Rice, the California Supreme Court found direct evidence that resale
price maintenance resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p.
, supra,
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific nding in
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld
for the same reasons the retail price maintenance }rovisions were declared
mvalid in Rice." Midcal Aluminum
v. Rice, 90 Cal. App.
153 Cal. Rptr. 757,760 (1979).
6
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341 ( 1943). That
immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded in our
federal structure. "In a dual system of government in which,
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as
Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority,
an unexpressed purpose to nulJjfy a state's control over its
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."
I d., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court found in the
Sherman Act no purpose to nullify state powers. Because the
Act is directed against "individual and not state action," the
Court concluded that state regulatory programs could not
violate it. Id., at 352.
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organization of local cooperatives to develop marketing policies for the
raisin crop. 'T he Court emphasized that the Advisory Commission, which was appointed by the governor, had to approve
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state·
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate
program. . . . [J]t is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program and enforces it...." ld., at
352. In view of this extensive official oversight, the Court
wrote, the Sherman Act did not apply. Without such oversight, the result could have been different. The Court expressly noted , "
state does not give Immunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it,
or by declaring that their action is lawful. ..." I d., at 351.
Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) , the Court
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state bar association were not mandated by ethical standards established by the
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules therefore were not
immune from antitrust attack. "It is not enough that . • .
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather,
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the
State acting as sovereign." !d., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), a majority of the
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "reflect[ed]
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in
enforcement proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
u. s. 350J 362 (1977) .
Only last T~his Court found antitrust immunity for a
California program requiring state approval of the location of
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Vehidle Bd. of Calif.
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That program
provided tha+ '§
utemohila freno&iiite }lUhi!kel a~&irtst R
the State would hold a
hearing 'jll...•=-•liii-111••*••~-----••e1~-~~~P'-' I d., at 103. In view of the State's active role, the
Court held, the program was not subject to the Sherman Act.
The "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" goal of
the state policy was to "displace unfettered business freedom
in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automoi e dealerships." I d., at 109.
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively supervised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of
8
BRENNAN, J.).
The California system for wine pricing satis-

.h-J

.=...2.J
,·.f: """"'

d~o J,;fL.

f~~k...~e ru-ft~

~ ~st.,_\,1\ .s~"
dL

Ml.~w.. ,!-

a.

0>~1i4

A~~G

J1ili••tl!lltllll"''l•••lllil•••

8 See Norman's On the Wat erfront, Inc . v. Wh eatley, 44 F . 2d 1011, 1018
{CA3 1971); Asheville 'l'obacco Bd. v. FTC, 263 F. 2d 502, 509-510 {CA4
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price maintenance. The program, however, does not meet the second
requirement for Parlcer immunity. The State simply authorizes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private
r *1' 'f
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does tll:iiJII§!!illl==----t---=-~-t--.u.. regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State
does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed
reexamination" of the program. 0 The national policy in favor
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private
price-fixing arrangement. As Parker teaches, "a state does
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action
is lawful. ... " 317 U. S., at 351.

III

~~,_[/~)
o;;aA_ .n
T~spo4~

of
1959); Note, Padce1· v. Brown Revi~ited: The State Action Doctrine After
Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 916 {1977).
9 The California program contrasts with the approach of those States
that completely control the distribution of liquor within their boundaries.
E. g., Va. Code §§ 4-15, 4-28 (Rcpl. Vol. 1979). Such comprehensive regulation would ·be immune from the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943), since ll10 State would "displace unfettered business
Jffcedom" with its own power. New Moto1· Vehicle
·. .
\ ?~·rin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978) ;fee State Board v. Young's
M!E.·ket Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63 (1936).
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of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited." The remaining question before us is
whether § 2 permits California to countermand the congressional policy-adopted under the commerce power-in favor
of competition.

A
In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court has focuse(o"n the language of the provision
rather than the history behmd it. State Board v. Young's
Market Co., 299 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1936):10 In terms, the
Amendment gives the States control over the ."transportation
or importation" of · liquor into their territories. Of course, .--e,_
such control logically entails considerable regulatory power$'
not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol.
The approach J,
supported by sound canons of constitutional
interpretation
demonstrates a wise reluctance to ~·-·-~....iL.:~:_:::_::~
the comp ex currents beneath the congressional resolution
the Amendment and the state conventions that ratified it.
sponsor of the resolution said the purpose of § 2 was "to restore to the
States ... absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting
intoxicating liquors .... " 76 Cong. Reo. 4143 (1933) (remarks of Sen.
l3laine). Yet he also made statements supporting Midcal's claim . that
the Amendment was designed only to ensure that "dry" States could not
be forced to pennit the sale of liquor. See id., at 4140-4151. The sketchy
records of the state convention · reflect no consensus on the thrust of
§ 2, although delegates at ~eveml conventions expressed their hope that
state regulation of liquor traffic would begin immediately. E. Brown,
Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution 104
(1938) (Wilson, President of the Idaho Convention); id., at 191-192
(Darnall, President of Maryland Convention); id., at 247 (Gaylord, Chairman of Missouri CoRvention); id., at 469-473 (resolution adopted at
Washington Convention calling for state action "to regulate the liquor
traffic"). See generally Note, The Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment
on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 Colum. L. Rev.
1578, 1580 (1975); Note, Economic Localism in State Alcoholic Beverage
·.Laws-Experience Under the Twenty-first Amendnient, -7~ Ha'rv. L. Rev.
1145, 1147 (1959).
10
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939). We should
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority.
This Court's early decisions on the Twenty-first Amendment recognized that each State holds great powers over the
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Market, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch &
Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing
Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). The
Court upheld the chailenged state authority in each case,
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's
Market, supra, 229 U. S., at 64.
Subsequent decisions ha.ve given "wide latitude" to state
liquor regulation, Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35,
42 (1966), but they also have stressed that important federal
·nterests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the
wenty-first Amendment. 131 *I iFtliitOJfl !lBBi9 POt aU~
tates
tax imported liquor in violation of the Exportmport Clause. Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co.,
377 U. S. 341 (1964). Nor can
nsu ate t e 1quor
industry from the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements of
equal protection, Cra'ig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209
( 1976), and due process, Wisconsin v. C onstantineau, 400
~ · _S. 433, 436 (1970).
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce
power. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v.
Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendment in a
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 (1935). And in Ziffrin,
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the
state program was reasonable. !d., at 139.
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324,
331-332 (1964).
"To draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto
'repealed,' then Congrees would be left with no regulatory
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and
is demonstrably incorrect."
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation:
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of
the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake
in any concrete case." I d., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429
U. S. 190, 206 (1976). 11
In Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court
commented in a footnote:
"[E]ven the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-first
Amendment gives the States the highest degree of control, is not altogether beyond the reach of the federal commerce power, at any rate when
the State's regulation squarely conflicts with regulation imposed by Congress . .. ." Id., at 425, n. 15.
11
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is ra matic effort to harmonize state and federal powers
as been evident in
· severai•Iiiiii=:-f1~c.is:<h'ls t...) ~e~~E
..:..-..:...--::::~a~;ji~~~~~~;;i;;;;; liable for anticompetitive
conduct not mandated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. FrankJ o.rt Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945). In Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951), for example, a
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a distributor to comply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a program similar in many respects to the California ----"iaitt;---..a..:=.::l.-....:..:_
issue here. The Court held that the Louisiana statute ~
b<2 c CJ.JAW. ~
W-'~mil1Ji1181111JU1:11H-..r~MI!8-rl could not be enforced against the
1/'1.Q i
e0 --tk(_
Fifteen years later, the Court rejected a Sherman c challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers
sh ~ll¥¥.0M
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest
price" charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram &
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court concluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible economic
pressure on the f dealers] to violate the Sherman Act in order
to comply," but it also cautioned that "[n]othing in the
Twenty-first Amendment, of course, would prevent the en-~-~~~'-~-...lL---~fr;;.o;;rc;:,e:;,;
:; m:;;,;e~n;:.:;t~o~f the Sherman Act" against an interstate conspiracy to fix rices. Id., at 45-46. See Burke v. Ford, 389
S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
These decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twentyfirst Amendment grants the States virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regulationS,ihose contra~ be subject to the federa.I commerce power in appropriate situations. The competing state
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a "concrete case." Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332.
1

or-e

Ac.+e
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B
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor
of competition is both familiar and substantial.
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 4,
( 1958). Although this federal interest is expressed through
a statute rather than a constitutional provision, Congress
"exercis[ ed] all the power it possessed" under the Commerce
Clause when it approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see
. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S.,
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's
procompetition policy.
The state interests protected by California's resale price
maintenance system were identified by the state courts in this
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in
Rice v. Alcoholic Be
Control
Bd., 21 Cal. 3d
451, 579 P. 2d
l aE.tf conclusions of those courts are
on
V£0 the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the

As
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c.~-M.o.>o.aJ

porrliN rf -n::r
c~e ~-b-1
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of
Pythias, 225 U. S. 246, 261 ( 1912). Nevertheless, this Court
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v.
Wood, 344 U. S. 157, 160 (1952).
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of
the State's system of wine pricing was "eontrolled by the reasoning of the [California] Supreme Court in Rice [supra].;,
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors.
.
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind
liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at
490. 13 The court found little correlation between resale price
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing
a 42% increase in per capita liquor consumption in California
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect.
!d., at 457-458, 57Q P. 2d, at 494, citing California Dept. of
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 ( 1974). Such studies, the
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote - - - - - - - - - - temperance." lbid. 14
il\o ~~~ S"""fe
1s The California Court of Appeal found • •
. .-lll••lllf
the instant case. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761.
That court rejected the suggestion that the wine price program was de. signed to protect the State's wine industry, pointing out that the statutes
"do not distinguish between California wines and imported wines." Ibid.
14 See Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35, 39 ( 1966) (citing study
concluding that resale price maintenance in New York State had "no
significant effect upon the consumption of alcoholic beverages").
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in
orderly market conditions as "protect [ing] small licensees
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456,
579 P. 2d, at 493. 15 In gauging this interest, the ,lourt J' (_ 1
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small
retailers. . . . " Ibid. The agency relied on a congressional
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted
under the Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade
laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment off~')
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. ~~ ~
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justification to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price competition among retailers." 21 Cal 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at
{494. The Court of Appea
WI
respec
~he wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983.
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the California courts that the asserted state interests are less substan-

15 The California Supreme Court also stated that orderly market conditions might "reduce excessive competition, thereby encouraging temperance." 21 Cal. 3d, at 456, 579 P. 2d, at 493. The concern for temperance,
however, was
considered by the court as an independent state interest
in resale price maintenance for liquor.
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Attorney Genera ----------------------------------~IH
has demonstrated that the program inhibits
the consumption of alcohol by Californians. We need not
consider whether the legitimate state interests in temperance
and the protection of small retailers ever could prevail against
the undoubted federal interest in a competitive economy.
The unsubstantiated state concerns put forward in this case
simply are not of the same statute as the broad goals of the
rman Act.
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly
decided that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's
wine pricing program.' 6 The judgment of the California
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is
Affirmed.

16 Since Midca.I requested only injunctive relief from the state court,
there is no question before us involving liability for damages tmder 15
u. s. c.§ 15.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
a wine distributor, presented a successful antitrust challenge
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting statutes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is
whether those state laws are shielded from the Sherman Act
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943), or§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.
I
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Professions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, ~rectifiers must
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules. 1 If
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade contract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that
1 The statute provides:
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and
rectifier shall:
"(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contmct made
by the person who owns or controls the brand.
"(b) Make and file a fair trade con tract and file a schedule of resale
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or
consumers."
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 24866 (West 1964).

1:5
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producer's brands. Id., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair
trade contract.... " Id., § 24862 (West Supp. 197.Q2.
"""r---...go-r'"" dministration of the wine pricing program -the State
~~~~~~~--~--------~--~~~~~ ~
is div1 e mto t 1ree trac mg areas
sing e fair trade contract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all wholesale transactions in that brand within a given trading are3t.
Id., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similarly, the
/}~ 
wine prices posted by a single distributor within a trading area
ll'i ~-~
bind all wholesalers in that area. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v.
~
Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983-984, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762
~'ti~
( 1979). A licensee selling below the established prices faces
~&,..o
fines, license suspension, or outright license revocation. Cal.
1/V'~
Bus. & Prof. Code § 24880. 2 The State has no direct control
tiu_~~~
over wine prices, and it does not review the reasonableness of
the prices set by wine dealers.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine
in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allegations were true and that the State could fine it or suspend
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midca.l then
~~"
sought to enjoin the State's wine pricing system witfl~ -v_;~
. 2
~ of mandate from the California Court of Appeal for the Third
~
l
Appellate
District.
1
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme )
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice
2 Licensees that sell wine below the prices specified in fair trade contracts or schedules also may be subject to private damage suits for unfair
competition. !d., § 24752.

,
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v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 21 Cal. 3d 431,
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors.
Irt tha:b sa~ ~he ~tt~e ~preme ¢'ourt ~that because the
State played only a passive part in wine pricing, there was no
Parker v. Brown immunity for the program.
"In the price maintenance program before us, the state
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The
prices are established by the producers according to their
own economic interests, without regard to any actual or
potential anticompetitive effect; the state's role is restricted to enforcing the prices specified by the producers.
There is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the
state to insure that the policies of the Sherman Act are
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486.
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pricing policies were protected by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which insulates state regulation of intoxicating liquors
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion
of temperance and the preservation of small retail establishments. The court emphasized that the California program
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed
at identical prices. 3 Referring to congressional and state
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price mainThe court cited record evidence that in July 1976, five leading brands
of gin each sold in California for $4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and that
five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for either $8.39 or $8.40 a fifth.
Rice v. Alcoholic B everag e Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, and
nn. 14, 16, 579 P. 2d 476, 491-492, and nn. 14, 16 (1978).
8
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or
small retail stores. See p. - , infm.
In the instant case, the State Court of Appeal found the
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984,
153 Cal. Rptr., at 760. The court ordered the De'Partment of
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade.
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from
this Court, did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, an intervenor. 5 The California Supreme Court declined
to hear the case, and the Dealers Association sought certiorari
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979),
and now affirm the decision of the state court.

II
~
The threshold question is whether California's
_ f_o_r _
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled
consistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains
~---:t-ra-d-;-e-.- Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S.
373, 407 (1911), p.ginted -eut- t at sue arrangements are
"designed to maintain prices ... , and to prevent competition
among those who trade in [competing goods]." See Albrecht
v. The H er:ald Co., 390 U. S. 145 ( 1968); United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960); United States v.
Schrader's Son, I nc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920). For many years,
though, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the States
to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. The
goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect small

~
---.

4 The State also did not appeal the decision in Capiscean Corp. v.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bel., 87 Cal. App . 3d 995, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 492 (1979), which used the a.nalysi · in Rice to invalidate California's
resale price maintenance scheme for retail wine sales to consumers.
5 The California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, a trade association
of independent retail liquor dealers in California, claims over 3,000
members.

_,.~
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retail establishments that Congress thought might otherwise
be driven from the marketplace by large-volume discounters.
But in 1975 that congressional permission was rescinded. The
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, repealed
the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation. 6 Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price maintenance
now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity.
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see
Albrecht v. The Heraald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. Park & Sons Co. , supra. The wine producer holds the
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competition among wholesalers and retailers as effectively as "if they
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same
restrictons ... by agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at
408. 7 Moreover, there can be no claim that the California
program is simply intrastate regulation beyond the reach of
the Sherman Act. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp.,
supra; Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
6 The congre sion ul reports accompanying the Consumer Goods Pricing
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that the repeal of fair trade authority
would not alter whatever power the States hold under the Twenty-first
Amendment to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong.,
1st Scss., 2 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-341 , 94th Cong., 1st Sess ., 3, n. 2
(1975). We consider the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on this
case in Part III, infra.
7
In Rice, the California Supreme Court found direct evidence that resale
price maintenance resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. - , supra,
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific finding in
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld
for the same reasons the retail price maintenance provisions were declared
invalid in R ice." Midcal Aluminum Co. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App . 3d 979, 983,
153 Cal. Rptr. 757,760 (1979) .
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That
immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded in our
federal structure. "In a dual system of government in which,
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as
Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority,
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."
!d., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court found in the
Sherman Act no purpose to nullify state powers. Because the
Act is directed against "individual and not state action," the
Court concluded that state regulatory programs could not
violate it. I d., at 352.
Under the program cha1lenged in Par'lcer, the state Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organization of local cooperatives to develop marketing policies for the
raisin crop. The Court emphasized that the Advisory Commission, which was appointed by the governor, had to approve
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate
program. . . . [Il t is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program and enforces it...." I d., at
352. In view of this extensive official oversight, the Court
wrote, the Sherman Act did not apply. Without such oversight, the result could have been different. The Court expressly noted, "[A] state does not give immunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it,
or by declaring that their action is lawful ...." !d., at 351.
Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 (1975). the Court
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state bar association were not mandated by ethical standards established by the
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules therefore were not
immune from antitrust attack. "It is not enough that ...
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather,
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the
State acting as sovereign." !d., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) , a majority of the
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "refl.ect[ed]
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in
enforcement proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U. S. 350, 362 ( 1977).
Only last Term this Court found antitrust immunity for a
California program requiring state approval of the location of
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Calif.
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That program
provided that if an automobile franchisee protested against a
proposed new or relocated dealership, the State would hold a
hearing "to determine whether there is good cause to block the
change." I d., at 103. In view of the State's active role, the
Court held, the program was not subject to the Sherman Act.
The "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" goal of
the state policy was to "displace unfettered business freedom
in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealerships." I d., at 109.
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively supervised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of
8
BRENNAN, J.) .
The California system for wine pricing satis8

See No1·man's On the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wh eatley, 44 F. 2d 1011, 1018
(CA3 1971); Asheville Tobacco Bd. v. FTC, 263 F. 2d 502, 509-510 (CA4
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price mainte~
nance. The program, however, does not meet the second
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply authorizes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does the government regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State
does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed
reexamination" of the program. 0 The national policy in favor
of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private
price-fixing arrangement. As Parker teaches, "a state does
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action
is lawful. ... " 317 U.S., at 351.

III
Petitioner contends that even if California's system of wine
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amendment bars application of the Sherman Act ·in this case. Section 1 of that constitutional provision repealed the Eighteenth
Amendment's prohibition on liquor. The second section reserves to the States certain power to regulate traffic in liquor:
"The transportation or importation into any State, Territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
1959) ; Note, Parker v. B1·o1un Revisited: The State Action Doctrine After
Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 916 (1977).
0 The California program contrasts with the approach of those States
that completely control the di ~ tribution of liquor wit.hin their boundari es.
E. g., Va. Coda §§ 4-15, 4-28 (Rep!. Vol. 1979). Such comprehensive regulation would be lmmune from the Sherman Act under Parlcm· v. Brown,
317 U. S. 341 (1943), since the State would "disJ1l ace unfettered business
freedom" with it own power. N ew Motor Vehicle Board of Calif. v.
Onin W. Fox Co. , 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978); See State Board v. Young's
Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63 (1936) ,
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of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, IS
hereby prohibited." The remaining question before us is
whether § 2 permits California to countermand the congressional policy-adopted under the commerce power-in favor
of competition.
A
In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court has focused on e
1e provisiOn
rather than the history behind it. State Board v. Young's
Market Co., 299 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1936)? 0 In terms, the
Amendment gives the States control over the "transportation
or importation" of liquor into their territories. Of course,
such control logically entails considerable regulatory powers
not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol.
10 The approach is not only supported by sound canons of constitutional
interpretation but also demonstrates a wise reluctance to try to interpret
the complex currents beneath the congressional resolution the proposed
the Amendment and the state conventions that ratified it:" The Senate
sponsor of the resolution said the purpose of § 2 was "to restore to the
States ... absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting
intoxicating liquors . . . . " 76 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1933) (remarks of Sen.
Blaine). Yet he also made sttttements support.ing Midcal's claim that
the Amendment was designed only to ensure that "dry" StaiPS could not
be forced to permit the sale of liquor. See id., at 4140-4151. The sketchy
records of the state conventions reflect no consensus on the thrust of
§ 2, although delegates at several conventions expre~sed their hope that
state regulation of liquor traffic would bPgin immediately. E. Brown,
Ratification of the Twcnty-fir;:;t Amendment to the Constitution 104
(1938) (Wilson, President of the Idaho Convention); id., [Lt HH-192
(Darnall, President of Maryland Convention); id., at 247 (Gaylord, Chairman of Missouri Convention); id., at 469-473 (resolution adopted at
Washington Convention calling for state action "to regulate the liquor
traffic"). See generally Note, The Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment
on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 Colum. L. Rev.
1578, 1580 (1975); Note, Economic Localism in State Alcoholic Beverage
Laws-Experience Under the Twenty-first Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev.
1145, 1147 (1959) ,

7
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939). We should
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority.
This Court's early decisions on the Twenty-first Amendment recognized that each State holds great powers over the
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Market, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types
of liquor that could be imported from other Sta.tes, Mahoney
v. Joseph 'Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch &
Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing
Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). The
Court upheld the challenged state authority in each case,
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's
Market, supra, 229 U. S., at 64.
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude" to state
liquor regulation , Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35,
42 ( 1966), but they also have stressed that important federal
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the
Twenty-first Amendment. That provision does not allow the
States to tax imported liquor in violation of the ExportImport Clause. Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co.,
377 U. S. 341 (1964). Nor can the States insulate the liquor
industry from the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements of
equal protection, Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209
(1976), and due process, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U. S. 433, 436 (1970).
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce
power. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v.
M orgenthau, 307 U. S. 171 ( 1939) (per curiam), this Court
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendment in a
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 (1935). And in Ziffrin,
Inc. v. Reeves,_, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the
state program was reasonable. !d., at 139.
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324,
331-332 (1964).
"To draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto
'repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and
is demonstrably incorrect."
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation:
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of
the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake
in any concrete case." !d., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 206 (1976). 11
In Nipp ert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court
commented in a footnote:
"[E]ven the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-first
Amendment gives the States the highest degree of control, is not altogether beyond th e reach of the federal commerce power, at any rate when
the State's regulation squarely conflicts with regulation imposed by Congress . . . . " /d., at 425, n. 15.
11
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This pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers
has been evident in the Court's conclusion in several cases that
the liquor industry may be held liable for anticompetitive
conduct not mandated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945). In Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 ( 1951), for example, a
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a distributor to comply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a program similar in many respects to the California sefi.em,r=at
issue here. The Court held that the Louisiana statute violated the Sherman Act and could not be enforced against the
distributor. Fifteen years later, the Court rejected a Sherman Act challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest
price" charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram &
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court concluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible economic
pressurP on the rdealers] to violate the Sherman Act in order
to comply," but it also cautioned that "[n]othing in the
Twenty-first Amendment, of course, would prevent the enforcement of the Sherman Act" against an interstate conspiracy to fix prices. !d., at 45-46. See Burke v. Ford, 389
U. S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
These decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twentyfirst Amendment grants the States virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regulations, those controls may also be subject to the federal commerce power in appropriate situations. The competing state
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a "concrete case." Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332.
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B
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor
of competition is both familiar and substantial.
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and ·our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 4,
( 1958). Although this federal interest is expressed through
a statute rather than a constitutional provision, Congress
"exercis [ed] ail the power it possessed" under the Commerce
Clause when it approved the Sherman Act. Aaantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S.,
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's
procompetition policy.
The state interests protected · by California's resale price
maintenance system were identified by the state courts in this
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d
431, 451, 579 P. 2d 476, 490 (1978). 12 Of course, the findings
and conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Court
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the
· er

sm

s wme pncmg system IS sha e
we note , the state
agency responsible for administering the program did not appeal the
decision of the California Court of Appeal. See p. - , supra; Tr. of Oral
Arg. 20. Instead, this action has been maintained by the California
Liquor Dealers Association, a private intervenor . .]tnt .!)either the intervenor nor the State Attorney General, who filed a brieC amicus curiae in
support of the legislative scheme, has specified any state interests protected by the resale price mn,intenance system other than those noted in
the state court opinions cited in text.
1
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of
Pythias, 225 U. S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v.
Wood, 344 U. S. 157, 160 (1952).
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of
the State's system of wine pricing was "controlled by the reasoning of the [California] Supreme Court in Rice [supra]."
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors.
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind
·liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at
490. 13 The court found little correlation between resale price
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing
a 42% increase in per capita liquor consumption in California
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect.
Id., at 457-458, 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing Ca1ifornia Dept. of
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote
temperance.'' Ibid. 14
The California Court of Appeal found only these same interests in
the instant case. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760~761.
That court rejected the suggestion that the wine price program was designed to protect the State's wine industry, pointing out that the statutes
"do not distinguish between California wines and imported wines." Ibid.
14 See Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 39 (1966) (citing study
concluding that resale price maintenance in New York State had "no
significant effect upon the consumption of alcoholic beverages").
18
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in
orderly market conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 1)56,
579 P. 2d, at 493. 15 In gauging this interest, the ,.eDurt
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small
retailers. . . . " Ibid. The agency relied on a congressional
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted
under the Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade
laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. - ,
supra, the State Supreme Court found 'no persuasive justification to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price competition among retailers." 21 Cal. 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at
494. The Court of Appeal made the same finding with respect
to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983.
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the Car
fornia courts that the asserted state interests are less

,.....

15
The California Supreme Court also stated that orderly market conditions might "reduce excessive competition, thereby encouraging temperance." 21 Cal. 3d, at 456, 579 P. 2d, at 493. The concern for temperance,
however, was also considered by the court as an independent state interest
in resale price maintenance for liquor.
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Attorney General has demonstrated that the program inhibits
the consumption of alcohol by Californians. We need not
consider whether the legitimate state interests in temperance
and the protection of small retailers ever could prevail against
the undoubted federal interest in a competitive economy.
The unsubstantiated state concerns pttt ferw:trd~ in this case
simply are not of the same statu,fe as the ~ goals of the
Sherman Act.
~
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly
decided that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's
wine pricing program. 10 The judgment of the California
.Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is
Affirmed.

Since Midca.l requested only injunctive relief from the state court,
there is no question before us involving liability for damages under 15
u. s. c.§ 15.
16
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-97
California Retail Liquor Deal~~ On Writ of Certiorari to the
ers Association, Petitioner,
Court of Appeal of Califorv.
nia for the Third Appellate
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et al.
District.
[February -, 1980]
MR. Jus'riCE PowJ<~LL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal1 Aluminum, Inc.;
a wine distributor, presented a successful antitrust challenge
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting statutes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is
whether those state laws are shielded from the Sheni1an Act
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317
U. S. 341 (1943), or § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.

I
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Professions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers must
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules. 1 If
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade contract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that
The stnt.ute provides:
"Each wine grower, wholcsLder licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and
rectifier shaH:
"(a) Po~t a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailer~ or con~umers
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made
Ly tho person who owns or eontrob tho brand.
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of re,sale
prices, if he own~ or controls a brand of wine resold t.o retailers or
consumer:;." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (West 1964),
1
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producer's brands. Id., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair
trade contract.... " Id., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979).
The State is divided into three trading areas for administration of the wine pricing program. A single fair trade contract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all wholesale transactions in that brand within a giveu trading area.
Id., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similiarly,
state regulations pr<)vide that the wine prices posted by a
single wholesaler within a trading area bind all wholesalers
in that area. M -idcal Aluminum, lnr;. v. Rice, 90 Cal .1\pp.
3d 979, 983-984, 153 Cal. Rptr, 757, 762 (1979). A licensee
seling below the establish ed prices fa~es fines, license suspension, or outright license revocation. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
~ 24880. 2 The State has no direct control over wine prices,
and it does not review the reasonableness of the prices set by
wine dealers ..
Midcal Aluminum. Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine
in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27
cases of wine for less thau the prices set by the effective price
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allegations were true and that the State could fine it or suspend
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midca1 then
filed a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal for
the Third Appellate District asking for an injunction ag~ainst
the State's wine pricing system.
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C.
2

Licrn,;ees that Hell wine below the prices specified in fajr tmde contract,.; or schedule~ al,;o may be :;ubjcct to private damage :;uits for tmfair
competition. I d., § 24752,
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§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice
v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 CaL 3d 431,
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors.
In that case, the court held that because the State played
only a passive part in liquor pricing, there was no Parker v.
Brown immunity for the program..

"In the price maintenance program before us, the state
plays no rol(' whatever in setting the retail prices. The
prices are established by the producers according to their
own ecouomic interests. without r('gard to any actual or
potential an ticompetitive effect; the state's role is restricted to enforci ng the prices specified by the producers.
There is 1.10 control. or 'pointed re-examination,' by the
state to insur(' that the policies of the Sherman Act are
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21
CaL 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486.
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pricing policies were protected by ~ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which insulates stat~ regulation of intoxicating liquors
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion
of temperance and the preservation of small retail establishments. The court emphasized that the California system
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed
at identical prices.~ Referring to congressional and state
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price mainThe court cited rc<·ord evidence tlm.t in July 1976, five leading bnmds
of gin each ;;old in California, for $4.~9 for a fifth of a gallon, and that
five le1Lding bramb of ~cotch whiskey i:iold for either $8.39 or $8.40 a fifth .
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, and
nn. 14, 16, 579 P. 2d 476, 491-492, and nn. 14, 16 (1978).
8
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or
small retail stores.. See pp. 14-15, infra.
In the insta11t case, the State Court of Appeal found the
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984,
153 Cal. Rptr., at 760. The court ordered the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade.
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from
this Court. did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Association , an iutervenor. 5 The California Supreme Court declined
to hear the case, aud the Dealers Association sought certiorari
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979),
and now affirm the decision of the state court.

II
The threshold question is whether California's plan for
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled
consisteutly that resale price maintenance illegally restrains
trade. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 407 (1911) , the Court observed that such arrangements
are "designed to maintain prices ... , and to prevent competition among those who trade in [competing goods]." See
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960); United
States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920). For many
years owever, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the
States to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693.
The goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect
1 Tho Stat<> al:;o did uot appeal the deci::;ion in Capiscean Corp. v.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 492 (1979) , which u~cd the analysi::; in Rice to invalidate Califomia's
resale pric(' maintt•nance :scheme for retail wine ~a.le:s to cou~urner:;.
5 The California. Hetail Liquor Dealer::; AH::5ociation, a trade associ!Ltion
of imlrpl'nclent. retail li4uor dcalen:> in California, claim::; over 3,000.
member;;,
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small retail establishments that Congress thought might otherwise be driven from the marketplace by large-volume discounters. But in 1975 that congressional permission was
rescinded. The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat.
801, repealed the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation. 0
Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price maintenance now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry
or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity.
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schwegmann Bros. Y. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. Park & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competition among wholesalers and retailers as effectively as "if they
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same
restrictions ... by agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at
408. 7 Moreover, there can be no claim that the California
program is simply iBtrastate regulation beyond the reach of
the Sherman Act. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp.,
s-u pra; Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
u The cougre<::>ional report::; acc:ompnuying the Consumer Goods Pricing
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that. repeal of fair trade authority
would not alter whatever powPr the States hold under the Twenty-first
Amendment. to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong.,
lst Sess., 2 (1975); H. R. Rep . No. 94-341, 94th Cong., ht Se~., 3, n. 2
(1975). We com;ider the effect of the Twenty-first AmPndment on this
ca;;e in P::trt III, ·infra.
7 In Bice, the California Supr<'mc Court found direct evidence that resale
price maintenance resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. a, supra,
a11d 11. 3. Although the Conr1 of Appea.I marie no such specific finding in
thi~:> case, the ('OUI't. noted that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld
for tite S<Ulle reasons the rrtail price maintenance provisions were declared
invalid in Bice." Midcal Alurn£nwn, Inc . v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979,,
98:3, 15:3 Cal. Hptr. 757, 760 (1979).
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'l'hus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That
immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded iu our
federal structure. "In a dual system of government in which,
uuder the Constitution, the states are sovereign. save only as
Congress may constitutioually subtract from their authority,
au unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."
ld., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court found in the
Sherman Act HO purpose to nullify state powers. Because the
Act is directed against "individual and not state action, " the
Court coucluded that state regulatory programs could not
violate it. ld. , at 352.
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organization of local cooperatives to develop marketing policies for the
raisin crop. The Court emphasized that the Advisory Commission, which was appointed by the governor. had to approve
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate
program. . . . [I] t is the state, acting through the Commissiou. which adopts the program and euforces it...." Id., at
352. In view of this extensive official oversight, the Court
wrote, the Sherman Act did not apply. Without such oversight, the result could have been different. The Court expressly noted , "a state does not give immunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it,
or by declaring that their action is lawful. ..." I d., at 351.
Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In
Goldfarb v. Viry'inia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). the Court
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state bar association were not mandated by ethical standards established by the
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules >thPrefore were uot
immune from aHtitrust attack.. "It is not enough that ....
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather,
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the
State actiug as sovereign." I d., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U. S. 579 (1976), a majority of the
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In
contrast, Arizona rules agaiust lawyer advertising were held
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "reftect[ed]
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior" and were "subject to poi11ted re-examination by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in
enforcement proceedings." Bales v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U. S. 350, 362 (1D77).
Only last Term, this Court found antitrust immuuity for a
California program requiring state approval of the location of
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Tfehicle Bd. of Calif.
v. Orrin W . Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That )ro ram
provided that the State would hold a hearing fan automobile
franchisee protested the establishment or relocation of a competing dealership. I d., at 103. In· view of the State's active
role, the Court held, the program was not subject to the
Sherman Act. The "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" goal of the state policy was to "displace unfettered
business freedom in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealerships." I d., at 109'.
These decisions establish two staudards for antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challeuged restraint
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy''; seco11d, the policy must be "actively supervised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 ( 1978) (opinion of
BmmNAN , J.). H The Califomia system for wine pricing satis8 Sre Norman's On the Waterf,.ont, Inc . v. Wheatley, 4-l F. 2d 1011, 1018
(CA3 1971) ; Asheville Tobacco Bd .. v. FTC, 26;3 F. 2d 502, 509-510 (CA4.
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly
stated and clear iu its purpose to permit resale price maintenance. The program, however, does not meet the second
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply authorizes price-setti11g and enforces the prices established by private
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate
the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamination" of the program.1J The national policy in favor of
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private
price-fixing arraugemeut. As Parker teaches. "a state does
not give immuuity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizillg them to violate it, or by declaring that their action
is lawful. ... " 317 U. S., at 351.

III
Petitioner contends that even if California's system of wine
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amendment bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. Section 1 of that Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment's prohibition on the manufacture, sale or transportation
of liquor. The second section reserved to the States certain
power to regulate traffic in liquor: "The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
105\-J): Note, Parker v. Bruu·n ReviHi1(•d: The State Action Doctrine After

C:uldfarb. Cuntor, and Bates. 77 Cohun. L. Rev. 8V8, 916 (1977) .
9

The California program ('Olltrast8 with t.he approach of those States
that complete!)' control tlw Ji::;tributiou of liquor within the1r boundaries.
E. Q., Va . Code§§ 4--15, 4--28 (Rep!. Vol. 1979). Sueh eornprehensive regulatiotl would be immune from the 81wrman Aet. under Parker v. Brown,.
317 U. S. M1 (10·!:~), ~inre tiH' Sta.t<' would ' ·di~place unfe1tered but-~iness
fn:Pdom" with itt-~ own power. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox
Co., 439 U. 8. 9fi, 109 (1978); Bee State Board v. Yo·ung's Market Co .).
'299 u. s. 5\J, 63 (l\-J3ti) .
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United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
The remaining question before us is whether § 2 permits
California to countermand the congressional policy-adopted
under the commerce power-m favor of competition.

A
Iu determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court has focused primarily on the language of the
provision rather than the history behind it. State Board v.
Young's Market Co., 299 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1936).' 0 In terms,
the Amendment gives the States control over the "transportation or importaqon'' of liquor into their territories. Of course,
such control logically entails considerable regulatory power
not strictly limited to importipg and transporting alcohol.
The approach j>; ~upportrd b~, ~onnd ranons of com>titutional interpretation and drmollstrntr~ a wist~ reluctance to wade into the complex
currents beneath thp c·oHgr!'~:<ional l'f'i'iolntion that propo~ed tht> AmendllH'nt. and the ,;tate rollvl'ntions that ra.tifiPd it. Tht> Senate sponsor
of the resolution ><a.id tlw pmpo,.;e of §:! wac; "to rt>,.,tore to thf' Statt•s .. .
ab,.;ulutc' elllltrol in rlfr<'t uvC'r iptt>r;;t:1.t l' commrreP affeeting intoxit·nting liquor~ , . . ." 76 Coug. Hec . 414:3 (HJ:l:l) (remarks of Sen.
Bhtine). Yet, be al,;o made ;;ta.temrnt,; ,;upporting ::\I ideal ':; claim that
the Amendrrwnt wa~ cl<•,;igned only to l'llHilrr t.hat "dr~·" State:; could not
be forced to pl'rmit tlw tialr of liqu~Jj' . SPe id., at. 4140-4151. Tlw sketchy
reeord;:; of the ::;tate convention::: rctl<'et no ron:;Pil<'ll<' on the thrust of
§ 2, although delegatrs Ht ,;cwral ronn·nt.im1,- expre~sed their hope that
state reguhtion of liquor t mliit• woukl bPgin immediately . E. Brown,
Hatification of the TwPJtty-Jirt>l Amemlment to the Constitution 104
(1938) (Wilson, l're~icleut of tlw Idaho Convention); id., a.t 191-192
(Darnall , Preside11L of Maryland ('{)nvrntion) ; id., at 247 (Gaylord, Chairman of Mi:;~ouri C011 \TnLion); id.. fLt; ..J.p9-..J.73 ( re,;olution
opted u,t
Wa:;hington Convention eallin~ for state a.rtion "to J'egulatc the liquor
traffic"). See generally X ott', The Effcet. of the Twenty-firti1· Amendment
on State Authority lo Co.utrol lntoxi<·ating Liquor,, 75 Cultnn. L. Rev.
1578, 1580 (1975) ; ~ote, E<"onomic; Locali::;m in State Aleoholie Beverage
Laws-Expl'ri<•nco Under the TweHty-firsL Amendment, 7'2 Harv. L . Rev.
10

au

1145, 1147 (1959) .
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939). We should
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority.
This Court's early decisions on the Twenty-first Amendment recognized that each State holds great powers over the
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Market, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch &
Co. v. NlcKittrick, 305 G. S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing
Co. v. Liquo1· Control Comm'n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). · The
Court upheld the challenged state authority in each case,
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the
"importatiou and transportatiou" of intoxicating liquors. Yet
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of
the Amendment, the Court :resisted the contention that § 2
''freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power
to be found ill other provisions of the Constitution." Young's
Market, supra, 229 U. S., at 64.
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude'' to state
liquor regulation, Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35,
42 (1966), but they also have stressed that important federal
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the
Twenty-first Amendment. The States cannot tax imported
liquor in violation of the Export-Import Clause. Department
of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U. S. 341 (1964). Nor
can they insulate the liquor industry from the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirements of equal protection, Craig v.
Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 (1976), and due process, Wis. consin v. Constant'ineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1970).
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which
Congress eau regulate liquor under its interstate commerce
power. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v.
Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendment in a
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 (1935). And in Ziffrin,
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's
systNn of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the
staiR program was reasonable. ld., at 139.
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324,
331-332 (1964).
"To draw a conclusio11 . . . that the Twenty-first
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the CommercE:' Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors
is concc'nwd would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto
'repealed.' then Congress would be left with no regulatory
power over i11terstate or foreigu commerce in iutoxicating
liquor. Such a conclusion would be pateutly bizarre and
is demonstrably incorrect."
The Court added a significant, it' eleme11tary, observation:
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment am! the Commerce Clause
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of
the Coustitution, each must be considered in the light of the
other. and iu the context of the issues and interests at stake
in ally concrete case." !d., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429
U. S. 190, 206 (1976).n
u b1 Nippert 1 . C'ity of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court
comnwntE·tl in a foot uute:
" I l•:jwn lhr eomtn(•rce in intoxieatiug liqnors, over which the Twenty-fir:st
AuH'n<hnmt gives the 8tatr~ till• highrst dPgrre of control, is not altogrt.h<'r f>pyond the reach of thr federal commerce power, at any rate when
the State'" regulation ~qunrdy <'onftict<> with regulntion imposrd b:r Congr<•::.:< •••• " I d., at. 425, n. 1!).
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'l'his pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers
has been evident in several decisions where the Court held
liquor companies liable for anticompetitive conduct not mandated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram &
Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frankfort
Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945). In Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951), for example, a
liquor mauufacturer attempted to force a distributor to com.ply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a program similar in many respects to the Califomia s st
issue here. The Court held that the Louisiana statute could
not be enforced ag·ainst the distributo(#e
., d8l
1 J:he J.---:--:----=---~hq
'
Fifteen years later, the Court rejected a Sher- vio (().+~ -fLt
man Act challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers
S ~ Ac:.tJ
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest
price'' charged anywhere iu the United States. Seagram &
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court concluded that the statute exerted ''no irresistible economic
pressure on the [dealers] to violate the Sherman Act iu order
to comply,'' but it also cautioned that " [ n] othing in the
Tweuty-first Amendment, of course, would prevent the enforcement of the Sherman Act" agaiust an interstate conspiracy to fix liquor prices. !d., at 45-46. See Burke v. Ford,
389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
These decisions demonstrate that there is 110 bright line
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twentyfirst Amendment grants the States virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor a11d how
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States
retai11 substantial discretion to establish other liquor regulations, those controls may be subject to the federal commercr power in appropriate situations. The competing state
and federal iuterests can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those coucNns in a "concrete case.'' Hostetter v. Idle~
wild Liq'uor Corp ., 377 U, S., at 332,
j

;T
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B
rrhe federal interest in enforcing the national policy iu favor
of competition is both familiar and substantial.
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."
United States v. 'Popco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
See Northern Pacific Ry. \. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 4,
( 1958). Although this federal interest is expressed through
a statute rather than a constitutional provisiou, Congress
"exercis[edJ all the power it possessed" under the Commerce
Clause when it approved the Shermall Act. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see
City vf Lafayette v. Lo·uisia·na Power & Light Co., 435 U. S.,
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's
]Jrocompetition policy.
The state interests protected by California's resale price
maintenauce system were identified by the state courts in this
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in
Hice v. Alcoholic B13verage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d,
at 451, 579 P. 2d. at 490. 12 Of course, the findings and
couclusions of those courts arf' uot binding on this Court
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the
12 As the unusual po::;ture of thi~ rase reflects, the Sta.te of California
has shown less than an enthusiastic interest in its wine pricing system.
A~ we noted, the ,;tate agency re;;ponsible for administering the program
did not, appeal thP deri~ion of the California. Court of Appeal. See p . 4,
li~tpr-a ; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. lnstrad, thi~ action has l>t>en maintained by
lhe Culifornia Liquor DPaler;, A,;:;ociation, a prviate intervenor. But
1wither the intervruor nor rhr Sta.tr Attornry General, who filed a brief
amicus curiae in support of the legil:\lative srhl•mr, has speCified any state
iutercst:s protl:'rted by the re;;a]e price maintenance Hystrm other than
those noted in th<' :,;(atr court opinio rlt~->d .in text,
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of
Pythias, 225 U. S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court
accords rcrespectful consideration and great weight to the views
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the
absence of ((exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v.
Wood, 344 U. S. 157, 160 (1952).
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of
the State's system of wine pricing was "·controlled by the reasoning of the [California.] Supreme Court in Rice [supm] ."
90 Cal. App. 3c.l, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr. , at 761. Therefore, we
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors.
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind
liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at
490. 13 The court found little correlation between resale price
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing
a 42% increase in per capita liquor consumption in California
from 1950 to 1972. while resale price maintenance was in effect.
!d., at 457-458, 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing California Dept. of
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the
justification for such laws ou the ground that they promote
temperance." Ibid.u
1 3 The California Court, of Appeal found no additional state intere&1s in
the int;tant ea::>e. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761.
That court rejceterl the sugge&iion that. the wine price program was designed to protect the State's wine industry, pointing out that the &iatutes
"do not distinguish between California. wines and imported wines. " Ibid.
11 See Seagram<~· Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. a5, 39 (1966) (citing ::>i.udy
coneludiug that n'salc price mniutrnance in New York State had "nq
~ignificm1t e.ffeet upon the con~umption of alcoholic beveragel:l").
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in
orderly market conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456,
579 P. 2d, at 493.' 5 In gauging this interest, the court
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small
retailers. . . ." Ibid. The agency relled on a congressional
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted
under the Miller-Tydiugs Act. The study revealed that
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade
laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Coug., 1st Sess.,
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goocls Pricing Act, see p. 5,
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justification to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price competition among retailers." 21 Cal 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at
494. The Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion with
respect to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983.
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the Califor·Hia courts that the asserted state interests are less substantial than the national policy in favor of competition. That
evaluation of the resale price maintenance system for wine is
reasonable, and is supported by the evidence cited by the State
Supreme Court iu Rice. Nothing in the record in this case
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the State
15 The California Supreme Court nl~o stated that orderly market condi1ion~ might. ''redncp PX<'<'..;~iw competition, tlwrpby eueouraging tempernurP." 21 Cal. :3d, at. 45(), 579 P. 2d . at 493. The concern for t.empcraucc,
how<'vcr, wa,.; con:;idl'red by the comt as an independent :>tate interes1,
it1 resalr priee maintenance for littuor.
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Attorney General in his amicus brief has demonstrated that
the program inhibits the consumption of alcohol by Californians. We need not consider whether the legitimate state
interests in temperance and the protection of small retailers
ever could prevail against the undoubted federal interest in a
competitive economy. The unsubstantiated state concerns
put forward in this case simply are not of the same statute as
the broad goals of the Sherman Act.
Vire conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly
decided that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's
wine pricing program.10 The judgment of the California
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is

Affirmed,

16

Since Midca.l requested only injunctive rPlief from Lhe state court,
is no que;;tion before us involving liability for damages under 19

~here

u, s. c. §15.
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resale

price

maintenance

and

price

posting statutes for the wholesale wine trade.

The

issue in this case is whether those state laws are
shielded from the Sherman Act by either the "state
action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown,

317 U.S.

341

(1942), or§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.

I
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§

24866(b)
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California

Business and Professions Code, all wine producers,

2.

schedule

for

24866(a).
wine

producer's

brands.

Id. ,

§

No state-licensed wine merchant may sell

to

a

"either

that

retailer

in

effective

an

at

other

effective

fair

trade

than

price

the

price

schedule

contract.

or

set

in

an

Id. ,

II

§

24866(a).

program,
areas.

For

administration

the

State

A single

of

is divided

fair

trade

the

into

wine
three

contract or

price
trading

schedule

filed within a trading area sets the terms for all
wholesale

transactions

in

involving that brand of wine.
Code Ann.

§§

that

trading

Cal.

Bus.

&

area
Prof.

24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979).

All wholesalers within a trading area are bound by

~·1

~ ~~ r~

"J".e'-t

.fi.~"tJtA,o

theA prices posted , by [ a singl ~ distributor.

®
Aluminum,
984

Inc.

(1979).

v.

Rice,
A

jl'\ tlo..

90 Cal. App.

licensee

not

Midcal
W'f.

~I

I<

3d 979, 983-

meeting

these

requirements may face fines, license suspension, or
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Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Ann.

§ )

_.;
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!

3.

~o/-

charged

was

by
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Department

of

Alcoholic

.....
~

Beverage Control with selling 27 cases of wine at
less

than

the

prices

set

by

the

schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery.
alleged

that

Midcal

effective

price

A second count

sold wines for which no fair

trade contract or schedule had been filed with the
State.
were

Respondent stipulated that the allegations
true

and

that

the

State

could

fine

suspend its license for those transgressions.
App • , at 1 9-2 0 •

it

or
Jt.

Midcal then sought to enjoin the
~

State's wine pricing system with a writ of mandate

from the California Court of Appeal for the Third
Appellate District.
The

state

court

ruled

that

the

wine

pricing scheme restrains trade in violation of the
Sherman

Act.

15

U.S. C.

§§1,

et

seq.

The

court

relied entirely on the reasoning of the California
Supreme Court in Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
Appeals Board, 21 Cal. 3d 431, 579 P.2d 476 (1978),

?.

~

~

10t-j

4.

Parker v. Brown immunity for the program.
"In the price maintenance program
before

us,

whatever
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the
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state

setting

prices

are
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the
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retail

role

prices.
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by

the

producers according to their own economic
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anticompetitive
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prices
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enforcing
producers.
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by the state to insure that
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'unnecessarily
T?Olicy."
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control,

examination,'
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effect;
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Sherman Act
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not

state

21 Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P.2d, at

486.
Rice

also

California's liquor
by

§

2

of

the

rejected
price

the

claim

policies were

Twenty-first

that

protected

Amendment,

which

5.

in

1 iquor

price

temperance

and

maintenance
the

establishments.
that

the

preservation

of

promotion of
small

program

not

only

control of prices by producers,

frequently

retail

The state supreme court emphasized

California

vertical

the

resulted

in

horizontal

permitted
but also

price-fixing.

Under the program, many comparable brands of liquor
were marketed at

identical prices.

}/

Referring

to congressional and state legislative studies, the
court

observed

little

positive

that

resale

impact

Appeal

the

found

controlling

and

instant
the

case,

analysis

ruled

maintenance

either

See p.

small retail stores.
In

on

price

that

temperance

984.

The

Alcoholic
resale

court

Beverage

price

ordered

or

, infra.
the

state

in

Rice

the

system

pricing unlawfully restrains trade.
at

has

not

maintenance

and

of

squarely
of
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90 Cal. App.,

the

Control

Court

Department
to

enforce

price

of
the

posting

6.

( CRLDA),

Association

an

The

intervenor.

California Supreme Court declined to hear the case,
and
We

the CRLDA sought certiorari
granted

the

writ,

from

u.s.

this Court.
( 1979) ,

and

now affirm the decision of the state court.

II

threshold

The

question

is

whether

California's policy for wine pricing violates the
Sherman

Act.

This

Court

has

ruled

consistently

that resale

price maintenance

illegally restrains

Dr.

Miles Medical Co.

v.

trade.
220

U• S •

37 3 ,

40 7

( 19 1 1 ) ,

Park & Sons Co.,

pointed

out

that

arrangements are "designed to maintain prices

such
•

. , and to prevent competition among those who trade
in them."

See Simpson v.

Union Oil Co., 377 U.S.

13 (1964); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362

u.s.

29

(1960);

Inc., 252 U.S.

United States v.
85 (1920).

Schrader's Son,

For many years, though,

7.

Congress

~A;/
~t

marketplace
1975 that

might otherwise be driven

by

large-volume

But

discounters.

in

congressional permission was rescinded.

The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of
801 ,

from the

repealed

Miller-Tydings

legislation. __§)

1975,

89 Stat.

and

related

Consequently, the Sherman Act's

ban on resale price maintenance now applies to fair
trade

contracts

unless

an

industry

or

program

enjoys a special antitrust immunity.
California's
plainly

constitutes

system
resale

price

violation of the Sherman Act.
Calvert
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341

U.S.

for
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pricing
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384
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<::.

o v./.
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~v. S~)
5vo w;, -z..tt ( t1sJ.
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competition.
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As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out in

~;>.11_,· such
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competition
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among

control
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and retailers as effectively as "if they formed a

o/,

8.
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Sherman Act

impact.
supra;
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Schwegmann

Burke

v.

Ford,

Bros.
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v.

U.S.

no

interstate

Cal vert
320
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(1967)

(per

curiam).
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involvement
sufficient
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a

v.
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in
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the
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price-setting
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state

for
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in
are
may
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constitutionally subtract from their authority, an
unexpressed
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to

nullify

a

state's

control

over its officers and agents is not lightly to be
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317
in

u.s.,
the
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at 350-351.
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Act
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In view of
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the

antitrust

oversight,

laws

the

did

result

not
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apply.
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such

different.
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to
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have

applied
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that • • • anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by
state action;
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sovereign...

Id., at 791.
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acting

as

Similarly, in Cantor v.

Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), a majority
of the Court found that no antitrust

immunity was

conferred by a state agency's passive acceptance of
a

public

utility's

In

tariff.

contrast,

the

Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held
to

be

they
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11
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for
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state approval

11.
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unfettered
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the

in

the matter of
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restraint

v.
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Brown.
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clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as
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supervised" by the State itself.
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Louisiana Power & Light Co.,
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policy
purpose
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The California system for wine pricing
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1 3.
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hereby
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prohibited."

Const. ,

Amend. XXI.
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question

before

us

is

whether

§

2

permits California to countermand the congressional
pol icy -- adopted

under

the commerce power -- in
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U.S.
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In

terms, the amendment gives the States control over
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control
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v.
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and
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sight
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Co.
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(1939); Joseph
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all
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transportation"
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Yet even in those special circumstances,
§

the
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to
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the Court resisted the contention that
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1 5.

Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45 (1966), but also
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provision
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not

prevent federal action with respect to liquor under
the Export-Import Clause.
James Beam Co.,
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377

Department of Revenue v.
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Amendment's
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Nor can the

industry

requirements

from
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More
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to

control

over
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§
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however,
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Although that power is

2, the Court has held that

the federal government retains some Commerce Clause
authority over liquor.

In William Jameson & Co.
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1 6.
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that
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U.S.

324,

331-332
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State requirement that 1 iquor dealers attest that
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U.S.

384

concluded

that

35

the

Seagram
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an
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Id.,
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(per
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and
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The Twenty-first Amendment grants the

1 9.

liquor regulations, but those controls may also be
subject
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appropriate situations.
state and federal
after
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power
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concerns
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preservation

our

Bill of

are

and

of

free-enterprise

Rights

fundamental

is

to

the

personal

freedoms."
United States v.

Topco Assoc.,

405 U.S.

596,

610

20.

"exercis[ed]

all the power it possessed" under the

commerce

clause when

it approved the Sherman Act.

Atlantic

Cleaners

Dyers

U.S.

425,

435

( 1932):

Louisiana Power
39 8.

We

&

must

&

v.

see

United

286

of

Lafayette

v.

supra,

495 U.S.,

at

City

Light Co.,

acknowledge

States,

the

importance

of

the

Act's procompetition policy.
Our view of California's interests in its
wine

pricing

unusual

system

posture

of

is
this

shaped
case.

in
As

part
we

by

the

noted,

the

state agency that administers the program did not
appeal

the

decision

of

the

Appeal.

See p.

supra:

Instead,

this

has

action

California
Tr.

been

Court

of Oral Arg.
maintained

CRLDA, a private intervenor.

by

of
20.
the

X.

t

(._~ ~~..:f
State Attorney General, who
V\ot k&.."'

amicus

::lUiS: .2

">f ,.

(~tV

curicl
~;:•

;?7 d

t

I..J.<).

l.u'

±H?Pert ef
he'

..._-'-

~'7

f19s

particular

filed a

v ..:.J-/,pA.. C g L I> A

, eg

.....,b
_r
_l
_e
~-

~

i slath e ssh11

state

---

interests

1

\ O,.lfc-'tw~--

protected by ~sale price maintenance

syst~

21.

Court

to

the

guaranteed
Hooven

&

(1945);
246,

261

extent

by

the

All~
Creswill

undercut

Twenty-first

v.

state

rights

Amendment.

See

v. Evatt, 3 24 u.s. 652, 659

Co.

(1912).

"respectful

they

Knights of

Pythias,

225 U.S.

Nevertheless, this Court accords

consideration and great weight to the

views of the state's highest court" on matters of
state law,
U.S.

95,

Indiana ex rel.

99

(1938),

Anderson v.

Brand,

303

and we customarily accept the

factual findings of state courts in the absence of
"exceptional

Fry

circumstances."

Roofing

Co.

v.

Wood , 3 4 4 U . S . 1 57 , 1 6 1 ( 1 9 52 ) •
The California Court of Appeal stated that
its
was

review of

the

"controlled

[California]

state's system of wine pricing
the

by

Supreme

Court

Beverages Control Board,
476 (1978)]."
we

turn

to

reasoning
in

Rice

[v.

of

the

Alcoholic

21 Cal. 3d 431, 579 P.2d,

90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983.

Therefore,

that opinion's treatment of the

state

22.

promote temperance and orderly market conditions."

~

Id., at 451: 579 P.2d, at 493.

The court found

little correlation between resale price maintenance
and temperance.
42 % increase
California

1950

was

at 494,

Alcohol

in per capita liquor consumption in

from

maintenance
P.2d,

It cited a state study showing a

in

to

1972,

effect.

while

Id.

at

resale

457-458,

citing California Dept.

and

the

State:

price

of

Finance,

Reappraisal

A

579

of

California's Alcohol Control Program xi, 15 (1974).
Such studies,

the court wrote,

"at the very least

raise a doubt regarding the justification for such
laws on the ground that they promote temperance."
Ibid.
The
interest

small

policies

temperance.

opinion

orderly

in

"protect[ing]
pricing

Rice

Id.

identified

market
licensees

of

large

at

456,

state

conditions
from

retailers"
579

the

P.2d,

as

predatory
and,

at

493.

again,
The

23.

argument that fair trade laws were necessary to the
economic survival of small retailers."

Ibid.

Appeals Board had relied on a congressional

The
study

of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws
enacted under the Miller-Tydings Act.
found
per

that

cent

trade

"states with fair trade

higher

states,

rate of

and

the

firm
rate

That report

laws had a

failures
of

55

than

free

of

small

growth

retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and
197 2 was

3 2 per

fair

trade

laws."

466,

94th Cong.,

cent higher
Ibid.,
1st Sess.

than

in states with

citing S.
3 (1975).

Rep.

No.

94-

Pointing to

the congressional abandonment of fair trade in the
1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, the state Supreme
Court found no persuasive justification to continue
"fair trade laws which eliminate price competition
among retailers."

Id., at 457,

579 P.2d,

at 494.

That conclusion was adopted by the Court of Appeal
for the wholesale wine trade.

90 Cal. App. 3d., at

24.

in favor of competition.

That evaluation of the

State's stake in resale price maintenance for wine
, ~bo..r~~ ~ it... .......t~ ~ ~ ~

is

rea son abl'jl'~

tl=!: i ers

7

$t~ )~

~.eB11:W.~.. ,. ! "~' ~~-.!iM!l-.:~d!::bee-A--

~f ~ ~~ )
'JC'.eiu.telil

:a.~~::-t:h'1T

-cou-rt.

We

conclude

California Court of Appeal

that

decided

the
that

the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter for
the

violation

of

the

Sherman

State's wine pricing program.

Act

caused

by

~

Appeal, Third Appellate District, is
Affirmed.

.J

the

DOS, 2/6/80
No. 79-97, Midcal, Footnotes

lL

The statute provides:
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to
sell

wine,

wine

rectifier

and

rectifier

shall:
" (a)

Post a

schedule of selling

prices of wine to retailers or consumers
for which his resale price is not governed
by

a

fair

trade

contract

made

by

the

person who owns or controls the brand.
"(b)
contract

and

Make and file
file

a

a fair trade

schedule

of

resale

prices, if he owns or controls a brand of
wine resold to retailers or consumers."
Cal.

Bus.

1979).

&

Prof.

Code Ann.

§

24 86 6

(West

Supp.

FN2.

I

3/

The court cited record evidence that in July

1976

five

leading

brands

of

gin

all

sold

in

California for $4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and
that five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for
either $8.39 or $8.40 a fifth.

Rice v. Alcoholic

Beverage Control Appeals Board, 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454
& nn.

14,

15,

579

P.2d

476,

492

& nn.

14,

15

(1978).

4/

The State also did not appeal the decision in

Capiscean Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Bd.,
87 Cal. App. 3d 996 (1979), which used the analysis
in

Rice

to

maintenance

invalidate

California's

for

scheme

retail

resale

wine

price

sales

to

consumers.

The
Association
independent

California
(CRLDA),
retail

Retail
a

liquor

trade
dealers

Liquor

Dealers

association
in

of

California,

FN3.

repeal
alter

of general
whatever

Twenty-first

fair

power

trade

the

Amendment

to

authority would

States

hold

control

under

liquor

Rep.

No.

(1975).

94-431,

94th Cong.,

the

prices.

S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
H.

not

(1975)~

1st Sess.

3,

n.2

We consider the effect of the Twenty-first

Amendment on this case in Part III, infra.

7I

In Rice,

direct

the California Supreme Court

evidence

resulted

in

supra, & n.3.

that

resale

horizontal

price

price

found

maintenance

fixing.

See

p.

Although the Court of Appeal made no

such specific finding in this case, the court noted
that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld for
the

same

reasons

the

retail

provisions were declared invalid
Aluminum Co.
(1979).

v.

Rice,

90

Cal.

price

maintenance

in Rice." Midcal
App.

3d

979,

983

1 2.

program.

The

national

competition cannot be
gauzy

cloak

of

policy

in

thwarted by

state

favor

casting

involvement

over

of

such
what

a
is

-----

essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.

As

-

j{ R~~~

~fs ~+Lcf~

Parker teaches, "a state does not give immunity to
those who
them

to

violate
violate

the
it,

action is lawful."

Sherman Act by
or

by

declaring

authorizing
that

their

317 U.S., at 351.

4~5t~~~~
~ '-t~ aLJt~ t .
~~Jt~~~~

~

J

lA. &&/

~Ch~S~~~

~k,~·rP4

f~ /1.:.-f ~ ~ivL
III
1/o

Petitioner
California's

system

contends

that

of

pricing

wine

even

if

is

not

protected state action, the Twenty-first Amendment

~ ~ ;4

w~ ''&.~/ ~--4 f~
~$./ r~ II~~,{ /j;
~~\ ~/JL~

v:~;fi
0~

bars application of the Sherman Act in this case.
Section 1 of that constitutional provision repealed
the Eighteenth Amendment's prohibition on

liquor.

The second section reserves to the States certain
power to regulate traffic in liquor.
"The

transportation

or

jf-~

2dJ ~·'-' v.
h I! r:. 7'37 s: [£
I

/

1/-

DOS, 2/12/80

No.

79-97,

California

Retail

Liquor

Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.

MR.

JUSTICE POWELL delivered

the opinion

of the Court(;)

In a state court action, respondent Midcal
Aluminum,

Inc.,

successful

a

wine

antitrust

distributor,

challenge

presented

to

a

California's

resale price maintenance and price posting statutes
for

the

wholesale wine

trade.

The

issue

in this

case is whether those state laws are shielded from
the

Sherman

Act

by

either

doctrine of Parker v. Brown,
or

§

the

"state

317 U.S.

341

action"
(1943),

2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.

I

Under

§

24866(b)

of

the

California

2.

trade

contract,

wholesalers

must

post

a

resale

price schedule for that p roducer's brands.
24866(a).
wine
11

to

either

Id.,

§

No state-licensed wine merchant may sell
a

retailer

in

an

at

other

effective

than

price

the

price

schedule or

effective fair trade contract . • .

Id.,

II

in

set
an

24862

§

(West Supp. 1979).
For
program,
areas.
for

administration

the State
A single

each

brand

transactions
area. Id.,

fair

sets

wine

pricing

into

three

trading

trade contract or schedule

the

terms

for

all

wholesale

24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979).

the

distributor

is divided

the

in that brand within a given trading

§§

Similarly,

of

wine

within

prices
a

wholesalers in that area.

posted

trading

by

area

a

single

bind

all

Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v.

Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983-984, 153 Cal. Rptr.
757,

762

(1979).

A licensee

selling

below

the

established prices faces fines, license suspension,

3.

dealers.
Midcal

Aluminum,

distributor

of

July

the

1978,

Control

wine

in

Inc.

Southern

Department

charged

Mid cal

is

of

with

a

wholesale

California.

Alcoholic

selling

27

In

Beverage
cases

of

wine for less than the prices set by the effective
price

schedule

of

the

E

J

&

Gallo

Winery.

The

Department also alleged that Midcal sold wines for
which no fair trade contract or schedule had been
filed.
true

Midcal stipulated that the allegations were

and

that

the State could fine

it or suspend

its license for those transgressions.
Midcal

then

pricing

sought

system

with

to
a

enjoin
writ

of

the

App. 19-20.
State's

mandate

wine

from

the

California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate
District.
The

Court of Appeal

ruled

that

the wine

pricing scheme restrains trade in violation of the
Sherman

Act,

15

u.s.c.

§

1

et

seq.

The

court

4.

the sale of distilled liquors.

In that case, the

state Supreme

because

Court

the

State

played only a passive part in wine pricing,

there

~

found

that

was no Parker v. Brown immunity for the program.
"In the price maintenance program
before

us,

whatever
The

the

in

state

setting

prices

are

plays

the

no

retail

role

prices.

established

by

the

producers according to their own economic
interests, without regard to any actual or
anticompetitive

c J 7 1 : :tential
state's
the

role

prices

There

is

is

restricted

specified
no

by

control,

the

effect:
to

the

or

enforcing
producers.

'pointed

re-

examination,' by the state to insure that
the

policies of

'unnecessarily
policy."
486.

the

Sherman Act

subordinated'

to

are

not

state

21 Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P.2d, at

5.

from

many

federal

determined

that

the

restrictions.
national

The

policy

in

court

favor

of

competition should prevail over the state interests
in

1 iquor

price

temperance

and

maintenance
the

establishments.
California

the

preservation

The

program

court
not

promotion

of

small

emphasized

only

permitted

of

retail

that

the

vertical

control of prices by producers, but also frequently
!"'

resulted

in

horizontal

program,

many

marketed

at

comparable

identical

congressional
court

and

observed

little

positive

that

Appeal

the

found

controlling.
at

760.

The

on

either

case,

analysis

Under
liquor

the
were

Referring

2/

price

See p.

instant

of

legislative

resale

impact

the

brands

prices.

state

small retail stores.
In

pricefJixing.

to

studies,

the

maintenance

has

temperance

or

, infra.
the

state Court

in

Rice

of

squarely

90 Cal. App., at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr,
court

ordered

the

Department

of

6.

appeal

the

ruling

in

this

_!L.

case.

An appeal

was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association,

an

_2/

intervenor.

Supreme Court declined to hear
Dealers

Association

Court.

We

( 1979),

sought

granted

the

California

case,

certiorari

and

from

the
this

u.s.

writ,

the

and now affirm the

The

decision of

the

state

court.

II

The

threshold

question

is

whether

California's policy for wine pricing violates
Sherman

Act.

This

Court

has

ruled

the

consistently

that resale

price maintenance

illegally restrains

trade.

Miles Medical Co.

v.

22 0

Dr.

U• S •

37 3 ,

arrangements

40 7

are

( 19 1 1 ) ,

Park & Sons Co.,

pointed

out

that

"designed to maintain prices

such
.

• , and to prevent competition among those who trade
in

[competing goods]."

See Albrecht v. The Herald

7.

permitted

the

maintenance.
statute was

States
50

to

Stat.

authorize
The

693.

resale
goal

price

of

that

to allow the States to protect small

r etail establishments

that Congress

thought might

otherwise be driven from the marketplace by largevolume discounters.
permission
Pricing

was

Act

rescinded.

of

Miller-Tydings

But in 1975 that congressional

197 5,
Act

89

and

The

Stat.

Consumer

801,

related

Goods

repealed

the
~/

legislation.

Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price
maintenance
unless

an

now

applies

industry

or

to

fair

program

trade
enjoys

contracts
a

special

antitrust immunity.
California's
plainly

constitutes

system
resale

for

price

violation of the Sherman Act.

wine

pricing

maintenance

in

Schwegmann Bros. v.

Calvert Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951); see Albrecht v.
The

Herald

Seagram

&

Co.,
Sons ,

supra;
340

U• S •

Kiefer-Stewart
2 11

( 19 5 1 ) ;

Co.

Dr •

v.

Mi 1 e s

8.

Dr.

Miles,

such

horizontal

competition

retailers

as

combination

and

endeavored

Co~,

the

that

intrastate
Sherman

.

to

California

See

supra;

"if

they

formed

establish

Moreover,

regulation

Act.

and

wholesalers

the

a

same

by agreement with each other."

a ~ 08. ___
7/

220 U.S.,

as

destroys

control

among

effectively

restrictions

claim

vertical

Schwegmann

th

reach

Bros.

Ford, 389

simply

is

program

beyond

Burke v.

there can be no

of

v.

the

Calvert

u-.s. 320 (1967)

(per curiam).
Thus, we must consider whether the State's
in

involvement
sufficient
Parker

v.

to

establish

Brown,

program

price-setting

the

317

anti trust

u.s.

is

immunity

under

(1943).

That

3 41

immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded
in our

federal

government
states

are

in

structure.
which,

sovereign,

under
save

"In

a

the

Constitution,

only

dual

as

system of
the

Congress may

9.

v.

Brown,

this Court found

in the Sherman Act no

purpose to nullify state powers.
is

directed

against

Because the Act

"individual

and

not

state

action," the Court concluded that state regulatory
programs could not violate it. Id., at 352.
Under

the

program

challenged

in

Parker,

the state Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission
authorized

the organization of

local cooperatives

to develop marketing policies for the raisin crop.
The Court emphasized that the Advisory Commission,
which was appointed by the governor, had to approve
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It
is the state which has

created

the machinery for
.........._

establishing the prorate program •

[I]t

is

"--

the

state,

acting

through

the

Commission,

adopts the program and enforces it • • •
352.
the

II

which
Id. , at

In view of this extensive official oversight,
Court

wrote,

the

Sherman Act did

not

apply.

Without such oversight, the result could have been

1 0.

Id., at 351.
Several

recent

Parker's analysis.

decisions

In Goldfarb v.

have

applied

Virginia State

Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court concluded that
fee schedules enforced by a state bar association
were not mandated by ethical standards established
by

the

state

therefore
"It

is

were

not
is

~onduct

Supreme
not

immune

enough

from

conduct

fee

schedules

anti trust

attack.

anticompetitive

that

'prompted'

anticompetitive

The

Court.

by

state
must

action;
be

rather,

direction of the State acting as sovereign."
at

791.

Similarly,

Co., 428 U.S.

579

in

Cantor

v.

by

compelled

Detroit

Id.,
Edison

(1976), a majority of the Court

found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when
a

state

agency

utility's
against

tariff.

lawyer

passively
In

accepted

contrast,

advertising

were

a

public

Arizona

held

immune

rules
from

Sherman Act challenge because they "reflect [ed]

a

11.

proceedings."

u.s.

Bates v.

State Bar of Arizona,

4 33

350, 362 (1977).
Only last Term this Court found antitrust

immunity for
approval

a California program requiring state

of

dealerships.

the

location

of

new

New Motor Vehicle Bd.

Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96 (1978).

automobile

of Calif.

v.

That program

provided that if an automobile franchisee protested
against a proposed new or relocated dealership, the
State would hold

a

hearing

"to determine

there is good cause to block the change."

whether
Id. , at

103.

In view of the State's active role, the Court

held,

the program was

Act.

The

expressed"

"clearly
goal

of

not subject to the Sherman

articulated
the

and

state

affirmatively

policy

was

to

"displace unfettered business freedom in the matter
of the establishment and relocation of automobile
dealerships."
These

Id., at 109.
decisions

establish

two

standards

1 2.

supervised" by the State itself.

City of Lafayette

v.

435

Louisiana Power & Light Co.,

(1978)

(opinion

California
first

of

system

for

standard.

forthrightly
permit

wine

The

stated

resale

BRENNAN,

and

price

immunity.

price-setting and

the

policy

is

purpose

to

its

maintenance.

The

The

program,

second requirement

State

enforces

by private parties.

in

the

The

satis f ies

legislative
clear

389, 410

~I

J. ) .

pricing

however, does not meet the
Parker

u.s.

for

simply

authorizes

prices

established

The State neither establishes

prices nor reviews the reasonableness of the price
schedules:

nor

does

the

government

terms of fair trade contracts.
monitor market conditions or

the

The State does not

engag~

reexamination" of the program.

regulate

in any "pointed

~

The national

policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted
by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement
over

what

is

essentially

a

private

price-fixing

1 3.

351.

III

Petitioner
California's

contends

system

of

that

wine

even

if

is

not

pricing

protected state action, the Twenty-first Amendment
bars application of the Sherman Act in this case.
Section 1 of that constitutional provision repealed
the Eighteenth Amendment's prohibition on

liquor.

The second section reserves to the States certain
power

to

regulate

transportation

or

traffic

in

importation

liquor:

into

any

"The
State,

Terri tory, or possession of the United States for
del ievery or use there in of
in

violation

prohibited."
whether

§

of

the

laws

intoxicating 1 iquors,
thereof,

is

hereby

The remaining question before us

is

2 permits California to countermand the

congressional policy -- adopted under the commerce
power -- in favor of competition.

1 4.

history behind it.
Co.,
the

u.s.

299

59,

Amendment

63-64

gives

"transportation
their

State Board v. Young's Market

the

or

entails

_l2L

States

control

importation"

of

course,

Of

territories.

logically

(1936).

considerable

In terms,
over

liquor

the
into

control

such

regulatory

powers

not strictly limited to importing and transporting
alcohol.

Ziffrin,

138 (1939).

Inc.

v.

Reeves,

308

u.s.

132,

We should not, however, lose sight of

the explicit grant of authority.
This

Court's

early

decisions

on

the

Twenty-first Amendment recognized that each State
holds great powers over the
from other

jurisdictions.

importation of liquor
Young's Market,

concerned a license fee for

supra,

interstate imports of

alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting
the

types

of

1 iquor

that

could

be

imported

other States, Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp.,
U.S.

401

from
304

(1938); two others involved "retaliation"

1 5.

u.s.

305

{1939).

391

The

Court

upheld

the

challenged state authority in each case, largely on
the

basis of

"importation
liquors.
the

the
and

States'

special

transportation"

power over
of

the

intoxicating

Yet even when the States had acted under

explicit

terms

of

the

resisted the contention that

Amendment,
§

the

Court

2 "freed the States

from all restrictions upon the police power to be
found

in

other

provisions

of

the

Constitution."

Young's Market, supra, 229 U.S., at 64.
Subsequent
latitude"

to

state

decisions
liquor

have

given

regulation,

"wide

Seagram

&

Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 42 {1966), but they
also have stressed that important federal interests
in liquor matters survived the ratification of the
Twenty-first
allow

the

Amendment.
States

to

That
tax

provision
imported

violation of the Export-Import Clause.

does
liquor

not
in

Department

of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U.S. 341

{1964).

1 6.

Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1970).
More difficult to define, however,

is the

extent to which Congress can regulate liquor under
its interstate commerce power.

Although that power

is directly qualified by

the Court has held

2,

§

that the Federal Government retains some Commerce
Clause authority over liquor.
Morgenthau,
Court

307 U.S.

found

no

171

In Jameson & Co. v.

(1939)

violation

Amendment

in

a

whiskey

prescribed

by

the

Federal

of

-

(per curiam) ,this
the

Twenty-First

labeling
Alcohol

Act, 49 Stat. 977 (1935).

requirement

Administration

And in Ziffrin, Inc. v.

Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's
system of
satisfied

1 icens ing

that

the

1 iquor

State

haulers

unti 1

program was

it

was

reasonable.

Id. , at 1 39.
The

contours of Congress'

commerce power

over liquor were sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild
Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 331-332 (1964).

1 7.

liquors is concerned would, however, be an
absurd

oversimplification.

Commerce
1

repealed,

Clause
1

had

then

been

Congress

pro

would

with no regulatory power over
or

commerce

foreign

liquor.

Such

patently

bizarre

a

tanto
be

left

interstate

intoxicating

in

conclusion
is

and

the

If

would

be

demonstrably

incorrect."

~The

Court

added

observation:
the

Commerce

Constitution.

a

significant,

if

elementary,

"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and
Clause

are

Like

other

parts

of

provisions

the
of

same
the

Constitution, each must be considered in the light
of the other, and in the context of the issues and
interests at stake in any concrete case."
332.

Id. , at

See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976) .

..!ll
This pragmatic effort

to harmonize state

1 8.

u.s.

Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340

211

(1951);

United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324

u.s.

293

Corp.,

(1945).

U.S.

341

In
384

Schwegmann Bros.

attempted

comply

Louisiana's

with

to

Cal vert

for example,

(1951),

manufacturer

v.

force
resale

a

a · liquor

distributor

price

to

maintenance

program, a program similar in many respects to the
California

scheme

at

The Court held

issue here.

that the Louisiana statute violated the Sherman Act
and could not be enforced against the distributor.
Fifteen years later,
Act

challenge

to

the Court rejected a Sherman

a New York 1 aw requiring 1 iquor

dealers to attest that their prices were "no higher
than

the

United

u.s.

lowest

States.
35

price"
Seagram

(1966).

The

charged
&

anywhere

Sons v.

Court

in

the

Hostetter,

3 84

concluded

that

the

statute exerted "no irresistible economic pressure
on

the

order

[dealers]
to

comply,"

to

violate
but

it

the
also

Sherman

Act

cautioned

in

that

1 9.

u.s.

320 (1967)

(per curiam).

-

These decisions demonstrate that there is
no

bright

line

over liquor.

between

federal

and

state

powers

The Twenty-first Amendment grants the

States virtually complete control over whether to
permit

importation or

sale

of

liquor

and

structure the liquor distribution system.
States

retain

subject

appropriate
federal

Although

to

the

federal

commerce

The

competing

situations.

interests

can

those controls may also

be

reconciled

power
state
only

careful scrutiny of those concerns in a
case."

u.s.,

to

substantial discretion to establish

other 1 iquor regulations,
be

how

Hostetter

v.

Idlewild

Liquor

interest

in

in
and

after

"concrete

Corp.,

3 77

enforcing

the

at 332.
B

The
national

federal

policy

in

favor

familiar and substantial.

of

competition

is

both

20.

economic

freedom

system as

the

and

our

Bill of

Rights

is

the

of

freedoms."

United States v. Topco Assoc.,

u.s.

fundamental

to

protection

405

our

free-enterprise

personal

596, 610 (1972)

See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1,

4,

Although

(1958).

expressed

through

this

federal

statute

a

interest

is

than

a

rather

constitutional provision, Congress "exercis[ed] all

L

the power

it possessed" under the Commerce Clause

when

approved

it

Cleaners
435
Power

&

Dyers v.

(1932);
&

the

see

Light

acknowledge

Co.,

of

435

286 U.S.

Lafayette
U.S.,

importance

Atlantic

Act.

United States,

City

the

Sherman

at

v.

Louisiana

398.

of

427,

We

must
Act's

the

procompetition policy.
The

state

interests

protected

California's resale price maintenance
identified

by

the

state

courts

in

by

system were

this

case,

90

21 .

those courts are not binding on this Court to the
extent that
by

the

Allison

they undercut

Twenty-first
Co.

v.

Creswill v.

state rights guaranteed

Amendment.

Evatt,

324

U.S.

Knights of Pythias,

(1912).

Nevertheless,

"respectful

Hooven

See
652,
225

659

u.s.

Court

this

&

(1945):
246,

261

accords

consideration and great weight to the

views of the state's highest court" on matters of
state law,

u.s.

95,

Indiana ex rel.

100(1938),

Anderson v.

Brand,

303

and we customarily accept the

factual findings of state courts in the absence of
"exceptional

circumstances."

u.s.

Wood, 344

Fry

Roofing

Co.

v.

157, 160 (1952).

The California Court of Appeal stated that
its
was

review of

"controlled

[California]
Cal.

the

App.

Therefore,

by

Supreme

3d,
we

state's system of wine pricing

at
turn

reasoning

the
Court

983,

153

in

Rice

Cal.

of

[supra]."

Rptr.,

at

the
90
761.

to that opinion's treatment of

22.

"to

promote

conditions."

lll

The

temperance

orderly

and

market

21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P.2d, at 490.

court

found

little

correlation

between
It cited

resale price maintenance and temperance.

a state study showing a 42 % increase in per capita
liquor consumption in California from 1950 to 1972,
while resale price maintenance was in effect.
at

457-458,

Dept.

of

579

Finance,

Reappraisal

of

Program,

15

wrote,

P.2d,

xi ,

at

494,

Alcohol

and

California's
( 19 74 ) •

citing

Id.,

California

the

State:

Control

Alcohol

Such studies,

A

the

court

"at the very least raise a doubt regarding

the justification for such laws on the ground that
they promote temperance."
The
state

Rice

interest

"protect[ing]

in

Ibid.

opinion
orderly

small

14/

identified
market

licensees

15/

primary

conditions
from

pricing policies of large retailers."
579 P.2d, at 493.

the

as

predatory
Id. at 456,

In gauging this interest,

23.

necessary

to

the

retailers.

study

of

fair

Miller-Tydings
"states

,.I

Ibid.

II

congressional
retailers

economic

with

fair

of

small

The agency relied on a
the

impact

on

laws

enacted

under

of

trade

Act.

survival

The

trade

study

laws

rate

of

firm

I
failures

states,

and

the

rate

of

55 per

a

than

growth

of

the
that

revealed

had

higher

small

cent

free

trade

small

retail

stores in free trade states between 1956 and 1972
was

32 per

trade

cent higher

laws."

94th Cong.,

Ibid.,
1st Sess.

than

citing

1

3

in states with
S.

Rep.

No.

fair

94-466,

Pointing to the

(1975).

congressional abandonment of fair trade in the 1975
Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p.
state

Supreme

':/

Court

Cal.

3d,

at 457,

persuasive

found

no

"fair

trade

"
justification to continue

eliminate price

, supra, the

competition among
579 P.2d,

Appeal made the same finding

laws

which

retailers."

at 494.

21

The Court of

with respect

to the

24.

national

policy

evaluation of
maintenance

in

the

for

favor

of

State's

wine

is

competition.

stake

in

reasonable

That

resale
based

price
on

the

-

material cited by the state Supreme Court in Rice.
~

Nothing

in the record

in

this

case

suggests

that

the wine pricing system helps sustain small retail
Neither

establishments.
State

Attorney General

program

inhibits

Californians~

We

legitimate

state

protection

of

against

the

competitive

the

the

has

not

interests

the

demonstrated

that

the

in

alcohol
whether

by
the

temperance

and

ever

prevail

federal
The

of

consider

retailers

undoubted
economy.

nor

consumption

need

small

petitioner

could

interest

unsubstantiated

in

the

a

state

concerns put forward in this case simply are not of
the same statutre as the broad goals of the Sherman
Act.
We conclude that
Appeal

correctly

decided

the California Court of
that

the

Twenty-first

25.

Affirmed.
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lL

The statute provides:
a "Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to
sell wine,

wine

rectif'ier,

and

rectifier

shall:
" (a)

Post

a

schedule of selling

prices of wine to retailers or consumers
for which his resale price is not governed
by

a

fair

trade

contract

made

by

the

person who owns or controls the brand.

-·

"(b)
contract

and

Make and file
file

a

a

schedule

fair

trade

of

resale

prices, if he owns or controls a brand of
wine resold to retailers or consumers."

j / cal.

2/

Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (West 1964).

Licensees

that

sell

wine

below

the

prices

FN2.

3/

The court cited record evidence that in July

1976,

five

leading

brands

of

gin

each

sold

in

California for $4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and
that five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for
either $8.39 or $8.40 a fifth.

Rice v. Alcoholic

Beverage Control Appeals Bd. ,

21 Cal.

and nn.

491-492 and nn.

14, 16, 579 P.2d 476,

4 54 J

3d 4 31 ,

14,

1

16 ( 1978).

4/

The State also did not appeal the decision in

Capiscean

Corp.

v.

Alcoholic

Appeals Bd.,

87 Cal.

492

which

( 1979),

invalidate

App.

used

California's

Beverage

3d 996,

the

151

analysis

resale

price

Control

Cal.
in

Rptr.

Rice

to

maintenance

scheme for retail wine sales to consumers.

The

California

Association,
retail

liquor

a

trade
dealers

Retail
association

Liquor
of

in California,

Dealers

independent
claims

over

FN3.

noted that the repeal of fair trade authority would
not alter whatever power the States hold under the
Twenty-first

Amendment

to

control

liquor

prices.

S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 2 (1975);
H.

R.Rep.

"

(1975).

No.

94-341,

94th Cong.,

1st Sess. 1 3,

n.2

We consider the effect of the Twenty-first

Amendment on this case in Part III, infra.

7I

In Rice,

direct

the

evidence

resulted

in

California Supreme Court
that

resale

horizontal

supra, and n.3.

price

upheld

fixing.

in this

that

the

wine

pricing

for

the

same

reasons

maintenance

maintenance
See

p. - 1

Although the Court of Appeal made

no such specific finding
noted

price

found

provisions

were

case,

system
the

the

"cannot

retail

declared

court
be

price

invalid

in

Rice." Midcal Aluminum Co. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d
979, 983, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 760

(1979).

FN4.

State Action Doctrine After Goldfarb,

Cantor,

and

Bates, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 916 (1977).

9/

The

California

approach of

those

program

States

that

contrasts

with

completely

the

control

the distribution of liquor within their boundaries.
~'

Va.

Code

§§

4-15,

4-28

(Repl.

Vol.

1979).

Such comprehensive regulation would be immune from
the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown, 317

u.s.

341

(1943), since the State would "displace unfettered
business

freedom"

with

Vehicle Board of Cal if.
U.S.

96,

109

(1978)~

New Motor

its own power.
v.

Orr in W.

Fox Co. ,

See State Board

v.

4 39

Young's

Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63 (1936).

lQI

This approach is not only supported by sound

canons

of

constitutional

interpretation

but

also

demonstrates a wise reluctance to try to interpret
the

complex

currents

beneath

the

congressional

FN5.

control

in

effect

over

affecting

intoxicating

Rec.

(1933)

4143

interstate

commerce
7 6 Cong.

II

1 iquors.

(remarks of Sen. Blaine).

Yet he

also made statements supporting Midcal's claim that
the

Amendment

was

designed

only

to

ensure

that

"dry" States could not be forced to permit the sale
of

1 iquor.

records

of

See
the

id.,

at

conventions

state

consensus on the thrust of
at

l

several

state

regulation

immediately.
first

reflect

no

2, although delegates

expressed

liquor

their

traffic

hope

that

would

begin

to

the

Constitution

104

(1938)

President of the Idaho Convention);

191-192

Convention);
Missouri

of

§

sketchy

E. Brown, Ratification of the Twenty-

Amendment

(Wilson,
at

conventions

The

4140-4141.

(Darnall,
id.,

at

Convention);

of

President
247

id.,

(Gaylord,
at

469-473

id.,

Maryland

Chairman

of

(resolution

adopted at Washington Convention calling for state
action

"to

regulate

the

liquor

traffic").

See

FN6.

Beverage Laws -- Experience Under the Twenty-first Jl-Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1147 (1959).

)_
ll/

In Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327

u.s.

416

(1946), the Court commented in a footnote:

/) n [E)ven

the

commerce

1 iquors,

over

Amendment

gives

degree

of

in

intoxicating

which

the

Twenty-first

the

States
is

control,

not

beyond the reach of the
power,

at

regulation

any

rate

the

altogether

federal

when

squarely

highest

commerce

the

State's
with

conflicts
("'"'--

II

regulation imposed by Congres t,..·

---

( (i d., at 425, n.15.
12/

Our view of California's interests in its wine

pricing

system

posture

of

agency

is

this

shaped
case.

responsible

for

in
As

part
we

by

noted,

administering

the

unusual

the
the

state

program

did not appeal the decision of the California Court

FN7.

the

State

Attorney

General,

who

filed

a

brief

amicus curiae in support of the legislative scheme,
has specified any state interests protected by the
resale

price

maintenance

system other

than

those

noted in the state court opinions cited in text.

_!l!

The

California

Court

of

Appeal

found

90 Cal.

these same interests in the instant case.
App.

only

3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761.

That

court rejected the suggestion that the wine price
program was designed
industry,

pointing out

distinguish
wines."

l!/
39

to protect
that

the

the

State's wine

statutes

between California wines

"do

and

not

imported

Ibid.

See Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35,
(1966)

price

(citing

maintenance

significant

effect

study
in

concluding

New
upon

York
the

that

State

resale

had

"no

consumption

of

FN8.

competition,

thereby

encouraging

Cal. 3d, at 456, 579 P.2d, at 493.
temperance,
court as

an

however,

was

independent

also
state

temperance."

21

The concern for

considered
interest

in

by

the

resale

price maintenance for liquor.

16/

Since Midcal requested only injunctive relief

from the state court,

there is no question before

us involving liability for damages under 15 U.S.C.
§15.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-97
California ~e~ail Liqu:o~ Deal-) On Writ of Certiorari to. the
ers Assomatwn, Pet1t10ner,
Court of Appeal of Cahforv.
nia for the Third Appellate
District.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et al.
[February -, 1980]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
a wine distributor, presented a successful antitrust challenge
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting statutes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is
whether those state laws are shielded from the Sherman Act
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943), or§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.

I
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Professions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, or rectifiers must
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules.]. If
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade contract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that
1 The sta.tute provides:
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and
rectifier shall:
"(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made
by the person who owns or controls the brand.
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or
consumers."
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (West 1964).

79-97-0PINIGN
CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALERS v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM

2

producer's brands. !d., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair
trade contract.... " !d., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979).
For administration of the wine pricing program, the State
is divided into three trading a.reas. A single fair trade con- 1
tract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all wholesale transactions in that brand within a given trading area;.
!d.,§§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similarly, the
wine prices posted by a single distributor within a trading area
bind all wholesalers in that area. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v.
Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983-984, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762
( 1979). A licensee selling below the established prices faces
fines, license suspension, or outright' license revocation. Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 24880. 2 The State has no direct control
over wine prices, and it does not review the reasonableness of
the prices set by wine dealers.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wi1ie
in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also
.. alleged that Midcal so1d wines for which no fair trade contract
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allegations were true and that the State could fine it or suspend·
'its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. M!dcal then
sought to enjoin the State's wine pricing system with a writ
of mandate from the California Court of Appeal for the Third
Appellate District.
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice
Licensees that sell wine · below the prices specified in fair trade contracts or schedules also may be subject to private damage suits for unfair
competition. !d., § 24752.
2
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3

v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Board, 21 Cal. 3d 431,
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court
·struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors.
In that case, the State Supreme Court found that because the
State played only a passive part in wine pricing, there was no
Parker v. Brown immunity for the program.
"In the price maintenance program before us, the state
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The
prices are established by the producers according to their
own economic interests, without regard to any actual or
potential anticompetitive effect; the state's role is re·
stricted to enforcing the prices specified by the producers.
There is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the
state to insure that the policies of the Sherman Act are
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486.
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pricing policies were protected by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which insulates state regulation of intoxicating liquors
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion
of temperance and the preservation of small retail establishments. The court emphasized that the California program
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed
at identical prices. 3 Referring to congressional and state
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price main3 The court cited record evidence that in July 1976, five leading brands
of gin each ~old in California for 4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and that
five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for either S .39 or $8.40 a fifth.
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, and
nn. 14, 16, 579 P. 2d 476,491-492, and nn. 14, 16 (1978).

79-97-0PINION
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or
small retail stores. Seep.-, infra,
In the instant case, the State Court of Appeal found the
analysis in Rice squarely controlling, 90 Cal. App., at 984,
153 Cal. Rptr., at 760. The court ordered the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade.
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from
this Court, did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, an intervenor. 5 The California Supreme Court declined
to hear the case, and the Dealers Association sought certiorari
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979),
and now affirm the decision of the state court.

II
The threshold question is whether California's policy for
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled
consistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains
' trade. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S.
373, 407 (1911), pointed out that such arrangements are
"designed to maintain p'tices ... , and to prevent competition
among those who trade in [competing goods]." See Albrecht
v. The Herald Co,, 39"0 U, S. 145 (1968); United States v.
., Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 ( 1960); United States v.
\ ' Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920). For many years,
~Jt hougb, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the States
~
to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. The
goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect small
4 The State also did not appeal the decision in Capiscean Corp. v.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 492 (1979), which used the analysis in Rice to invalidate California's
res::lle price maintenance scheme for retail wine sales to consumers.
5 The California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, a trade association
of independent retail liquor dealers in California, claims over 3,000
' members.
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retail establishments that Congress thoughS migh otherw~
be driven from the marketplace by large-vo~une discounters.
But in 1975 ~congressional permission was rescinded. The
Consumer Goocfs Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, repealed
the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation. 6 Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price maintenance
now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity.
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schweg~
mann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see
Albrecht v. The Heraald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. Park & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competition among wholesalers and retailers as efi'ectively as "if they
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same
restrictons ... by agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at
408. 7 Moreover, there can be no claim that the California
program is simply intrastate regulation beyond the reach of
the Sherman Act. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp.,
supra; Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
The congressional reports accompanying the Consumer Goods Pr' ·~
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that the repeal of fair trade
ority
would not alter whatever power the States hold under the wenty-first
Amendment to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 9
, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 2 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-341 , 94th Con ., 1st Sess., 3, n. 2
(1975). We consider the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on this
case in Part III, infra.
7 In Rice, the California Supreme Court found direct evidence that resale
price maintenance resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. - , supra,
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific finding in
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld
for the same reasons the retail price maintenance provisions were declared
invalid in Rice." Midcal Aluminum Co. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983,
153 Cal. Rptr. 757,760 (1979).
6
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That
immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded in our
federal structure. "In a dual system of government in which,
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as
Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority,
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."
!d., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court found in the
Sherman Act no purpose to nullify state powers. Because the
Act is directed against "individual and not state action," the
Court concluded that state regulatory programs could not
violate it. I d., at 352.
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organization of local cooperatives to develop ma.rketing policies for the
·raisin crop. The Court emphasized that the Advisory Commission, which was appointed by the governor, had to approve
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate
program. . . . [I] t is the sta.te, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program and enforces it...." !d., at
352. In view of this extensive official oversight, the Court
wrote, the Sherman Act did not apply. Without such oversight, the result could have been different. The Court expressly noted, "[A] state does not give immunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it,
or by declaring that their action is lawful. ..." I d., at 351.
Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state ba.r association were not mandated by ethical standards established by the
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules ·therefore were not
immune from antitrust attack. "It is not enough that .. ,
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather,
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the
State acting as sovereign." I d., at 791. Sim:!i~la!:!.r.!.ll~i~n-:t=~o~oU..-----:--"'
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) a majority of he
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "refl.ect[ed]
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in
enforcement proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U. S. 350, 362 (1~77).
Only last Term)this Court found antitrust immunity for a
California program requiring state approval of the location of
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Calif.
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That program
provided that if an automobile franchisee protested against a
proposed new or relocated dealership, the State would hold a
hearing "to determine whether there is good cause to block the
change." I d., at 103. In view of the State's active role, the
Court held, the program was not subject to the Sherman Act.
The "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" goal of
the state policy was to "displace unfettered business freedom
in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealerships." I d., at 109.
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively supervised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.). 8 The California system for wine pricing satisSee Norman's On the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 44 F. 2d 1011, 1018
(CA3 1971); Asheville Tobacco Bd. v. FTC, 263 F. 2d 502, 509-510 (CA4
8
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price mainte~
nance. The program, however, does not meet the second
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply author~
izes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private
parties. The ~tate neither establishes prices nor reviews the .
1
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does the...govet-n
rneftt regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State
does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointe~d
reexamination" of the program. 0 ;lhe national policy in favor
T~
of competition p:-.umat he thwartid gy Gt;~iltiliil~ i!Yy~gauzy
Cloak or state involvement over what--is essentially ~private
price-.fixii:g arra:1gemenf.7 As Par~er ~eaches, "a st'ate does a.hrh-1 ...L..\ I(..Q _
not give immumty to those who violate the Sherman Act by
\]""''.:
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action
~~'{;,P. dYV1tt-"
is lawful. .. ," 317 U.S., at 351.
GV'
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III
Petitioner contends that even if California's system of wine
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amend~
ment bar~lication of the Sherman Act in this case. Section 1 of that):onit.itu+ional p1=ov~io .repealed the Eighteenth
Amendment's prohibition on liquofl. The seeend ~ectior ~e~
serves to the States certain power Co regulate traffic in liquor:
"The transportation or importation into any State, Territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
Hl59) ; Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited: The State Action Doctrine After
Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 916 ( 1977).
The California program contrasts with the approach of those States
that completely control the distribution of liquor within their boundaries.
E. g ., Va. Code §§ 4-15, 4-28 (Rep!. Vol. 1979). Sueh comprehensive regulation would be immune from the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943), since t11e State would " displace unfettered business
freedom" with its own power. New Motor Vehicle Board of Calif. v.
Onin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978); Sec State Board v. Young's
Market Co., 299 U.S. 59,63 (1936).
9
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of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is
hereby prohibited." The remaining question before us is
~hether §. 2 permits California to counte~ th~
swna.l pohcy~d under the commerce power m favor
of competition.

A
In determining state powers under the T'wenty-first Amendment, the Court has focused on the language of the provision
rather than the history behind it. State Board v. Young's
Market Co., 299 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1936).10 In terms, the
Amendment gives the States control over the "transportation
or importation" of liquor into their territories. ~
such control logically entails considerable regulatory power- r r
. ~ot strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol.
"\

~-

The
oach is ~te~t onl~supported by sound canons of constitutional
- Interpretation
d~monstrates a wise reluctm1cC'to try to 111 -;r tr
the complex 1 rrents beneath the congressional resolution th proposed
the Amendment and the state conventions that ratified it.
he Senate
sponsor of the resolution said the purpose of § 2 was "to restore to the
State.<;; ... absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting
intoxicating liquors .... " 76 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1933) (remarks of Sen.
Blaine). Y·et he also made statements supporting Midcal's claim that
the Amendment was designed only to ensure that "'dry" States could not
· be forced to permit the sale of liquor. See id., at 4140--4151. The sketchy
records of the state conventions reflect no consensus on the thrust of
§ 2, although delegates at several conventions expressed their hope that
state regulation of liquor traffic would begin immediately. E. Brown,
Ratification of tho Twenty-first Amendment to tho Constitution 104
(1938) (Wilson, President of the Idaho Convention); id., at 191-192
(Darnall, President of Maryland Convention); id., at 247 (Gaylord, Chairman of Mi;;souri Convention); id., at 469-473 (resolution adopted at
Washington Convention calling for state action "to regulate the liquor
traffic"). See generally Nate, The Effect of the Twenty-fir~t Amendment
on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 Colum. L. Rev.
1578, 1580 (1975); Note, Economic Locali m in State Alcoholic Beverage
Laws-Experience Under the Twenty-first Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev.
1145, 1147 (1959) .
10
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Zifjrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U. S. 132, 138 ( 1939). We should
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority.
This Court's early decisions on the. T-weJ:l.t.x-first Amendment recognized that each State hhl.durcat power over the
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Market, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch &
Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing
Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, '305 U. S. 391 (1939). The
Court upheld the challenged state ·authority in each case,
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's
Market, supra, 229 U. S., at 64.
.
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude" to state
liquor regulation, Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35,
42 ( 1966), but they also have stressed that important federal
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of _91e
Twenty-first Amendment. 'I'fta-t-provlsion Q'Omj-not1rllo~1he
--- --st~te.J, tax imported liquor in violation of the ExportImport Clause. Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co.,
377 U. S. 341 (1964). Nor can th~~te§)insulate the liquor
industry from the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements of
equal protection, Cmig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209
( 1976), and due process, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U. S. 433, 436 (1970).
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce
power. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some
Commerce Cla.use authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v.
Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendment in a
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 (1935). And in Zifjrin,
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the
state program was reasonable. !d., at 139.
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324,
331-332 (1964).
"To draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto
'repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and
is demonstrably incorrect."
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation:
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of
the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake
in any concrete case." !d., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 206 (1976). 11
In Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court
commented in a footnote:
"[E]ven the commerce in intoxicnting liquors, ov·er which the Twenty-first
Amendment gives the Stales thP highest degree of control, is not altogether beyond the reach of thl? federal commerce power, at any rate when
the State's regulation squnrely conflicts with regulation impo~ed by Congress . .. ." !d., at 425, n. 15.
11

I
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This pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers
has been evident in the Court's conclusion in several cases that
the liquor industry may be held liable for anticompetitive
conduct not mandated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945). IIi Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 ( 1951), for example, a
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a distributor to comply with Louisiana's resa.le price maintenance program, a program similar in many respects to the California scheme at
issue here. The Court held that the Louisiana statute violated the Sherman Act and could not be enforced against the
distributor. Fifteen years later, the Court rejected a Sherman Act challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest
price'' charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram &
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court concluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible economic
pressure on the [dealers] to violate the Sherman Act in order
to comply," but it also cautioned that "[n] othing in the
Twenty~first Amendment, of course, would prevent the en'"
forcement of the Sherman Act" against an interstate conspiracy to fix prices. Id., at 45-46. See Burke v. Ford, 389
U. S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
These decisions demonstra.te that there is no bright line
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twenty.first Amendment grants the States virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States
retain substantial discm;_t~~o establish other liquor regulations, those controls~;-ay~ be subject to the federal commerce power in appfcmriate situations. The competing state
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a "concrete case." Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332.

79-97-0PINION

I

CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALERS v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM 13

B
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor
'Of competition is both familiar and substantial.
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the p-reservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 ( 1972).
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 4,
( 1958). Although this federal interest is expressed through
a statute rather than a constitutional provision, Congress
"exercis [ed] all the power it possessed" under the Commerce
Clause when it approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S.,
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's
procompetition policy.
The state interests protected by California's resale price
maintenance system were identified by the state courts in this
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d
431, 451, 579 P. 2d 476, 490 (1978).u Of course, the findings
and conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Court
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the
Our view of Californiajs intJcrests in its wine pricing systom is shaped
in part by the unusual posture of this case. As we noted, the state
agency responsible for administering the program did not appeal the
decision of the California Court of Appeal. See p. - , supra; Tr. of Oral
Arg. 20. Instead, this action bas been maintained by the Ca1ifornia
Liquor Dealers Association, a private intervenor. But neither the intervenor nor the State Attorney General, who filed a brief amicus curiae in
support of the legisla,tive scheme, has specified any state interests protected by the resa1e price maintenance system other than those noted in
the state court opinions cited in text.
12
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of
Pythias, 225 U.S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v.
Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 160 (1952).
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of
the State's system of wine pricing was "controlled by the reasoning of the [California.] Supreme Court in Rice [supra]."
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors.
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind
liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at
490. 13 The court found little correlation between resale price
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing
a 42% increase in per capita liquor consumption in California
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect.
!d., at 457-458, 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing California Dept. of
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the .
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote
temperance." Ibid. 14
t-.:> 0.
\
The California Court of Appeal foun~l'l€f!e sar97 interests in
the instant case. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761.
That. court rejected the suggestion that the wine price program was de-·
signed to protect the State's wine industry, pointing out that the statutes
"do not distingui.~h bl'twern California wines and imported wines." Ibid.
14 See Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 39 (1966) (citing study
concluding that resale price maintenance in New York State had "no
significant effect upon the consumption of alcoholic beverages").
13
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in
orderly market conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456,
579 P. 2d, at 493.' 5 In gauging this interest, the Court
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small
retailers . . . . " Ibid. The agency relied on a congressional
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted
under the Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade
laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. - ,
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justification to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price competition among retailers." 21 Cal. 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at
494. The Court of Appeal made the same finding with respect
to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983-:We have n~basis f9r disf!greeing: with the view of the California courts that the asserted state interests are less substantial than the national policy in favor of competition. Tha~
e~alu~tion of the State's stake in resale pric~ maintenance for
WI'ne IS reasonable based on the matenal cited by the State
Supreme Court in Rice. Nothing in the record in this case
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the State
The California Supreme Court also stated that orderly market conditions might "reduce excessive competition, thereby encouraging temperance." 21 Cal. 3d, at 456, 579 P. 2d, at 493. The concern for temperance,
however, was ~considered by the court as an independent state interest
in resale price maintenance for liquor.
15
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Attorney General has demonstrated that the program inhibits
the consumption of alcohol by Californians. We need not
consider whether the legitimate state interests in temperance
and the protection of small retailers ever could prevail against
the undoubted federal interest in a competitive economy.
The unsubstantiated state concerns put forward in this case
simply are not of the same statu as the -broad goals of the
Sherman Act.
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly
decided that the Twenty-first Amondment, providos no shelter
for the violation of the Sherman Act ~u~ cy tho State's
wine pricing program.10 The judgment of the California
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is
Affirmed,

10 Since Midcal requested only injunctive relief from the state court,
there is no question before us involving liabilit,y for damages under 15
U. S. C. § 15.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-97
California Retail Liquor Deal-] On Writ of Certiorari to the
ers Association, Petitioner,
Court of Appeal of Califorv.
nia for the Third Appellate
District.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et al.
[February -, 1980]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
a wine distributor, presented a successful antitrust challenge
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting statutes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is
whether those state laws are shielded from the Sherman Act
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943), or§ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.

I
Under § 24866 (b)
sions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers,
rec 1 ers mus
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules. 1 If
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade contract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that

(.

1 The statute provides:
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and
rectifier shall:
"(a) Post a schedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made
by the person who owns or controls the brand.
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale
prices, if ht owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or
_
consumers." 1
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 24866 (We~
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producer's brands. ld. , § 24866 (a). No sta.te-licensed wine
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair
trade contract.... " ld., § 24862 (West Supp. 197,;;.9-:-):....--:--~-~
or a ministration of the wine pncmg_ J2!0~ the tate
is divide m o ree trading area
A single fair trade contractM s• J. blQ for each brand s s the terms for all wholesale transactions in that brand within a given trading are
ld., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979) . .SiL-·l=ar:..::.ll...)Jit::.t=he~~-
wine prices posted by a single~a trading area
bind all wholesalers in that area. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v.
Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979, 983-984, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762
( 1979). A licensee selling below the established prices faces
fines, license suspension, or outright license revocation. Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 24880. 2 The State has no direct control
over wine prices, and it does not review the reasonableness of
the prices set by wine dealers.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine
in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allegations were true and that the State could fine it or suspend
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midcal then
e-pr~~~~~~-~
· · the St
v ~f:;a;&*iililillle~ he Califorma
ourt of Appeal for the Third --~
L Appellate Distnc .
d,._,_ i~
~~
The Court o Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme
· i1' -tke
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C.
~ ~-<- ~
§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice

~-t~~

~:..c-4 S''i Je<M.

2 Licensees that sell wine below the prices specified in fair trade contracts or schedules also may be subject to private damage suits for unfair
competition. !d., § 24752.
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v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals ~al~431,
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors.
In that case, ~'rnb S!!i:JFe~e }tourt
that because the
pricmg, t 1ere was no
State played only a passive part in
Parker v. Brown immunity for the program.
"In the price maintenance program before us, the state
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The
prices are established by the producers according to their
own economic interests, without regard to any actual or
potential anticompetitive effect; the state's role is restricted to enforcing the prices specified by the producers.
There is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the
state to insure that the policies of the Sherman Act are
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486.
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pric'ing policies were protected by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which insulates state regulation of intoxicating liquors
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion
of temperance and the preservation of small retail establish- G'i~_
ments. The court emphasized that the California ~]!11Jio~g!!iitil!ll&lflliitf~..l--=--r:.._,__
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed
at identical prices. 3 Referring to congressional and state
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price mains Tho court cited record evidence that in July 1976, fivo leading brands
of gin each sold in California for $4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and that
five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for either S8.39 or S8.40 a fifth.
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, and
nn. 14, 16, 579 P. 2d 476, 491-492, and nn. 14, 16 (1978).
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tenance has little positive im act on either temperance or
small retail stores. See
, infra.
In the instant case, the tate Court of Appeal found the
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984,
153 Cal. Rptr., at 760. The court ordered the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade.
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from
this Court, did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, an intervenor. 5 The California Supreme Court declined
to hear the case, and the Dealers Association sought certiorari
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979),
and now affirm the decision of the state court.

II
The threshold question is whether California's
for
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled
consistently that resaie price maintenance illegally restrains
\---...;t~ra-d;:.e..:... ..:. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S.
--373, 40 (1911), 1 · · Jt t that such arrangements are
"designed to maintain prices ... , and to prevent competition
among those who trade in [competing goods]." See Albrecht
v. The H emld Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United States v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 ( 1960); United States v.
Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 ( 1920). For many years,
though, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the States
to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693. The
goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect small
Tho State also did not appeal the decision in Capiscean Corp. v.
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 492 (1979), which used the analysis in Rice to invalidate California's
resale price maintenance schC'mc for retail wine sales to consumers.
5 The Californi'a Retail Liquor Dealers Association, a trade association
of independent retail liquor dealers in California, claims over 3,000
members.
1

pi~

~

·+~Gd
obs:~J
~
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retail establishments that Congress thought might otherwise
be driven from the marketplace by large-volume discounters.
But in 1975 that congressional permission was rescinded. The
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, repealed
the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation. 6 Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price maintenance
now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity.
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see
Albrec t v. The Hr~._ri,a]..d Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, 340LJ. S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. Park & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competition among wholesalers and retailers as effectively as "if they
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same
restnc ns ... by agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at
Moreover, there can be no claim that the California
program is simply intrastate regulation beyond the reach of
the Sherman Act. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp.,
supra; Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
o The congresRional reports accompanying the Consum r Goods Pricina
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that
repeal of fair trade au onty
would not alter whatever power the States hold under the Twenty-first
Amendment to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 2 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-341, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, n. 2
(1975). We consider the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on this
case in Part III, infra.
7 In Rice, the California Supreme Court found direct evidence that resale
price maintenance resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p.
, supra,
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific finding in
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld
for the same reasons the retail price maintenance provisions were cleclar
invalid in Rice." Midcal Aluminum
v. Rice,
a . pp.
979, 983,
153 Cal. Rptr. 757,760 (1979).
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That
immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded in our
federal structure. "In a dual system of government in which,
under the Constitution, the states arc sovereign. save only as
Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority,
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."
Id., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court found in the
Sherman Act no purpose to nullify state powers. Because the
Act is directed against "individual and not state action," the
Court concluded that state regulatory programs could not
violate it. Id., at 352.
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organization of local cooperatives to develop marketing policies for the
raisin crop. The Court emphasized that the Advisory Commission, which was appointed by the governor. had to approve
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate
program. . . . [I]t is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program and enforces it.... " ld., at
352. · In view of this extensive official oversight, the Court
wrote, the Sherman Act did not apply. Without such oversight, the result could have bee
·
pressly noted, "
s ate oes not give immunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it,
or by declaring that their action is lawful. ..." Id., a.t 351.
Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state bar association were not mandated by ethical standards established by the
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules therefore were not
immune from antitrust attack. "It is not enough that ...
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather,
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the
State acting as sovereign." I d. , at 791. Similarly, in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co. , 428 U.S. 579 (1976), a majority of the
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "reflect[ed]
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to pro.
fessional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court--in
enforcement procredings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizora.t, 433
U. S. 350, 362 (1977).
Only last Term this Court found antitrust immunit for a
t e location of t;l,sJCX~
California program requiring state approval
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Vehicle Bd.
[i({
v. Orrin W. F_ · Co., 439
S. 96 \1978).
~ ..it
"13~~:ed=thii7":r:iJan automobile franchisee iill:.,Qiiuted~ sr-a~
f~t ' ll\.ll
proposed new or relocated dealership, the ~tatQ smotld I olil a,.
)t~
bearing "to detel'ffiitre whether thete i~ geed etnlse to block the
~ 1"ftlJ
clumW:.:Z¥ , lb 108. In view of the State's active role, the
4t. ~
Court held; the program was not subject to the Sherman Act.
The "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed" goal of
_;~J_ ~~
the state policy was to "displace unfettered business freedom
~
in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automo{~
bile dealerships." I d., at 109.
fk
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immuF..Je&ef
1
nity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint
es~~
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
I ~ ~a..'l~~"~ ~
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively supert:fr .._ t. I'
vised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
...p_..-n:&"S:~~
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of
~< k...-f>
_
8
BRENNAN, J.).
The California system for wine pricing satis~

1!·

@graffi&i)T

j

.---r

8 See Norman's On the Wat erfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 44 F. 2d 1011, 1018
(CA3 1971); Asheville Tobacco Bd. v. FTC, 263 F. 2d 502, 509~510 (CA4

f
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price maintenance. The program, however, does not meet the second
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply authorizes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does the government regulate the terms of fair trade contracts. The State
does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed
reexamination" of the program. 9 The national policy in favor
of competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private
price-fixing arrangement. As Parker teaches, "a state does
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action
is lawful. ... " 317 U. S., at 351.

III
Petitioner contends that even if California~s system of wine
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amendment bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. Section 1 of that constitutional provision repealed the Eighteenth
V
Amendment's prohibition on liquor. The second section re~ to the States certain power to regulate traffic in liquor:
"'!Jhe transportation or importation into any State, Territory,
or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein
1959) ; Note, Pad.:er v. Brotun Revisited : The State Action Doctrine After
Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 916 (1977).
9 The California program contrasts with the approach of those States
that completely control the distribution of liquor within their boundaries.
E. g., Va. Code§§ 4-15, 4-28 (Rep!. VoL 1979). Such comrwchcn ive reg{S&,
ulation would be immune from the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943), since the Stat e would "di ~:Jplace unfettered busin;;:;
es:.s: :.·_ ___,__ _ _
. v.
freedom" with its own power. New Motor Vehicle
Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978); iec State Board v. Young's
1
Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63 (1936).
/
C,

J
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of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, IS
hereby prohibited." The remaining question before us is
whether § 2 permits California to countermand the congressional policy-adopted under the commerce power-in favor
of competition.
A
In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court has focused on the anguage of the provision
rather than the history be 1 1d it. State Board v. Young's
Market Co., 299 U. S. 59, 63-64 (1936). 10 In terms, the
Amendment gives the States control over the "transportation
or importation" of liquor into their territories. Of course,
such control logically entails considerable regulatory powers
not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol.
Tho approach is not only supported by sound canons of constitutional
interpretation but also demonstrates a wise reluctkmce to h:!J~~!!!!J!~)
the complex currents beneath the congreRsional resolution
he Senate
the Amendment and the state conventions that ratified it.
sponsor of the resolution said the purpose of § 2 was "to restore to the
States ... absolute control in effect over interstate commerce affecting
intoxicating liquors. . . ." 76 Cong. Rec. 4143 (1933) (remarks of Sen.
Blaine). Yet he also made statements supporting Midcal's claim that
the Amendment was designed only to ensure that "dry" States could not
be forced to permit the sale of liquor. Sec id., at 4140-4151. The ketchy
records of the state conventions reflect no consensus on the thrust of
§ 2, although delegates at several conventions expressed their hope that
state regulation of liquor traffic would begin immediately. E. Brown,
Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment to the Con::;titution 104
(1938) (Wilson, President of the Idaho Convention); id., at HH-192
(Darnall, President of Maryland Convention); id., at 247 (Gaylord, Chairman of Missouri Convention); id., at 469-473 (resolution adopted at
Washington Convention calling for state action "to regulate tl1e liquor
tra.ffic"). See generally Note, The Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment
on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 Colum. L. Rev.
1578, 1580 (1975); Note, Economic Localism in State Alcoholic Beverage
Laws-Experience Under the Twenty-first Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev.
1145, 1147 (1959).
10
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939). We should
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority.
This Court's early decisions on the Twenty-first Amendment recognized that each State holds great powers over the
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Market, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch &
Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing
Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). The
Court upheld the challenged state authority in each case,
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's
Market, supra, 229 U. S., at 64.
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude" to state
liquor regulation , Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35,
42 (1966), but they also have stressed that important federal
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the
Twenty-first Amendment. That provision does not allow the
States to tax imported liquor in violation of the ExportImport Clause. Department of Revenue v. James Beam Co.,
377 U. S 341 (1964). Nor can the States insulate the liquor
industry from the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements of
equal protection, Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209
( 1976) , and due process, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U. S. 433, 436 (1970).
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce
power. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v.
Morgenthau, 307 U. S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendment in a
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 ( 1935). And in Ziffrin,
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the
state program was reasonable. I d., at 139.
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324,
331-332 (1964).
"To draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto
'repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and
is demonstrably incorrect."
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation:
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of
the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake
in any concrete case." Id., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429
U. S. 190, 206 (1976). 11
11 In Nipp ert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court
commented in a footnote:
"[E] ven the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-first
Amendment gives the States the highest degree of control, is not altogether beyond the reach of the federal commerce power, at any rate when
the State's regulation squarely conflicts with regulation imposed by Congress . . . . " /d., at 425, n. 15.

\
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This pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal )Owers
hltSoeen evidentln
· · several
~-·-ttrn-tiqtlor industry'i!IU§
liable for anticompetitive
conduct not mandated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U . S. 293 (1945). In Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 ( 1951), for example, a
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a distributor to comply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a program similar in many respects to the California ..it:l
1tf
~~rt'
issue here. The Court held that the Louisiana statute ~
v-t6{(1... & -#q
\Mi.t.i~ii!I*J•illliilliliiilllllii;iiiiiil} could not be enforced against the
s~Act
distributo . Fifteen years later, the Court rejected a Sher- -- - - - - '- .........:-a'!::"n-:rc::;t~challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest
price" charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram &
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court concluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible economic
pressure on the [dealers] to violate the Sherman Act in order
to comply," but it also cautioned that "[n] othing in the
Twenty-first A~endment, of course, would prevent the enforcement of the Sherman Act" against an interstate conspiracy o x )rices. Id., at 45-46. See Burlce v. Ford, 389
U. S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
These decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twentyfirst Amendment grants the States virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regulations, those controls may
be subject to the federal commerce power in appropriate situations. The competing state
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a "concrete case." Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332.

*
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B
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy ih favor
of competition is both familiar and substantial.
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.''
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972).
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U. S. 1, 4,
( 1958). Although this federal interest is expressed through
a statute rather than a constitutional provision, Congress
"exercis[ed] all the power it possessed" under the Commerce
Clause when it approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S.,
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's
procompetition policy.
The state interests protected by California's resale price
maintenance system were identified by the state courts in this
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in
Rice v. Alcoholic Bevem e Control AP' eal
,
I 5 451, 579 P. 2d
490
~.
Of course, the findings
and conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Courr:r:---Ar"
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the
12

As
agency responsible for administering the
decision of the California Court of Appeal. See p.
, supra; Tr. of Oral
Arg. 20. Instead, this action has been maintaine by the California
Liquor Dealers Association, a private intervenor. But neither the intervenor nor the State Attorney General, who filed a brief amicus curiae in
support of the legislative scheme, has specified any state interests protected by the resale price maintenance system other than those noted in
the state court opinions cited in text.
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of
Pythias, 225 U.S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938) , and we
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v.
Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 160 (1952).
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of
the State's system of wine pricing was "controlled by the reasoning of the [California.] Supreme Court in Rice [supra]."
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors.
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind
liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at
490. 13 The court found little correlation between resale price
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing
a 42% increase in per capita liquor consumption in California
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect.
!d., at 457-458, 579 P. 2cl, at 494, citing California Dept. of
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote
temperance." Ibid. 14
18 The California Court of Appeal found only these l"ame interests in
the instant case. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761.
That court rejected the suggestion that the wine price program was designed to protect the State's wine industry, pointing out that the statutes
"do not distingu1«h b etween California wines and imported winPs." Ibid.
14 See Seagram L~ Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35,39 (1966) (citing study
concluding that resale price maintenance in New York State had "no
significant effect upon the consumption of alcoholic beverages").
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in
orderly market conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456,
579 P. 2d, at 493. 1 5 In gauging this interest, the J'ourt .f'. t..,
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small
retailers. . . ." Ibid. The agency relied on a congressional
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted
under the Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher ra.te of
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade
laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94- 466, 94th Cong. , 1st Stf!:9ess.,
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair 5
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p.
,
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justi cation to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price com-f,. tk
petition among retailers." 21 Ca.l. 3d, at 457 579 P 2
~ "
494. The Court of Appeal
· with respect
~
..
to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983.
~,..,_
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the California courts that the asserted state interests are less substantial than the national policy in favor of competition.
5
evaluation of the
· resale price maintenanc
'1
wine is reasonable
· cited by the S ate
_ __
Supreme Court in Rice. Nothing in the recor m IS case
~ ~ •
1
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small
\ .t
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the S~e
~U-ff<Y'-~ ~

------

? _::.. :::._

15 The California Supreme Court also stated that orderly market conditions might "reduce excessive competition , thereby encouraging temperance." 21 Cnl 3d, at 456, 579 P. 2d, at 493 . The concern for temperance,
how~v~ considered by the court as an independent state interest
in resale price maintenance for liquor.
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Attorney Gene~l has demonstrated that the program inhibits
tl:le' consumption of alcohol by Californians. We need not
consider whether the legitimate state interests in temperance
and the protection of small retailers ever could prevail against
the undoubted federal interest in a competitive econom
The unsubstantiated state concerns
in this case
simply are not of the same statu
Sherman Act.
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly
decided that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's
wine pricing program.1. 6 The judgment of the California
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is
Affirmed.

16
Since Midcal requested only injunctive relief from the state court,
there is no question before us involving liability for damages under 15
tJ. s. c. § 15.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-97
California Retail Liquor Deal-~ On Writ of Certiorari to the
ers Association, Petitioner,
Court of Appeal of Califorv.
nia for the Third Appellate
District.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., et al.
[February -, 1980]
Mn. J usTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal1 Aluminum, Inc.J
a wine distributor, presented a successful antitrust challenge
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting statutes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is
whether those state laws are shielded from the Sherman Act
by eithrr the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943), or § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.

I
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Professions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers must
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules. 1 If
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade con·
tract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that /
The stnt,u le provides:
"Etwh wi11c grower, wholesaler licem;ed to sell wine, wino rectifier, and
rect.ifier shall:
''(a) Po~1 , a schedule of selling pricl';; of wine to retailers or con;;umers
for whirh hi:; rc:;all' price iAnot governed by it fair trade coutra.ct made
by the p(•rson who owns or controls the bmml.
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file n schedule of resale
pric<'8, if he owns or coHtrols a brand of wine resold to retailers or
/
con,;umer~." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (West 1964) .
_/
1
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producer's brands. /d., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair
trade contract.... " Id., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979).
The State is divided into three trading areas for administration of the wine pricing program. A single fair trade contract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all wholesale transactions in that brand within a given trading area.
/d., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similiarly,
state regulations provide that the wine prices posted by a
single wholesaler within a trading area bind all wholesalers
in that area. Midcdl Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. .t\.pp.
3d 979, 983- 984. 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 ( 1979 ). A licensee
seling below the established prices faces fines, license suspension, or outright license revocation. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§ 24880. 2 The State has no direct control over wine prices,
and it does uot review the reasonableness of the prices set by
wine dealers.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine
in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allegations were true and that the State could fine it or suspend
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midca.l then
filed a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal for
the Third Appellate District asking for an injunction against
the State's wine pricing system.
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C.
2 Licen~re::; that sell wiuc below the prices specified in fair tr·ade contract,::; or schedule,; al,.:o may be ~ubjcct to private damage suits for unfair
competition. I d., § 24752,

CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALERS v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM

3

§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice
v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431,
579 P. 2d 476 (1978). where the California Supreme Court
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors.
In that case, the court held that because the State played
only a passive part in liquor pricing, there was no Parker v.
Brown immunity for the program.

"In the price maiutenance program before us, the state
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The
prices are established by the producers according to their
own economic interests. without regard to any actual or
potential anticompetitive effect; the state's role is restricted to enforcing the prices specified by the producers.
There is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the
state to insure that the policies of the Sherman Act are
not 'unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486.
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pricing policies were protected by ~ 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which insulates state regulation of intoxicating liquors
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion
of temperance and the preservation of small retail establishments. The court emphasized that the California system
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the
program. mauy comparable brands of liquor were marketed
at identical prices.~ Referring to congressional and state
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price maina Tho court cited record evidence tlmt in July 1976, five leading brands
of gin each Hold in California for $4.~9 for a fifth of a gallon, a11d that
five leacling brand:; of ~cotch whi:;key ,;old for either $8.a9 or $8.40 a fifth.
Rice v. Alcohvlic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, ar1d
nn. 14, 16, 579 P. 2d 476, 491-492, and nn. 14, 1G (1978) •

•
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or
small retail stores. See pp. 14-15, infra.
In the instant case, the State Court of Appeal found the
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984,
153 Cal. Rptr .. at 760. The court ordered the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade.
The Departmeut. which in Rice had not sought certiorari from
this Court. did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Association. an intervenor." The California Supreme Court declined
to hear the case. aud the Dealers Association sought certiorari
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979),
and now affirm the decision of the state court.

II
The threshold question is whether California's plan for
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled
consistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains
trade. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S.
373, 407 (1911). the Court observed that such arrangements
are "desigm•d to maintain prices ... , and to prevent competitioll among those who trade in [competing goods]." See
Albrecht \'. The Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960); United
States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U. S. 85 (1920). For many
ears owever, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the
L"""""~t..
at~e"'s to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693.
The goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect ~
1 Tho St.at<' a.l~o did not appeal the decit:ion in Capiscean C01·p. v.
Alcoholic Beverage Cuntrul Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal.
llptr. 49:Z ( 197H), whi<'h u~ed the anal~·si::; in Uice to invaliJ,ite Califomia's
rc:oale priee mnintPJWJH'P ~e hemc for retail wine :;ale.- to con.-umcr~.
5 The Califomia HPtail Liqnor Dealer;; At<l:iociation, a, trade associ<Ltion
of indcp<'uuent. retail liquor dealer::; in California, claim::; over 3,000,
members,
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1:>tnall retail establishme11ts that Congress thought might otherwise be driven from the marketplace by large-volume discouBters. But in 1975 that congressional permission was
rescinded. The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat.
801, repealed the Miller-Tydi11gs Act and related legislation.<~
Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price maintenance now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry
or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity.
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale
price maintenanc(' in violation of the Shermau Act. Schweymann Bros. '. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 ( 1951); see
Albrecht v. 'l'he Herald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & So11B, 340 U.S. 211 ( 1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. Park & So11s Co., supra. The wine producer holds the
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out
·u Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal c~
,-,--..'--1-o
~
·
as effectively as if
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same
restrictions . .. by agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at
408. 7 Moreowr, there call be no claim that the California
program is simply intrastate regulation beyolld the reach of
the Sherman Act. :::lee Schweyrnann Bros. v. Calvert Corp.,
supra; Burke v. Ford, 089 U. S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
u The congn·:<~ional report~ tlreompauyiug the Consumer Goods Pricing
A<"t of Hli5, 89 Stat. 801, notPd that. repPal of fair trade authority
would not alt<'r whatC'v<'r ]JOW<'r the State~ hold under the Twenty-fir:;t
Amendnwnt to eontrol liquor price:;. S. Rep. No. 94--!66, 94th Cong.,
l~<t SP,.;s., 2 (19i5): H. R. RPp. No. 94-:341, 94th Cong., M SPSS., :3, n. 2
(Hii5). We con~idPr the effect of the Twenty-first Ampndment on this
case in Part III, infra.
7 In Rice, the Califoruia. Suprrmc Court found direct evidence that rpsale
prire main1emuJe<> r<':;nltPd in horizontal pri<'e fixing. SE-e p. 3, supra,
and u. 3. Although tlw Court of Appt>al made no such ~;pccific finding in
thi:s ease, tiH-' <'OUrt. notE-d that tlw wine pricing sy:;tPm "rannot. bE' upheld
for the S:.llll£'. reasons the rE'tail prire maintenance provi~;ion~ were dPc!ared
iuvalid. in, Rice." P.!i~cal, Aluminum , Inc. v. Rice. 90 Cal. App . :3d 979,,.

983,15,1 C"l. Hptc. '''· 760 (1979).

/
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish au titrust
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That
immunity for state regulatory programs is gromtded in our
federal structure. "In a dual system of govemmeut in which,
under the Constitution, the states arc sovereign. save only as
Congress may coustitutionally subtract from their authority,
au unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's coutrol over its
officers and ageuts is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."
ld., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court fouud in the
Sherman Act no purposf' to nullify state powers. Because the
Act is directed against "individual and not state actiou," the
C'ourt concluded that state regulatory programs could not
violate it. I d. , at H52.
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricultural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organization of local cooperatives to develop marketing policies for the
ra1sm crop. Th€· Court emphasized that the Advisory Commission. ·which was appointeu by the governor. had to approve
cooperative polici<'s following public hearings: "It is the state
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate
program. . . . lll t is the state, acting through the Commission, which adopts the program and enforces it ... ." !d., at
852. In viPw of this exte11sive official oversight, the Court
wrote, the Sherma11 Act did not apply. \Yithout such oversight. the result could have been different. The Court expressly noted. "a state does not give immunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it,
or by declaring that their action is lawful. ... " !d., a.t 351.
Several rece11t decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In
Goldfarb Y. Viryiuia State Bar, 421 U. S. 773 ( 1975). the Court
concluded that feP schedu.les enforced by a state bar association were not mamlated by ethical standards established by the
Atate Supreme Court. T'he fee schedules therefore were uot
unmune from antitrust attack.. "r t is Hot enough that ....
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auticompetitive COJH1uct is 'prompted' by state action; rather,
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the
State acting as sovereign." /d., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U. S. 579 ( 1976) , a majority of the
Court found that 110 antitrust immunity was conferred when
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held
immune from Rherman Act challeuge because they "reflect [ed]
a clear articulatio11 of the State's policy with regard to professioual behavior" ami were "subject to pointed re-examiuation by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in
e11forcemeut proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U. S. 350. 362 (1977).
Only last Term, this Court found antitrust immunity for a
California program requiring state approval of the location of
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Yehicle Bd. of Calif.
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 1!. S. 96 (1978). That ro ram
provided that the State would hold a hearing fan automobile
franchisee protested~ the establishment or relocation of a competing dealership. I d., at 103. In· view of the State's active
role, the Court held, the program was not subject to the
Sherman Act. The "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" goal of the state policy was to "displace unfettered
business freedom in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealerships." !d., at 109·.
These decisious establish two staJ](]ards for antitrust immunity uuder Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint
must be ''one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively supervised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of
_/
BRENNAN, J .).~ The California system for wiue pricing satis-/
8 SPe Norman's On the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley , 44 F. 2d 1011, 1018
(CA3 1971) ; Asheville 'l'obacco !3d .. v. F'f'C, 263 F. 2d 50:2., 509-510 (CA4.

/
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price maintenance. The program, however, does not meet the second
requirement for Parker immunity. .The State simply authorizes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate
the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamination" of the program. 0 The national policy in favor of
competition caunot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private
price-fixing arrangellH~llt. As Parker teaches. "a state does
not give immunity to those v.·ho violate the Sherman Act by
authorizi11g them to violate it, or by declaring that their action
is lav.-ful. . .. " 317 U. S., at 351.

III
Petitioner contends that eveu if California's system of wine
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amendment bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. Section 1 of that Amendme11 t repealed the Eighteenth Amendment's prohibition ou the manufacture, sale or transportation
of liquor. The second section reserved to the States certain
.
power to regulate traffic in liquor: "The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of t h e /
1\150); Notr, htrkl:'r v. Bmtcn RrviHitl·u: The Statr Action Doctrine After
Ouldfarb. Cantor, and Bates. 77 Colum. L. Rrv. 898, 016 (1977) .
9 The Califomia program eo11tra~ts with the approach of tho;;c Statrs
thcLt complf•tely control thl' di~trib11tion of liquor within their l>oundariCJ:!.
H. (f ., Va. Code§§ 4-15, 4-:2.S (Repl. Vol. 1979). Such ('Ompn·hen~ive regulatiou would be imnnuw from the Slwrma.n Act under Parker \' , Brmt•n,
317 U. S. :Hl (Hl-!:l), :::ince the 8tt<tr> would "di~place unfettered bu~iness
frC'f'dom'' with it" own }lOwer. New Motor Vehicle Bd. r. Orrin W. Fox
Co., 439 U. S. 9() , 109 (1978) ; ::;ee State Board v. Young's Market Co.),
299 U.S. 5D, 63 (HJ;)li) .

/

/
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United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicatiug
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
The remaining question before us is whether § 2 permits
California to countermand the congressio11al policy-adopted
under the commerce power-In favor of competition.

A
In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court has focused primarily 011 the language o.f the
provision rather than the history behind it. Sta.te Board v.
Young's Market Co. , 299 U. S. 59, 63-04 (1936). 1 '> In terms,
the Amendment gives tlw States control over the "transportation or importation' ' of liquor into their territories. Of course,
such control logically entails considerablP regulatory power
~
not strictly limited to importipg and transporting alcohol./
I

The approach is ~upportrd b~· !:'Ollnd ranon ~ of con ~ titutional int.e rpretation and dPmon~tratl'c< a. wi~P rdnetanee to wade .into the complex
C'lll'l'eut~ beneath thr c·ongre~"ional re"olntion 1hat proposed the Amendnwnt. and the :;tatt·. (·onveution s that ratifircl it. The Senate ~ponsor
of tho resolution ,;aid t h<· purpo"e of § 2 wa" " to re~torc to the State::; .. .
ah"olute control in pffr('t. ovrr inter::<ta.tl' comnwrcp affecting intoxit"ating liquor:-: .. . ." 76 C'ong. H(•c. 414:3 (IU;n) (remarks of Sen.
Blainr) . Y ·et he al~o made :>tateltlf'llt"' c<upporting Midcal ' ~ elaim that
--~~IIJI••••..._ wa ~ fh·~igned only to cn~Hre t.hat ' 'dr~· " Skt:t<·"' could not
r------:---"'7'~-11' ll.!;l.,lfQ;OI~·(::•e5!Jd o wrmit. the ~alt• of liqu~>r. St>e id., at. -!140-41 1. The ~ketchy
L.. -ft.,_ f:e.£.~
reeords of the ~tate couventionc< rf•t!ect 110 coiJ:;<'II"U" on the thrust of
-J
§ 2, although dell'ga.t<·s at :;evt•r:d ronn•iJLion~ cxpn·~"'e<:l th<' ir hope thut
~+
slate regulation ol' liquo1· t raJ!ic would lwgin immediately. E. Brown,
Jht iftcation of thr Tw<'llty-fi r:,;t. Amendmcn1. t.o the Con~titutiou 104
(19:~8) (Wil~on, l're~ideJJL of 11H· Idaho Convcnt.ion); id ., a.t 191-192
(Darnall. Prt>1<idcn t of ~Lar~'iand Convrnt.ion); 'id., at 247 (G11ylord, Chairman of ..\Ii::;::;otlri Con1·<·ution) ; ·irl., at 4p9-47:3 (re~olution adopted at
·wa:;hington Com·<'nt.ioJJ C1tlli11g for ,;:tate a.etion "to regulate the liquor
lrnffic"). S<>e genemlly 'N·ot<·, The 'Effeet of the Twenty-fir~1 . Amendmeut
Oll St.:Lte Authority to Co.utrol lutoxi<'ating Liquor:;, 75 Cohun. L. Rev.
1578, 1580 (1975) ; XotP, Eeonomie Locali:;m in State .-\lcoholic Beverage
Lawtl-Experience Under the Twenty-fir~t Amendment, 72 Harv. L. llev.
1145, 11-±7 (1959) .
10

.-
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ZijJri·n, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939). We should
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority.
This Court's early decisions ou the Twenty-first Amendment recognized that each State holds great powers over the
importatio11 of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Marlcet, supra, co11cemed a liceuse fee for interstate imports of
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types
of liquor that could be imported from other Sta.tes, Mahoney
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States. Pinch &
Co. v. NicKittr'ick, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Ind-ianapolis Brewing
Co. v. Liquor eontrol Comm'n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). The
Court upheld the challenged state authority in each case,
largely ou the basis of the States' special power over the
"importation alld transportatiou '' of intoxicating liquors. Yet
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2
"freed the States frow all restrictions upon the police power
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's
Market, supra, 229 ·u. S.. at 64.
Subsequcu t clecisiOilS have given "wide latitude" to state
liquor regulation, Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35,
42 ( HW6), but they also have stressed that important federal
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the
Twenty-first Amendment. The States cannot tax imported
liquor in violation of the Export-Import Clause. Departrn.ent
of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U. S. 341 (1964). Nor
can they insulate the liquor industry from the Fourteenth
Ameudment's requirements of equal protection, Craig v.
Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 (1976), and due process, Wis. consin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1970).
More difficult to define, however, is the exte11t to which
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce
power. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the

/
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Court has held that tht' Federal Government retains some
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v.
Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court
found no violation of the Tweuty-first Amendment in a
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alcohol Administration Act. 49 Stat. 977 (1935). And in Ziffrin,
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's
system of licensing liquor haulers unt' ·
atisfied that the
state program was reasonable.
, at 139.
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were
sharpen ed in Hostetter\', Idlewild Liquor Corp. , 377 U. f:l. 324,
331- 332 (1 !:){)4)
0

" Tu draw a conclusiou . . . that the Tweuty-first
Amenchnent has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulatiou of intoxicating liquors
is eouccrned would, however, be au absurd oversimplifieatioll . If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto
'repeaJPd, ' theu Congress would be left with no regulatory
power owr interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating
liquor. ~uch a conclusion would be patently bizarre and
is d<'monstrably incorrect."
The Court add eel a siguificant, it' elementary, observation:
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause
an' parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of
the Constitution. each must be considered in the light of the
othe.r, and in the context of the issues aud interests at s t a k e /
in any concrete case." !d., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429
U. S. 190, 20() (1976).n
u in Nippert ,.. C'ity of Richmond, 627 U. S. 416 (1946) , the Court ·
conlliH'llte<l in a footuote:
"rEJven tJw <·omm<'J'Ce in int.oxicating liquors, over which the Twenty-fir~t
AnH•ndnu·nt. gives the StatE'~ tlw highest. dPgrce of control, is not altogc·t.lH·r bcyoud the reach of tlw federal commerce power, at any rate when
the Stut e'-: rPgulation ~q1111.rE'ly conflict:; with regulation imposed br Congre;:;:; . .. ," !d .. at; 425, 11. J5.
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This pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers
has been evident in several decisions where the Court held
liquor companies liable for anticompetitive conduct not mandated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co . v. Seagr.am &
Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frankfort
Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945). In Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951), for example, a
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a distributor to comply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a program similar in many respects to the California system at
issue here. The Court held thattthe Loms1ana statute could
not be enforced ag·ainst the distributor Is
't · ' ·
H1
Fifteen years later, the Court rejected a Sherman Act challenge to a X ew York law requiring liquor dealers
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest
price" charged anywhere in the Uuited States. Seagram &
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court concluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible ecouomic
pressure> on the [ dealersJ to violate the Sherman Act in order
to comply,'' but it also cautioned that "[n]othing ·in the
Twenty-first Amendment. of course, would prevent the enforcement of the Sherma11 Act'' against au i11terstate conspiracy to fix liquor prices. !d., at 45--46. See Burke\'. Ford,
389 U. S. ::320 ( HH37) (per curiam).
These decisions demo11strate that there is uo bright line
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twentyfirst Amendme11t grants the States virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regulations, those eontrols may be subject to the federal commerce power in appropriate situations. The competing state
and federal inter€'sts ca11 be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those concc·rns iu a "concr€'te case.'' Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332,
1

•
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B
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor
of competition is both familiar and substantial.
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
a11d our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to
the protection of our fuudamental personal freedoms."
United States v. 'Popco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). JL__
St'c Northern Pacific Ry. \. l'n·ited States, 356 U. 8. 1, 4 / - "
( Hl58). Although this federal interest is expressed through
a statute rather than a constitutional provision . Congress
"exercisr edj all the power it possessed" under the Commerce
Clause when it approved the Shermau Act. Aaantic Cleaners & Dyers v. Un-ited States, 286 U. S. 427. 4a5 (1932); see
City of La,fayette v. Lo·uisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. R.,
at 398. ·w e must acknowledge the importance of the Act's
procomJwtition policy.
The state interests protected by California's resale price
maiutenance system were identified by the state courts in this
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in
Hice v. Alcoholic Beverage Contml Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d,
at 451, 579 P. 2d. at 490.' 2 Of course, the fiHdings and
conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Court ..-----to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the/
1 " A::; thr 111111~ual po::;ture of thi~ ca~c reAt>cts, the State of California
hn,; shown le~:,; than an enthu~ia~tie inlere~t in it~ wine pricing system.
A~ we noted, thr ~tate agrncy rr~pon~iblr for administering the program
did not appt•al thr drcision of the Californin Court of Appeal. See p . 4,
snpm; Tr. of Om! Aqz:. 20. ln:stead, thi" action has bren maintained by
the Cnlifornia Liquor Dealer" A:s;;ociation, <L prviatr illtl'rvenor. But
neither thr iutrrvenor nor thr Statr Attornry Genrral, who filed a brief
amicus ruriae in tmpport of the legi~Jativr schrmc, has sprcifird any state
interc~t::; protrrt('([ by llw resalr pric(' maintenance system othrr than.
thot>e notrd in thr ~tate court opinion c:itecl in text,
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of
Pythias, 225 U. S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v.
Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 160 (1952).
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of
the State's system of wine pricing was "controlled by the reasoning of the [California] Supreme Court in Rice [supm] ."
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in
resale price mai11tenance for distilled liquors.
In R-ice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind
liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d. at 451, 579 P. 2d, at
490. 1 ;; The court foulld little correlation between resale price
maiuteuauce aDd temperance. It cited a state study showing
a 42~ increase in per capita liquor consumption in California
from 1950 to ID72. while resale price maintenance was in effect.
!d., at 457-458. 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing California. Dept. of
Finance, Alcohol a.11d the State: A Reappraisal of California's
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the
court wrote. "at the very lea.st raise a doubt regarding the
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote
temperance." lbid. 11
t 3 Th<• California Court of Appeal found no additional ~> tate interests in
the inHtaut ea~e . 90 Cal. Ap11 . 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761.
That court rejeeted the suggestion t.hat the wine price program was designed to protec t t he StatP's wine induHtry, pointing out that the statutes
"do not di;;tingui.-ill between California wines and imported wines. " Ibid.
H Se(• Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter. :~84 U.s. a5, 39 (HJfl6) (citing study
concludiug that rE'~al o price maintenance in New York State had "nq
·ignifieatJt effect upon the coiJsumption of alcoholic bevrrage;;") .
·
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in
orderly market conditions as "protect[ing l small licensees
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456,
579 P. 2d, at 493. '" In gauging this interest, the court
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled ou the claim
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair
trade laws were 11ecessary to the economic survival of small
reta.ilers. . . . " Ibid. The ageucy relied on a congressional
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted
Ultder the Miller-Tycliitgs Act. ThP study revealed that
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of
finn failures than ·free trade states. and the rate of growth
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade
laws." lb·id., citing 8. Rep. No. 94-466. 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
3 (1975). PoiHting to the congressional abandonment of fair
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. 5,
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justification to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price competition among retailers." 21 Cal. 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at
494. The Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion with
respect to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983.
·we have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the Califomia courts that the asserted state interests are less substantial than the uational policy iu favor of competition. That
evaluation of the resale price maintenance system for wine is
reasonable, and is supported by the evidence cited by the State
Supreme Court in Rice. NothiHg in the record in this case
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the State
The Califomia Supn·mr Court. abo stn.led that orderly market' conclitionH might. "rrduce <'X<'<'<l~ivr romprtit.ion, t.herrby encouraging temperntH'<'." 21 Cal. :{d, nt. 4511, 579 P. 2d. at 49il. The concern for t.emp<·nmee,
howrvcr, wa:; com;iciNPd by thr court ns an indrpendent .-tate interest
in re~ale price maintenance for liquor.
10
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Attorney General in his amicus brief has demonstrated that
the program inhibits the consumption of alcohol by Califomians. We need not consider whether the legitimate state
interests in temperance and the protection of small retailers
ever could prevail against the undoubted federal interest in a
competitive economy. The unsubstantiated state concerns
~t forward in this case simply are not of the same statuJ"e-as-.- -th~goals of the Sherman Act.
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly
decided that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shelter
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's
wiHe pricing program.'n The judgment of the California
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is
Affirmed,

JG 8i11ce Midcal requested only injunctive relief from t.he state court,
there i::; no que::;tion before "'involving liability fo< damng" w • d /

u.s. c.§ 15.

~o:

Th ~

! ,..

•· r .

ChiAf

,,
I'

'

l«r.

2-25-80

; .
t i L:~
. ~ i ,;e

1

J\. ,~ice

• 1

:·shall

T31ackwun
Rahnqui st
Stevena

From: Mr. Justic e Powell

Stylistic Changes Throughout.
2nd DRAFT

Circulated: _______________
'Recirculated:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-97
California Retail Liquor Deal-~ On Writ of Certiorari to the
ers Association, Petitioner,
Court of Appeal of Califorv.
nia for the Third Appellate
~ideal Aluminum, Inc., et al.
District,
[February - , 1980]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc ..,
a. wine distributor. presented a successful antitrust challenge
to California's resale price maintE'uance and price posting statutes for the wholesa1e wine trade. The issue in this case is
whether those state 1aws are shie1ded from the Sherman Act
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317
U. S. 341 (1943), or § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.

1
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Professions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers must
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules. 1 If
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade contract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that
The statute provides:
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, and
rectifier shall:
"(a) Post a :;chedule of selling prier;; of wme to retailer~ or ron::mmers
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contmct made
by the person who owns or controls the brand.
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of re:;ale
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of wine resold to ret.'iilers or
consumers." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (West 1964).
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producer's brands. !d., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair
trade contract.. . ." !d., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979) .
The State is divided into three trading areas for administration of the wine pricing program. A single fair trade con.
tract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all wholesale transactions in that brand within a given trading area.
!d., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similiarly,
state regulations provide that the wine prices posted by a
single wholesaler within a trading area bind all wholesalers
in that area. Midcctl Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App.
3d 979. 983-984. 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 (1979'). A licensee
seling below the established prices faces fines, license suspension, or outright license revocation. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§ 24880. 2 The State has no direct control over wine prices,
and it does not review the reasonableness of the prices set by
wine dealers.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine
in Southern California. In July 1978, the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipu1ated that the allegations were true and that the State could fine it or suspend
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midcal then
filed a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal for
the Third Appellate District asking for an injunction against
the State's wine pricing system.
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme
restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C.
2
Licen~ees that ,;ell wine below the price:; specified in fair trade contracts or ~chedule. · also may be l:lUbjcct t.o private damage ~uits for uufair
'competition. I d., § 24752,
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The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice

v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431,
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors.
In that case, the court held that because the State played
only a passive part in liquor pricing, there was no Parker v.
Brown immunity for the program.
"In the price maintenance program before us, the state
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The
prices are established by the producers according to their
own eco11omic interests, without regard to any actual or
potential anticohlpetitive effect; the state's role is re·
stricted to enforcing the prices specified by the producers.
There is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the
state to insure that the policiPs of the Sherman Act are
not 'unn ecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2cl, at 486.
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pricing policies were protected by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amend~
ment, which insulates state regula.tion of intoxicating liquors
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion
of temperance and the preservation of small retail establishments. '!"he court emphasized that the California system
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but
also frequently resulted in horizontal pricefixing. Under the
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed
at identical prices. 3 Referring to congressional and state
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price mainThe court cited record evidence tlmt. iu July 1976, five leading brand::.
of gin each sold in California for $4.89 for a. fifth of a gallon, and that,
five leading brands of scotch whiske~' sold for either $8.39 or $8.40 tL fifth .
Rice ' . Alcoholic Beverage Control Appealli Bd., 21 CaL 3d 431, 454, and
mm.l4, 16, 5:n! P.2d 476, 491-492, and m·n . H,1o (1978).
8
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or
small retail stores. See pp. 14--15, infra.
In the instant case, the ·state Court of Appeal found the
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984,
153 Cal. Rptr., at 760. The court ordered the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade.
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from
this Court, did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, an intervenor. 5 The California Supreme Court declined
to hear the case, and the Dealers Association sought certiorari
(1979),
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U. S. and now affirm the decision of the state court.

II
The threshold question ·is whether California's plan for
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled
consistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains
trade. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 407 (1911) , the Court observed that such arrangements
are "designed to maintain prices . . . , and to prevent competition among those who trade in [competing goods]." See
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960); United
States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920). For many
years, however, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the
States to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693.
The goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect
The State also did not appeal the decision in Capiscean Corp . v,
Alcoholic Bevemge Control Appeals Bel., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 492 (1979), which u~ed the analysi~ in Rice to invalidate Califomia's
resale price maintenance scheme for retail wine ~ales to consumers.
G The California Retail Liquor Dealer:; A::;sociation, a trade a:;sociation
of independent retail liquor dealer;:; in California, claim::; over 3,000
members.
4
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'Small retail establishments that Congress thought might otherwise be driven from the marketplace by large-volume discounters. But in 1975 that congressional permission was
rescinded. The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat.
801, repealed the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation. 6
Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price maintenance now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry
or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity.
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. Park & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competition as effectively as if wholesalers "formed a combination
and endeavored to establish the same restrictious ... by
agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at 408. 7 Moreover,
there can be no claim that the California program is simply
intrastate rPgulation beyoud the reach of the Sherman Act.
See Schwegnwnn Bros. Y. Calvert Corp., supra; Burke v. Ford,
389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
The congressional reports accompanymg the Consumer Goods Pricing
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that repeal of fair trade authority
would not alter wh.ttever power the States hold under the Twenty-first
Amendment to control liquor price~. S. Hep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 2 (1975) ; H. R. Hep. No. 94-341, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, n. 2
(1975). We con~ider the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on this
case in Part III, infra.
7 In Rice, the California Supreme Court found direct evidence that re~ale
price maintenance resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. 3, supra,
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific finding in
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing sy~tem "cannot be upheld
for the same reasons the retail price maintenance provisions were declared
invalid in Rice." Midcal Al-uminum, Inc . v Rice, 90 Cal. App . 3d 979,
983, 153 Ca.!. Rptr. 757, 760 (1979) .
6
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement iJ?.
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust
immunity under Parker v. BtoWn, 317 U.S. 34:1 (1943). That
immunity for state reguiatory pfograms is grounded in out
federal structure. "In a duai system of government in which,
under the Constitution, the states at~ sovereign, save only aS
Congress may constitutionaliy sub~rap~ froin their authority,
an unexpressed purpose to 11Uii.ify a sta~e's control over i~s
officers and agents is not lightiy to be attributed to Cougress:';
id., at 351. In Paricer v. Brown, this Court foui1ci in the
~herman Act no purpose to nuiiify st~te powers. Because the
Act is directed against "indivi(iu~=tl a11d not state action," the
Court concluded that state iiegJ.!li'J-tqry prograius could nof
.
·
.
_
violate it. !d., at 352.
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricul ..
tural Prorate Advisory Commission authorized the organiza,,.
tion of local cppperatives to develop_marketing pQlicies for the
raisin crop. The Court emphasized that the Advisory Com..
mission, which was apJ~ointed by. the goveruor, had to approve
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state·
which has created the machinery for establishing. the prorate
program. . . . [I It is the state, actiug through the Commis..
!'ion, which adopts the program an.cl enforces it...." I d., at
352. In view of this ext(ei!sive officjal oyersight, the Court
wrote, the Sherman Act did not apply. With.o.ut such over,
sight. the result could have been different. The Court expressly noted, "a state do~s not give iinniunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by autho(izing them to , violat~ i~,
or by declaring that their actioi1 is lawful. . . ." I d., at 351 ,
. Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the Court
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state ba.r associa...
tion were not mandated by ethical standards established by the
State
Supreme
Court.
The fee schedules
therefore
were not
• . .,. .. ,, '
..."'\_
'" .
•
- f
• '
immune from antitrust attack. "It is not enough that , , ,
·~

~

~

79-97-0PINION
CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALERS v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM

7

anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather,
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the
State acting as sovereign." Id., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U. S. 579 ( 1976), a majority of the
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer adverti1?ing were held
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "reftect[ed]
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker- the Arizona Supreme Court--in
enforcement proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
u. s. 350, 362 (1977).
Only last Term, this Court found antitrust immunity for a
California program requiring state approval of the location of
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Calif.
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That program
provided that the State would hold a hearing if au automobile
franchisee protested the establishment or relocation of a competing dealership. !d., at 103. Iu view of the State's active
role, the Court held, the program was not subject to the
Sherman Act. The "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" goal of the state policy was to "displace unfettered
business freedom in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealerships." I d., at 109.
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy" ; second, the policy must be "actively supervised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co. , 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.) .8 The California system for wine pricing satis..
8 See Norman's On the Water/runt, Inc . v. Wheatley, 4 F . 2d 1011, 1018
(CAS 119'(1) ~ 4-sheville Tobacco Bel~. v. llTC, 2.o3 F . 2d 502, 509-510 (CA4

£./
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price maintenance. The program, however, does not meet the second
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply authorizes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate
the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamination" of the program.\) The national policy in favor of
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private
price-fixing arrangement. As Parl~er teaches, "a state does
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action
is lawful. ... " 317 U. S., at 351.

III
Petitioner contends that eveu if California's system of wine
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amendment bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. Section 1 of that Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment's prohibition 011 the manufacture, sale or transportation
of liquor. The second section reserved to the States certain
power to regulate tra.ffic in liquor: "The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
1959); Note, Parker v. Brown Rt>vbited: The State Action Doctrine After
Goldfarb, Cantor, and BateN, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 898, 916 (1977) .
9
The California program contra~:~ts with the approach of those States
that completely control the di~trii.Jution of liquor within their bounclariel:i.
E. g., Va. Code §§ 4-15, 4-28 (Rep!. Vol. 1979). Such comprehen~ive regulation would be immune from the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown,
317 U. S. 341 (1943), since the State would "di~place unfettered bu~in~s
freedom" with its own power. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox
Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978) ; see State Board v. Young's Market Co .•
Z_99 U.S. 59, 63 (1936).
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United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
The remaining question before us is whether § 2 permits
California to countermand the congressional policy-adopted
under the commerce power-in favor of competition.

A
In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court has focused primarily on the language of the
provision rather than the history behind it. State Board v.
Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1936). 10 In terms,
the Amendment gives the States control over the "transportation or importation" of liquor into their territories. Of course,
such control logically entails considerable regulatory power
not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol.
The approach is supported by sound canons of constitutional interpretation and demonstrates a wise reluchmce to wade into the complex
currents beneath the eongresr;ional rrt>olution that proposed the Amendment and the ~:;tate conventions that ratified it. The Senate ~:;ponsor
of the resolution said the purpose of § 2' was " to restore to the State ' .. .
absolute coni rol in effect O\'er inter::;tate commerce affecting intoxicating liquors . . . ." 76 Cong. Rec . 4143 (1933) (remarks of Sen.
Blaine). Yet he abo madr ~tatement~ ~upporting .Ylideal's claim that§ 2
was drsignecl only to ensure that "dry" Statrs could not. be force by the
Federal Government to permit the ~:;a l e of liquor. See id., at 4140-4141.
The sketchy recordt> of the state conventions reflect no consensus on the
thrust. of § 2, although drlegates ut. ~everal convrntions expres::;rd their hope
that state rrgulation of liquor traffic would brgin immediately. E. Brown,
Ratification of the Twenty-fin;t Amendment to the Com;titution 104
(1938) (Wibon, President of the Idaho Convention); id., at 191-192
(Darnall, President of Maryland Convention); id., at 247 (Gaylord, Chairman of Missouri Convention); id., a.t 469-473 (resolution adopted at,
Washington Convention c~llling for state action "to regulate the liquor
traffic") . See generally Note, The Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment
on State Authority to Control Intoxicating Liquor:;, 75 Colt1m. L. Rev.
1578, 1580 (1975); Note, Economic Localit>m in State Alcoholic Beverage
Laws-Experience Under the Twenty-first Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Uev,
1145, 1147 (1959).
10
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S~ 132, 138 (1939). We should
not, however, lose sight of the e~plicit grant of authority,
This Court's early decisions on the Twenty-first Amendment recognized that each State holds great powers over the
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Mar ..
ket, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two other~
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch &
Co. v. McKittriclc, 305 U.S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing
Co. v. Liquor Control Cornrn'n, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). The
Court upheld the ch!1llenged state authority in each case,
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's
Market, supra, 229 U.S., at 64.
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude" to state
liquor regulation, Sea(Jrarn & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35,
42 (1966) , but they aiso have stressed that important federal
interests in liquor ·m atters survived the ratincation of the
Twenty-first Amendment. The States cannot tax imported
liquor in violation of the E){port-Import Clause. Department
of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 D. S. 341 (1964). Nor
can they insulate the liquor industry fro!n the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirements of equal protection, Craig v.
Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 (1976), and due process, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1970).
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce
powet. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v.
Morgenthau, 307 U. S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amend1pent in a
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 ( 1935). And in Ziffrin,
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the
state program was reasonable. 308 U. S., at 139.
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324,
331-332 (1964).
"To draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto
'repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and
is demonstrably incorrect."
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation:
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of
the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake
in any concrete case." Id. , at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429
190, 206 (1976). 11

u. s.

11 In Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court
commented in a footnote:
"[E]ven the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Tweuty-first
Amendment gives the States the highest degree of control, is not, altogether beyond the reach of the federal commerce power, at any rate when
the State's regulation squarely conflicts with regulation impo::;rd by Congress ..•." !d., at 425, n. 15.
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This pragmatic effort to hannonize state and federal powells
has been evident in several decisions where the Court held
liquor companies liable for anticompetitive conduct not mandated by a S~te. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram &
Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frankfort
Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945) . In Schwegman,_
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951), for example, a
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a. distributor to ~om::
ply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a program similar in many respects to the California system at
issue here. The Court held that because the Louisiana stat-:
ute violated the Sherman Act, it could not be enforced against
the distributor. Fifteen years later, the Court rejected aSher:man Act challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest
price" charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram &
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court con ..
eluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible economic
pressure on the [ deaiers] to vioiate the Sherman Act in order
to comply." but it also cautio11ed that "[n] othing in the
Twenty-first Ame11dment, of course. would prevent the en..
forcement of the Sherman Act" against an interstate conspiracy to fix liquor priers. i d., at 45---46. See Burke v. Ford,
389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
These decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line
between federai and state powers over liquor. The Twenty~
first Amendment grants the States virtuaily compiete control
over whether to permit importation oi; saie of iiquor and how
to structure the iiquor distribution system. Although States
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regulations, those controls may be subject to the federal commerce power in appropriate situations. The competing state
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a "concrete case." Hostetter v. Idle-.
wild ·Liquor Corp., 377 u. s.l at 332,
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B
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor
of competition is both familiar and substantial.
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms. "
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972).
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 456 U. S. 1, 4
( 1958) . Although this federal interest is expressed through
a statute rather than a constitutional provision, Congress
"exercis[ed] all the power it possessed" under the Commerce
Clause when it approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U. S.,
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's
procompetition policy.
The state interests protected by California's resale price
maintenance system were identified by the state courts in this
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in
Rice v. Alcoholic Bevemge Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d,
at 451, 579 P. 2d, at 490. 12 Of course, the findings and
conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Court
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the
12 As the unusual posture of this case reflects, the State of California
has shown less than an enthusiastic intere,t in its wine pricing system.
As we noted, the state agency re:;ponsible for administering the program
did not appeal the decision of the California Court of Appeal. See p. 4,
supra; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Instead, this action has been maintained by
the California Liquor Dealers As:;ociation, a prviate intervenor. But
neither the intervenor nor the State Attorney General, who filed a brief
amicus curiae in support of the legi~laJive scheme, has specified any stato
interests protected by the rc:;ale price maintenance system other than
those noted in the si:.o't.te court opinions cited in text,
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of
Pythias, 225 U.S. 246, 261 ( 1912). Nevertheless, this Court
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v.
Wood, 314 U.S. 157, 160 (1952).
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of
the State's system of winP pricing was "·controlled by the reasoning of the [California] Supreme Court in Rice [s'Upm] ."
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors.
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind
liquor resale price maintenance: "to promote temperance and
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at
490. 1 3 The court found little correlation between resale price
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing
a 42 % increase in per capita liquor consumption in California
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect.
Id., at 457-458, 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing California Dept. of
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 ( 1974). Such studies, the
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote
temperance." lbid.14
18 The California Court of Appeal found no additional state interests in
the instant case. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 15:3 Cal. Rptr., a.t 760-761.
That court rejcctrd the sugge:;tion that the wine price program was designed to protect the State's wine industry, pointing out that the ;,iatutes
"do not distingullih between California winrs and imported wim•:::. " Ibid.
14 See Seagram & So11s v. Hoiitetter, 384 U. S. 35,39 (1966) (citing study
concludii1g that resale price maintenance in New York State had "no
slgnifica11t effect upon the cousmnption of alcoholic beverage~ " ).
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in
orderly JJlarket conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456,
579 P. 2d, at 493.' 5 In gauging this interest, the court
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small
retailers. . . ." Ibid. The agency relied on a congressional
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted
under the Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade
laws." Ibid. , citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. 5,
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justification to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price competition among retailers." 21 CaL 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at
494. The Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion with
respect to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983.
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the California courts that the asserted state interests are less substantial than the national policy in favor of competition. That
evaluation of the resale price maintenance system for wine is
reasonable, and is supported by the evidence cited by the State
Supreme Court in Rice. Nothing in the record in this case
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the State
15 The California Supreme Court al:so stated that orderly market conditions might ''reduce excrssive competition, thrrrby encouraging temperance." 21 Cal. :-kl, at 456, 579 P. 2d, at 493. The concern for temperance,
however, was considerrd by the court a::; an independent state interest
in resale price maintenance for li4uor.
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Attorney General in his am·icus brief has demonstrated that
the program inhibits the consumption of alcohol by Californians. We need not consider whether the legitimate sta:w
'interests in temperance and the protection of small retail~r~
ever could prevail against the undoubted feder;:tl interest in a
competitive economy. The unsubstantiated state concerns
put forward in this case simply ar~ not of the same stature a~
the goals of the Sherman Act,
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly
decided that the Twenty,.first Amendment provides no shelter
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's
wine pricing program.16 The judgment of the California
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is

Affirmed,

MR.

did not take part in the considera..
tion or decision of this case,
JusTICE BRENNAN

1 6 Since Midcal requested only injunctive relief from the state court,
there is no quillltJOn before tus involving liability for damages under 15,
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MR. JusTICl!: PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc . ,
a wine distributor, presented a. successful antitrust challenge
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting statutes for the wholesa1e wine trade. 'The issue in this case is
whether those state 'laws are shie1ded from the Sherman Act
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341 (1943), or § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.

Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Professions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, and rectifiers must
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules. 1 If
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade contract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that ~

•.

1 The statute pro~·ide :
"Each wine grower, wholesaler licensrcl t.o sell wine, wine rectifier, and
rectifier shall:
"(a) Post a t:;chedule of selling pricel:l of wine to retailerM or consumers
for which his resale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made
by the person who owns or controls the bmnd.
"(b) Make and file a fair trade contract and file a schedule of l'el:lale
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or
consumers." Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (We t 1964).
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producer's brands. !d., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair
trade contract...." !d., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979) .
The State is divided into three trading areas for administration of the wine pricing program. A single fair trade 'C Ontract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all wholesale transactions in that brand within a given trading area.
!d., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similiarly,
state regulations provide that the wine prices posted by a
single wholesaler within a trading area bind all wholesalers
in that area. Midcctl Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App.
3d 979. 983-984. 153 Cal. Rptr. 757. 762 ( 1979). A licensee
seling below the established prices faces fines, license suspension. or outright license revocation. CaL Bus. & Prof. Code
§ 24880.2 The State has no direct colltrol over wine prices,
and it does not review the reasonableness of the prices set by
wine dealers.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine
in South em California. In July 1978, the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department a.lso
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allegations were true and that the State could fine it or suspend
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midca.l then
filed a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal for
the Third Appellate District asking for an injunction against
the State's wine pricing system.
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme
restrains trade in violation of tlw Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C.~
2 Licem;ees that ::;ell wine below the pril'et> ~:>1Jecifird in fair trade contracts or schedule;; al::;o may be ::;ubjrct to private dmnage ;:;UJts l'or unfair
'competition. I d., § 24752,

79-97-0PINION
CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALERS v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM

§ 1 et seq.

3

The court relied entirely on the reasoning in R 'ice

v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431,
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors.
In that case, the court h~ld that because the State played
only a passive part in liquor pricing, there was no Parker v.
Brown immunity for the program.
"In the price maintenance program before us, the state
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The
prices are established by the producers according to their
own economic interests, without regard to any actual or
potential an ticompetitive effect; the state's role is re·
stricted to enfm•ciug the prices specified by the producers.
There is no control, or 'pointed l'e-examination,' by the
state to insute that the policies of the Sherman Act are
not ' unnecessarily subordinated' to state policy." 21
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2cl, at 486.
Rice also rejected the claim that California's liquor pricing policies were protected by ~ 2 of the Twenty-first Amend~
ment, which insulates state regula.tion of intoxicating liquors
from many federal restrictions. 'I'he court determined that
the natioual policy in favor of competition should prevail over
the state interests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion
of temperance and the pteservation of small retail establishments. '1'he court emphasized that the California system
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers but
also frequently resulted in horizontal price xing.
nder the
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed
at identical prices. 3 Referring to congressional and state
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price main- /
8

The court cited record evidence tlwt in July 1976, five leadmg brands
of gin each ;;old in California for $4.89 for a fifth of a gallon, and that,
five leading brand;; of scotch whil'!ke~ · ~old for either $8.39 or $8.40 a fifth .
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bel., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, and
mlll.14, 16, 519 P .2d 476,491- 492, and :un. H,lo (1978) .

~
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or
5mall retail stores. See pp. 14--15, infra.
In the instant case, the ·state Court of Appeal found the
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984,
153 Cal. Rptr., at 760. The court ordered the 'Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade.
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from
this Court, did not appea.J. the ruling in this case.4 An appeal
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Associa~
tion, an intervenor. 5 The California Supreme Court declined
to hear the case, and the Dealers Association sought certiorari
from this Court. We granted the writ, U. S . - (1979),
and now affirm the decision of the state court.

II
The threshold question is whether California's plan for
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled
consistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains
trade. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 407 (1911) , the Court observed that such arrangements
are "designed to maintain prices ... , and to prevent com~
petition among those who trade in [competing goods]." See
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960); United
States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920). For many
years, however, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the
States to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693.
The goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect
The State also did not appeal the decitlion in Capiscean Corp. v.
Alcoholic Bevemge Control Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 492 (1979) , which u::;ed the analysi" in Rice to invalidate California's
4

resale price maintenance ::;cheme for retail wine ::;ale; to con::;umer~.
5 The California Retail Liquor Dealer::; A~ociation, a trade a~ociation
of independent retail liquor dealer::! in California, claim::; over 3,000
members.

79-97-0PINION
CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALERS v. lVIIDCAL ALUMINUM

'5

-small retail establishments that Congress thought might otherwise be driven from the marketplace by large-volume discounters. But in 1975 that congressional permission was
rescinded. The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat.
801, repealed the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation.u
Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price maintenance now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry
or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity.
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale
price maintenance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schwegrnann Bra::;. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 ( 1951); see
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. Park & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competition as effectively as if wholesalers "formed a combination
and endeavored to establish the same restrictions ... by
agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at 408. 7 Moreover,
there can be no claim that the California program is simply
intrastate regulation b0yotHJ tht• reach of the Sherman Act.
See Schwegmann Bros. Y. Calvert Corp., supra; Burke v. Ford,
389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam) .
6 The congre.:;~ioual report::; accompanying the Consumer Goods Pricing
Act of 1975, 89 Stat. 801, noted that repeal of fair trade authority
would not alter whatever power the State,:; hold under the Twenty-first
Amendment to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 2 (1975); H. R. Rep. No. 94-341, 94th Cong., 1st Se.:;s., 3, n. 2
(1975). We con::;ider the effect of the Twenty-fir::;t. Amendment on this
case in Part III, infra.
7
In Rice, the California Supreme Court found direct evidence that re~ale
price maintenance rc:sulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. 3, sup1'a,
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific finding in
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing sy::;t.em "cannot be upheld
for the same reasons the retail price maintenance provision~ were declared
invalid in Rice." Midcal Al-uminum, Inc . v. Rice, 90 Cal. App . 3d 979,
983, 153 Cal. Rptr. 7.57, 760 (1979 ).

~
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement i~
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitJ:"ust
immunity under Parker v. Btowri, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That
immunity for state reguiatory programs is grounded in out
federal structure. "In a duai system of government in whiei~ 1
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only a.S
Congress may constitutionaliy sub~rap~ from their au~hority,
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a sta~e's control over ips
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress/;
ja., at 351. In Paricer v. Brown, this Court found in the
Sherman Act no purpose to nuiiify stflte powers. Because the
Act is directed ~gainst "indivi(iu11l a11d not state action," the
Court concluded that state iiegjll11-tQry prograins could nof;
violate it. !d., at 352.
.
·
.
.
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricul ..
tural Prorate Advi~:>ory Commission authorized the organiza..
tion of local cppperatives to develop_marketing pQlicies for the
raisin crop. The Coui:t emnhasized that the Advisory Com..
mission, which was aPl~ointed by_the govet:uor, had to approve
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state·
which has created the inachinery for establishing. the prorate
program. . . . [I] t is the state. acting through the Commis~ion, which adopts the pt:ogram an.d enforces it.... " Id., at
352. In view of this ext.e11sive officjal oyersight, the Court
wrote, the Shetman Act did not apply. With.o.ut such over,.
sight, the result could have been different. The Court expressly noted, "a state do~s not give imn1unity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by autho~izing them to. violatE} i~,
or by declaring that their actioi1 is lawful. ..." Td., at 351,
Several recent decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In
Goldfarb v. Viryin,ia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) , the Court
concluded that fee schedules enforced by a state bar association were not mandated by ethical standards established by the
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules therefore were no:

iiiiiUUne frOm imtiiiust attack. "It iS nO~ enoUgh thai , • /

/

79-97-0PINION
CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALElts v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM

7

anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather,
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the
State acting as sovereign." ld., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), a majority of the
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "reflect[ed]
a clear articulation of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker-the Arizolla Supreme Court-in
enforcement proceedings." Bates v. State Bar of Arizo·na, 433
U. S. 350, 362 (1977).
Only last Term, this Court found antitrust immunity for a
California program requiring state approval of the location of
new automobile dealerships. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Calif.
v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That program
provided that the State would hold a hearing if an automobile
franchisee protested the establishment or relocation of a competing dealership. I d., at 103. In view of the State's active
role, the Court held, the program was not subject to the
Sherman Act. The "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" goal of the state policy was to "displace unfettered
business freedom in the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealerships." I d., at 109.
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy"; second, the policy must be "actively supervised" by the State itself. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
../
Power & Light Co., 435 U. S. 389, 410 (1978) (opinion of
BRENNAN, J.). 8 The California system for wine pricing satis.. / .
8

4~

See Norman's On the Waterfl'anl, Inc . v. Wheatley,
Bd~. v. ll'l'C, 2.63 F. 2rl-502, 509-510 (CM

(CA3 l9'U) ~ 4.shllville 'l'obacco

79-97-0PINION
CALIFORNIA LIQUOR. DEALERS v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM

8

fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly
stated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price maintenance. The program, however, does not meet the second
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply authorizes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate
the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamination" of the program.\) The national policy in favor of
tition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy
of state involvement over what is essentially a private
p e xing arrangement. As Parker teaches, "a state does
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action
is lawful. ... " 317 U.S., at 351.

III
Petitioner contends that even if California's system of wine
pricing is not protected state action , the Twenty-first Amendment bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. Section 1 of that Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment's prohibition on the manufacture, sale or transportation
of liquor. The second section reserved to the States certain
power to regulate traffic in liquor: "The transportation o:
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of thy
1959); Note, Parker v. Brown Revi~:~ited : The State Action Doctrine After
Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 Colum. L. R.ev . 898,916 (1977) .
The California program coutrai:its with the approa~h of those States
that completely control the distribution of liquor within their boundaries.
E. g., Va. Code§§ 4-15, 4-28 (Repl. Vol. 1979) . Such comprehcn;;ive regulation would be immune from the Sherman Act under Parker v. Brown,
317 U. S. 341 (1943), since the State would ''displace unfettered bu~:~ines s
freedom" with its own power. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Pox
Co., 439 U. S. 96, 109 (1978) ; see State Board v. Young's Market Co.,. /
Z.99 U.. S. 59, 63 (1936).
~
9

/
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United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
The remaining question before us is whether § 2 permits
California to countermand the congressional policy-adopted
under the commerce power-in favor of competition.

A
In determining state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court has focused primarily on the language of the
provision rather than the history bf'hind it. State Board v.
Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1936). 10 In terms,
the Amendment gives the States control over the "transportation or importation" of liquor into their territories. Of course,
~
such control logically entails considerable regulatory power
not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol./
The approach is supported by sound canons of constitutional interpretation and demonstrates a wise reluctance to wade into the complex
FH..o ~~ .J
urrent:> beneath the congrE-ssional
t,he Amendment and t H' :>tate conventionil
The SenatE' ;,;ponsor
of th esolution said the purpo:>e of § 2· wn:s "to rE-store to the
a solute control in effect O\'er interstate commerce affecting intoxicating liquors .. .." 76 Cong. Rec . 414-3 (1933) (remarks of Sen.
Blaine). 'frt he abo made ~tHtf'nw nt :s ~:;upporti 11g :Vfidr~tl's claim that§ 2
was designed only to ensure that "dry"' Sta.tes could not be force by the
Federal Governme>nt to permit thr :sale of liquor. See id., at 4140-4141.
The sketchy record::; of the state conventions reflect no consensus on the
thrust of§ 2, although delegates at ::;everal conventions exprcs::wd their hope
that. state rcgnlation of liquor traffic would brgin immediately. E. Brown,
Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment. to the Con::;titution 104
(1938) (Wilson, Pre::;ident of the Idaho Convention); id., at. 191-192
(Darnall, President of Maryland Convention); id., nt 247 (Gaylord, Chairman of Mi;;souri Convention); id., a.t 469-473 (resolution adopted at
Wa;;hingt.on Convent,ion ~tiling for &i<Lte action "to regulate the liquor
traffic"). SPe generally Note, The Effect of the Twenty-fir;;t Amendment
on State Authority to Control lntoxiculmg Liquor;;, 75 Cohm1. L. Rev.
1578, 1580 (1975); Note, Economic Loculil:lm in State Alcoholic Beverage
Laws-Experience Under the Twenty-fir«t Amendment, 72 Harv. L. HI:JV,
1145, 1147 (1959).
~
10

..f
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S: 132, 138 (1939). We should
not, however, lose sight of the e~plicit grant of authority,
This Court's early decisions on the Twenty-first Amend ..
ment recognized that each State holds great powers over the
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. Young's Mar . .
ket, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of
alcohol; another case focused on a law restricting the types
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney
v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others
involved "retaliation" statutes barring imports from States
that proscribed shipments of liquor from other States, Finch &
Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U. S. 395 (1939); Indianapolis Brewing
Co. v. Liquor Control Cornrn'n, 305 U . S. 391 ( 1939). The
Court upheld the chnJlenged state autho't'ity in each case,
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the
"importation and transpol'tation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet
even when the States had acted under the explicit terms of
the Amendment, the Court resisted the contention that § 2
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power
to be found in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's
Market, supra, 229 U.S., at 64.
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude" to state
liquor regulation, Seagram&: Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35,
42 ( 1966), but th ey aiso have stressed that important federal
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the
Twenty-first Amendment. The States cannot tax imported
liquor in violation o£ the Export-Import Clause. Department
of Revenue v. James Beam Co., 377 U. B. 341 (1964). Nor
can they insulate the liquor industry fro!n the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirements of equal protection, Craig v.
Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 (1976) , and due process, Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1970) .
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate commerce
powet. Although that power is directly qualified by § 2, the
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v.
Morgenthau, 307 U. S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendrpent in a
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 ( 1935). And in Ziffrin,
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the
state program was reasonable. 308 U. S., at 139.
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp ., 377 U.S. 324,
331-332 (1964) .
"To draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto
'repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and
is demonstrably inconect."
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation:
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of
the Constitution, each must be considered in the light of the
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake
in any concrete case." ld., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429
u. s. 190, 206 (1976).11
11 In Nippel't v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court
commented in a footnote :
"[E]ven the commerce in intoxicating liquors, over which the Tweuty-fir~t
Amendment gives the States the highest degree of control, is not altogether beyond the reach of the federal commerce power, at any rate when
the State's regulation squarely conflicts with regulation imposed by Congress..•." ld., at 42,1), n. 15.
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This pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powe:r;s
has been evident in several decisions where the Court held
liquor companies liable for anticompetitive conduct not man-:
dated by a St?-te. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagmm &
Sons, 340 U. S. 211 (1951); United States v. Frankfort
Distilleries, Inc., 324 U. S. 293 (1945) . In Schwegman'fl,
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951), for example, a
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a. distributor to com~
ply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a program similar in many respects to the California system at
issue here. The Court held that because the Louisiana stat-:
ute violated the Sherman Act, it could not be enforced against
the distributor. Fifteen years later, the Court rejected aSherman Act challenge to a New York law requiring liquor dealers
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest
price" charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram &,
Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court con ..
eluded that the statute exerted "nD irresistible economic
pressure on the [deaiers] to vioiate the Sherman Act in order
to comply," but it also cautio11ed that "[njothing in the
Twenty-first Amendment, of course, would prevent the en ..
forcement of the Sherman Act" against an interstate conspiracy to fix liquor prices. id., at 45--46. See Burke v. Ford,
389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam) .
These decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line
between federai and state powers over liquor. The Twenty~
first Amendment grants the States virtuaily compiete control
over whether to permit importation or saie of iiquor and how
to structure the iiquor distribution system. Although States
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regulations, those controls may be subject to the federal commerce power in appropriate situations. The competing state
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a "conc~·~te case." Hostetter v. ldle"' /
~
wild ·Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332,
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B
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor
of competition is both familiar and substantial.
"Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972).
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 456 U. S. 1, 4
( 1958). Although this federal interest is expressed through
a statute rather than a constitutional provision, Congress
"exercis[edj all the power it possessed" under the Commerce
Clause when it approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Powe1' & Light Co., 435 U. S.,
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's
procompetition policy.
The state interests protected by California's resale price
maintenance system were identified by the state courts in this
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in
Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d,
at 451 , 579 P. 2d, at 490. ~ Of course, the findings and
conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Court
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the /
1

12 As the unusual posture of this casE' refiects, the State of California
has shown less than an enthn~iaHtic intRrP<'t in its wine pricing system.
As we noted, the state agency rrtiponsible for administering the program
did not appeal the decision of the California Court of Appeal. See p. 4,
supra; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Instead, this action has been m::untain d
the alifornia Liquor Dealers A:;.-;oeJation, a p ,t e mtervenor. But
neither the intervenor nor the State Attorney General, who filed a. brief
amicus c·uriae in support of the legi~lative ~<Cherne, has specified any state
interest· protected by the resale price maintenance system other tha.ij
those noted in the :sta.te court opinions cited in text.

~
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of
Pythias, 225 U. S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court
accords "respectful consideration and great weight to the views
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95, 100 (1938), and we
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v.
Wood, 314 U. S. 157, 160 (1952).
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of
the State's system of winP pricing was "·controlled by the reasoning of the [California] Supreme Court in Rice [s·upra] ."
90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in
resale price maintenance for distilled liquors.
In Rice, the State Supreme Court found two purposes behind
liquor resale price maintenance : "to promote temperance and
orderly market conditions." 21 Cal. 3d, at 451, 579 P. 2d, at
490. 1 3 The court found little correlation between resale price
maintenance aHd temperance. It cited a state study showing
a 42 % increase in per capita liquor consumption in California
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect.
Id., at 457-458, 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing California Dept. of
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's
Alcohol Control Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote
temperance." Ib·id. 14
13 The California Court. of AppE>al found no additional stale interests in
the instant caHe. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761.
That court rejectE>d the :;ugge:;tiou that the wine price program wal:i designed to protect the St<~te's wine iuduHtry, pointing out that the ,;tatutes
"do not dhltingnllih between Ca lifomia wines and imported wine.:." Ibid.
14 See Seagram & Sous v. Flo8tetter, 384 U . S. 35, 39 (1966) (citing study
concluding that re:;ale price maintenance in New York State had "no
slgnificatlt effect upon the cotnnnption of alcoholic beverage~ " ).
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in
orderly :p1arket conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." I d., at 456,
579 P. 2d, at 493. 15 In gauging this interest, the court
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair
trade laws were necessary to the economic survival of small
retailers. . . ." Ibid. The agency relied on a congressional
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted
under the Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that
"states with fair trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of
firm failures than free trade states, and the rate of growth
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade
laws." Ibid., citing S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
3 ( 1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. 5,
supra, the State Supreme Court found no persuasive justification to continue "fair trade laws which eliminate price competition among retailers." 21 Cal 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at
494. The Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion with
respect to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983.
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the California courts that the asserted state interests are less substantial than the national policy in favor of competition. That
evaluation of the resale price maintenance system for wine is
reasonable, and is supported by the evidence cited by the State
Supreme Court in Rice. Nothing in the record in this case
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the State
15 The California Supreme Court al~o stated that orderly market conditions might "reduce excessive competition, thereby encouraging temperance." 21 Cal. 3d, at 456, 579 P. 2d, at 493. The concern for temperance,
however, was considered by the court a::; an independent state interest
in resale price maintenance for liquor.
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Attorney General in his amicus brief has demonstrated that
the program inhibits the consumption of alcohol by Californians. We need not consider whether the legitimate sta:t~
'interests in temperance and the protection of small retail{{rs
ever could prevail against the undoubted federfl,.l interest in a
competitive economy. The unsubstantiated state concerns
put forward in this case simply ar!OJ not of the same stature as
the goals of the Sherman Act,
We conclude that the California Court of Appeal correctly
decided that the Twenty,.first Amendment provides no shelter
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's
wine pricing program. 16 The judgment of the California
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is
Affirmed,
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In a state-court action, respondent Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
a wine distributor. presented a successful antitrust challenge
to California's resale price maintenance and price posting statutes for the wholesale wine trade. The issue in this case is
whether thosE' state laws are shielded from the Sherman Act
by either the "state action" doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317
U. S. 341 ( 1943), or § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment.

I
Under § 24866 (b) of the California Business and Professions Code, all wine producers, wholesalers, arid rectifiers must
file with the State fair trade contracts or price schedules. 1 If
a wine producer has not set prices through a fair trade contract, wholesalers must post a resale price schedule for that
The statute provides:
"Each wine grower, wholc~tialer licensed to sell wine, wine rectifier, arid
rectifier shall:
"(a) Post a tiChedule of selling prices of wine to retailers or consumers
for which his rE'~ale price is not governed by a fair trade contract made
by the person who owns or controls the brand.
"(b) Make aml file a. fair trade contract and file a schedule of resale
prices, if he owns or controls a brand of wine resold to retailers or
consumers." Cal Bus. & Prof. Code§ 24866 (West 1964) .
1

1~tl0
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producer's brands. Id., § 24866 (a). No state-licensed wine
merchant may sell wine to a retailer at other than the price
set "either in an effective price schedule or in an effective fair
trade contract...." Id., § 24862 (West Supp. 1979).
The State 1s divided into three trading areas for administration of the wine pricing program. A single fair trade 'Contract or schedule for each brand sets the terms for all wholesale transactions in that brand within a given trading area.
!d., §§ 24862, 24864-24865 (West Supp. 1979). Similiarly,
state regulations provide that the wine prices posted by a
single wholesaler within a trading area bind all wholesalers
in that area.. Jlidcal Alwninurn, tnc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App.
3d 979, 98a-984, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757, 762 (1979). A licensee
seling below tlH' established prices faces fines, license suspension, or outright license revocation. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§ 24880." The State has no direct control over wine prices,
and it does not review the reasonableness of the prices set by
wine dealer~.
Midcal AlumiHum, Inc. is a wholesale distributor of wine
in Southem California. In July 1978, the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control charged Midcal with selling 27
cases of wine for less than the prices set by the effective price
schedule of the E & J Gallo Winery. The Department also
alleged that Midcal sold wines for which no fair trade contract
or schedule had been filed. Midcal stipulated that the allegations were true and that the State could fine it or suspend
its license for those transgressions. App. 19-20. Midcal then
filed a writ of mandate in the California Court of Appeal for
the Third Appellate District asking for an injunction against
the State's wine pricing system.
The Court of Appeal ruled that the wine pricing scheme
restrains tratle in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C.
Licensees that srll wine below the prices specified in fair trade contracts or ~chedule~ al~o may be ~ubject to private damage ~uits for unfair
competition. ld., 24752.
2
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§ 1 et seq. The court relied entirely on the reasoning in Rice
v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 43i,
579 P. 2d 476 (1978), where the California Supreme Court
struck down parallel restrictions on the sale of distilled liquors.
In that case, the court held that because the State played
only a passive part in liquor pricing, there was no Parker v.
Brown immunity for the program.

"In the pric€' maintenance program before us, the state
plays no role whatever in setting the retail prices. The
prices arc established by the producers according to their
O\Vll <'COIIomic interests. without regard to any actual or
potential anticompetitive effect; the state's role is re ..
stricted to pnforcing the prices specified by the producers.
Tlwrc is no control, or 'pointed re-examination,' by the
state to insure that the policies of the Sherman Act are
not ' unncc<'ssarily subordinated' to state policy." 21
Cal. 3d, at 445, 579 P. 2d, at 486.
Rice also r<',kctf'd the claim that California's liquor pricing policies w<>re protected by § 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment, which insulates state regulation of intoxicating liquors
from many federal restrictions. The court determined that
the national policy in favor of competition should prevail over
the state i11terests in liquor price maintenance-the promotion
of temp<'ranee and the preservation of small retail establishments. The court emphasized that the California system
not only permitted vertical control of prices by producers, but
also frequently resulted iu horizontal price fixing. Under the
program, many comparable brands of liquor were marketed
at identical prices. 3 Referring to congressional and state
legislative studies, the court observed that resale price main8 The court ('itE'd record evidence that in .July 1976, five leading brands
of gin each ::;old in California for $4.8!:) for a fifth of a gallon, and that
five leading brands of scotch whiskey sold for either $8.39 or $8.40 a fifth.
Rice v. Alcohohc Beverage Control Appeals Bel., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 454, and
Dn. 14, 16, 579 P . 2d 476, 491-492, and nn. 14, 16 (1978) .
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tenance has little positive impact on either temperance or
small retail stores. See pp. 14--15, infra.
In the instant case, the State Court of Appeal found the
analysis in Rice squarely controlling. 90 Cal. App., at 984,
153 Cal. Rptr. , at 760. The court ordered the Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control not to enforce the resale price
maintenance and price posting statutes for the wine trade.
The Department, which in Rice had not sought certiorari from
this Court, did not appeal the ruling in this case.4 An appeal
was brought by the California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, an intervenor. 5 The California Supreme Court declined
to hem the case, and tlw Dealers Association sought certiorari
from this Court. We granted the writ,- U.S.- (1979),
and no\\ affirm the decision of the state court.

II

•

The thrrshold question is whether California's plan for
wine pricing violates the Sherman Act. This Court has ruled
consistently that resale price maintenance illegally restrains
trade. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S .
373, 407 (19 11), the Court observed that such arrangements
are "(lesign<'d to maintain prices ... , and to prevent competition among those who trade in [competing goods]." See
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., 390 U. S. 145 (1968); United
States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S. 29 (1960); United
States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920). For many
years, however, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937 permitted the
States to authorize resale price maintenance. 50 Stat. 693.
The goal of that statute was to allow the States to protect
4 The State al,:o did not appeal the decision in Capiscean Corp. v ..
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 87 Cal. App. 3d 996, 151 Cal..
Rptr. 492 (1979), which u::;ed the analysis in Rice to invalidate California's
resale pricP maintenance ::;cheme for retail wine sales to consumers.
5 The California. Retail Liquor Dealers Association, a trade association
of independent retail liquor dealers in California, claim:; over 3,{)()()J
members.
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small retail establishments that Congress thought might other~
wise be driven from the marketplace by large-volume discounters. But in 1975 that congressional permission was
rescinded. The Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, 89 Stat.
801, repealed the Miller-Tydings Act and related legislation. 6
Consequently, the Sherman Act's ban on resale price maintenance now applies to fair trade contracts unless an industry
or program enjoys a special antitrust immunity.
California's system for wine pricing plainly constitutes resale
price mainten ance in violation of the Sherman Act. Schwegmann Bros. r . Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951); see
Albrecht v. The Herald Co., supra; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Seagram & Sam;, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. Park & Sons Co., supra. The wine producer holds the
power to prevent price competition by dictating the prices
charged by wholesalers. As Mr. Justice Hughes pointed out
in Dr. Miles, such vertical control destroys horizontal competition as effectively as if wholesalers "formed a combination
and endeavoreJ to establish the same restrictions ... by
agreement with each other." 220 U. S., at 408. 7 Moreover,
there can br no claim that the Califomia progTam is simply
intrastate regulation beyond the reach of the Sherman Act.
See Sch weyrnantl Bros. v. Calvert Corp., supra; Burke v. Ford,
389 U.S. 320 (1H67) (per curiam).
6 The congre;~ional reports accompanying the Consumer Goods Pricing
Act of 1975, 89 Stnt. 801, noted that repeal of fair trade authority
would not alt.er whatever power the States hold under the Twenty-first
Amendment to control liquor prices. S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., 2 (1975): H. R. Rep . No. 94-341, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, n. 2
(1975) . We con,;ider the effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on this
case in Part III, infra.
7 In Rice, the Cahfornia Supreme Court found direct evidence that resale
price maintf'nancc resulted in horizontal price fixing. See p. 3, supra,
and n. 3. Although the Court of Appeal made no such specific finding in
this case, the court noted that the wine pricing system "cannot be upheld
for the same reasons th(' retail price maintenance provisions were declared
invalid in Rice." Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d 979,
983, 153 Cal. Rptr 757, 760 (Hl79).
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Thus, we must consider whether the State's involvement in
the price-setting program is sufficient to establish antitrust
immunity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). That
immunity for state regulatory programs is grounded in our
federal structure. "In a dual system of government in which,
under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as
Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority,
an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress."
/d., at 351. In Parker v. Brown, this Court found in the
Sherman Act uo purpose to nullify statf' powers. Because the
Act is direch•d against "individual and not state action," the
Court concluckd that state regulatory programs could not
violate It. I d. , at 352.
Under the program challenged in Parker, the state Agricultural Proratr Advisory Commission authorized the organization of local cooperatives to develop marketing policies for the
raisin crop. The Court emphasized that the Advisory Commission, whiCh was appointed by the governor, had to approve
cooperative policies following public hearings: "It is the state
which has created the machinery for establishing the prorate
program. . . . f Tlt is the state, acting through the Commission, whieh adopts the program and enforces it...." I d., at
352. In viPw of this extensive official oversight. the Court
wrote. the ~herman Act did not apply. Without such oversight, the result could have been different. The Court expressly noted. "a state does not give immunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it,
or by declaring that their action is lawful. ..." I d., at 351.
Several recellt decisions have applied Parker's analysis. In
Goldfarb v. Viroinia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 ( 1975), the Court
concludf'd that fee schedules enforced by a state bar association were uot mandated by f'thical standards established by the
State Supreme Court. The fee schedules therefore were not
immune from aut,itrust attack. "It is not enough that .••
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anticompetitive conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather,
anticompetitive conduct must be compelled by direction of the
State acting as sovereign." I d., at 791. Similarly, in Cantor
v. D etroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) , a majority of the
Court found that no antitrust immunity was conferred when
a state agency passively accepted a public utility's tariff. In
contrast, Arizona rules against lawyer advertising were held
immune from Sherman Act challenge because they "reflect[ed]
a clear artic ulation of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior" and were "subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in
enforcemeut proceedings." B ates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U. S. 350, 362 (1977).
Only last T<'rm, this Court found antitrust immunity for a
California program requiring state approval of the location of
new au tomobile dealerships. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Calif.
V; Orrin W. Pox Co ., 439 U. S. 96 (1978). That program
provided that the ~tate would hold a hearing if an automobile
franchisee protested the establishmeut or relocation of a competing dealership. ld., at 103. In view of the State's active
role, the Court held , the program was not subject to the
Sherman Act. The "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" goal of the state policy was to "displace unfettered
business freedom i.u the matter of the establishment and relocation of automobile dealerships." I d. , at 109.
These decisions establish two standards for antitrust immunity under Parker v. Brown. First, the challenged restraint
must be "one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
as state policy"; second, th e policy must be "actively supervised" by the State itself. Cdy of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co ., 435 U. S. 389, 410 ( 1978) (opinion of
BRENN AN, J.) .8 The California system for wine pricing satis8 Se0 Norman's On th~: Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F . 2d 1011, 1018'
(CA3 t971) ; Asheville Tobacco Bd. v. F.TC, 293 F. 2.d &02, 509-510 (CA4:
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fies the first standard. The legislative policy is forthrightly
.s tated and clear in its purpose to permit resale price mainte~
p.ance. The program, however, does not meet the second
requirement for Parker immunity. The State simply author~
izes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private
parties. The State neither establishes prices nor reviews the
reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate
the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not monitor market conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamination" of the program.n The national policy in favor of
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy
cloak of state involvement over what is essentially a private
price fixing, arrangement. As Parker teaches, "a state does
not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by
authorizing thetu to violate it, or by declaring that their action
is lawful. ... " 317 U. S., at 351.

III
Petitioner con tends that even if California's system of wine
pricing is not protected state action, the Twenty-first Amendment bars application of the Sherman Act in this case. Section 1 of that Amendment repealed the Eighteenth Amendment's prohibitioH Oll the manufacture, sale or transportation
of liquor. The second section reserved to the States certain
power to rPgulate traffic in liquor: "The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
1959 ); Note, Parke1' v. Brown Revi::;ited: The State Action Doctrine After
Goldfarb, Cautor, and Bates. 77 Colum . L. Hev. 898,916 (1977).
u The California. program contra::;ts with the approach of those States
that completely control the di~tribution of liquor within their boundaries.
E. g., Va. Code§§ 4-15, 4-28 (Rep!. Vol. 1979). Such comprehen~ ive regulation would bE' imm\lll(~ from the Slwrrnan Act unde1· Parker v. Brown,
317 U. S. :Hl (1 P43), ~ince the State would "di~place unfettered business
freedom" wtth it::; own power. New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox
Co., 4:~9 F . S. 9(), 109 (1978); ::;ce State Board v. Young's Market Co.,

299

u.s. 59, 63

{1\136).
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United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
The remai11ing question before us is whether § 2 permits
California to countermand the congressional policy-adopted
under the commerce power-in favor of competition.

A
In determimng state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment, the Court has focused primarily on the language of the
provision rather than the history behind it. State Board v.
Young's lvfarket eo., 299 U.S. 59. 63-64 ( 1936)."> In terms,
the Amendllleut gives the States control over the "transportation or importation " of liquor into their territories. Of course,
such control lugieally en tails considerable regulatory power
not strictly limited to importing and transporting alcohol.
Tlw approa('h 1" .,upportetl by sound canons of constitutional interpretation and drmonstrate:; a wi:;e reluctance to wade into the complex
current <~ ben<'alh llw eougrf',;~ional proposal of the Amendmeut and
it<~ mtificatiou in 1h<' Rial<' eonvPntion~. The Senate spom;or of the Amendment resolutiOn ,-<nid the purpo,;e of § 2 wa::; "to restore to the States ...
absolute eontrol iu rffect o\·er inter::;tate commerce affecting intoxicating liquor:-:. . ·· 71i Coug. Rcc. 4143 (193:3) (remarks of Sen.
Blaine). Yet he al~o made stntrnwnts HUpporting Midcal'::; elaim that§ 2
was designed only to <'n:<uw thai ·'dry" Sla.te:; could not be force by the
Federal Oovrmnu•ut to permit. the sale of liquor. See id., at 4140-4141.
The sketchy record,.; of the statt' conventions reflect no consensus on the
thrust of§ 2, althou~h delegates at seventl convent ions expressed their hope
that state regulation of liquor traffic would begin immediately. E. Brown,
Ratification of the Twenty-first. Amendment to the Constitution 104
(1938) (Wilson, Pre,.;ident. of the Idaho Convention); id., at 191-192
(Darnall, Prrsidcnt of .:\Inryland Convention); id., at 247 (Oa.ylord, Chairman of Mis,;ouri Couwntion); id., at 469-473 (resolution adopted at
Washington Com·eution calling for state action "to regulate the liquor
traffic"). See geiH'J'ally Note, The Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment
on State Authority t.o Control lntoxieating Liquors, 75 Colurn. L. Rev.
1578, 1580 ( 1975) ; ~ otc, Eronomic Locali~m in State Alcoholic Beverage
Laws-Expenenee Puder the Twf'nty-first Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev.
1145, 1147 (1959) .
10

I
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Ziffrin, Inc. v. R eeves, 308 U. S. 132, 138 (1939). We should
not, however, lose sight of the explicit grant of authority.
This Court's earrly decisions on the Twenty-first Amendment recognized that each State holds great powers over the
importation of liquor from other jurisdictions. · Young's Market, supra, concerned a license fee for interstate imports of
alcohol; another case fo cused on a law restricting the types
of liquor that could be imported from other States, Mahoney
v. Joseph T riner Corp. , 304 U. S. 401 (1938); two others
involved "retaliation'' statutes barring imports from States
that proseribrd shipme11ts of liquor from other Sta tes, Finch &
Co. v. McKittnck, :305 U. R. 395 (1939) ; Indianapolis Brewing
Co. v. Liquor Control Cornm'ti, 305 U. S. 391 (1939). The
Court upheld the challenged state authority in each case,
largely on the basis of the States' special power over the
"importation and transportation" of intoxicating liquors. Yet
even when thP States had acted uuder the explicit terms of
the Amendment. the Court resisted the contention that § 2
"freed the States from all restrictions upon the police power
to be fo und in other provisions of the Constitution." Young's
Market, supra, ~29 r. S.. at 64.
Subsequent decisions have given "wide latitude" to state
liquor regulation, Seagram & Son s Y. Hostetter, 384 U. S. 35,
42 ( 1966). but they also have stressed that important federal
interests in liquor matters survived the ratification of the
Twenty-first Amendment. The States cannot tax imported
liquor in violation of the Export-Import Clause. Department
of Revenue v. James Bearn Co., 377 U. S. 341 (1964). Nor
can they insulat e the liquor industry from the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirements of equal protection, Craig v.
Boren, 429 U. S. 190, 204-209 (1976), and due process, Wisconsin v. Co nstantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1970) .
More difficult to define, however, is the extent to which
Congress can regulate liquor under its interstate com.merce .
power. Although that power is directly qualified by . §.2, .the
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Court has held that the Federal Government retains some
Commerce Clause authority over liquor. In Jameson & Co. v.
Morgenthau, 307 U. S. 171 (1939) (per curiam), this Court
found no violation of the Twenty-first Amendment in a
whiskey labeling requirement prescribed by the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977 (1935). And in Zifjrin,
Inc. v. Reeves, supra, the Court did not uphold Kentucky's
system of licensing liquor haulers until it was satisfied that the
state program was reasonable. 308 U. S., at 139.
The contours of Congress' commerce power over liquor were
sharpened in Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S. 324,
331-332 (1964).
"To draw a conclusion . . . that the Twenty-first
Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of intoxicating liquors
is concerned would, however, be an absurd oversimplification. If the Commerce Clause had been pro tanto
'repealed,' then Congress would be left with no regulatory
power over interstate or foreign commerce in intoxicating
liquor. Such a conclusion would be patently bizarre and
is demonstrably incorrect."
The Court added a significant, if elementary, observation:
"Both the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause
are parts of the same Constitution. Like other provisions of
the Constitution. each must be considered in the light of the
other, and in the context of the issues and interests at stake
in any concrete case.'' I d., at 332. See Craig v. Boren, 429
190, 206 (1976).11

u. s.

11 In Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416 (1946), the Court
commented in a footnote:
"[E]ven the commerce in intoxicating liquor:;, over which the Twenty-first
Amendment gives the State:; the highest degree of control, is not altogether beyond the roach of the federal commerce power, at a.ny rate when
the State's regulation ::;qua.rely confiicts with regulation imposed by Congress. . . ." !d., at 425, u. 15.

79-97-0PINION
12 CALIFORNIA LIQUOR DEALERS v. MIDCAL ALUMINUM

This pragmatic effort to harmonize state and federal powers
has been evident in several decisions where the Court held
liquor companies liable for anticompetitive conduct not mandated by a State. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram &
Sons, 340 F. S. 211 (1951); United Btates v. Frankfort
Distilleries, l11c., 324 U. ·s. 293 (1945). In Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Corp., 341 U. S. 384 (1951), for example, a
liquor manufacturer attempted to force a distributor to comply with Louisiana's resale price maintenance program, a program similar in many respects to the California system at
issue here. The Court held that because the Louisiana statute violated the 1::lherman Act, it could not be enforced against
the distributor. Fifte<'n years later, the Court rejected aSherman Act challen~p to a New York law requiring liquor dealers
to attest that their prices were "no higher than the lowest
price" charged anywhere in the United States. Seagram &
Sons v. Hostetter, :384 U. S. 35 (1966). The Court concluded that the statute exerted "no irresistible economic
pressure on the [dealers] to violate the Sherman Act in order
to comply," but it also cautioned that "[n]othiug in the
Twenty-first Ameudmeut, of course, would prevent the enforcement of tlw ~herman Act" against an interstate conspiracy to fix liquor prices. !d., at 45-46. See Burke v. Ford,
389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
These decisions demonstrate that there is no bright line
between federal and state powers over liquor. The Twentyfirst Amendment grants the States virtually complete control
over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how
to structure the liquor distribution system. Although States
retain substantial discretion to establish other liquor regulations, those controls may be subject to the federal commerce power in appropriate situations. The competing state
and federal interests can be reconciled only after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a "concrete case." Hostetter v. Idle-.
wild Liquor Corp., 377 U. S., at 332.
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B
The federal interest in enforcing the national policy in favor
of competition is both familiar and substantial.
"Antitrust Jaws in general, and the Sherman Act in
particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They
are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to
the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms."
United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U. S. 596, 610 (1972).
See Northern Pacific Ry v. United States, 456 U. S. 1, 4
( 1958). Although this federal interest is expressed through
a statute ratht>r than a constitutional provision, Congress
"exercis[ed] all the power it possessed" under the Commerce
Clause wlwn 1t approved the Sherman Act. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers L [ 7 nited States, 286 U. S. 427, 435 (1932); see
City of Lafayette v. Louisian£L Power & Light Co., 435 U. S.,
at 398. We must acknowledge the importance of the Act's
procompetition policy.
The statf' in tt>rests protected by California's resale price
maintellancf' tSystem were identifie<.l by the state courts in this
case, 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761 and in
Rice v. Alcoholtc Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d,
at 451, 579 P. 2d, at 490.n Of course, the findings and
conclusions of those courts are not binding on this Court
to the extent that they undercut state rights guaranteed by the
12 As the unu~ual posture of this case reflects, the State of California
has shown le&; than an enthm:;ia,;tic interef't in its wine pricing system.
As we noted, the ~:<tate agency r~ponsible for administering the program
did not appe;Ll the deri;;ion of the California Court of Appeal. See p. 4,
supra; Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Iu~tead, this action ha,; been maintained by
the Ca.liforma HP1ttil Liquor Dealer:; As~ociation, a private intervenor. But
neither the intervl'nor nor the State Attorney General, who filed. a brief
amicus curiae in support of thE' lrgit'\lative :;chemc, has specified any state
interests protectrd h)· tho n•;;ale price maintenance system other than
those noted in t.lu• ~t:~te court opinion::; cited in text.
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Twenty-first Amendment. See Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U. S. 652, 659 (1945); Creswill v. Knights of
Pythias, 225 U. S. 246, 261 (1912). Nevertheless, this Court
accords "respectful considera.tion and great weight to the views
of the state's highest court" on matters of state law, Indiana
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938), and we
customarily accept the factual findings of state courts in the
absence of "exceptional circumstances." Fry Roofing Co. v.
Wood, 344 U.S. 157, 160 (1952).
The California Court of Appeal stated that its review of
the State's system of wine pricing was "controlled by the reasoning of the l Califomia] Supreme Court in Rice [supra]."
90 Cal. App . 0cl, at 983, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 761. Therefore, we
turn to that opinion's treatment of the state interests in
resale price mamtenanCl' for distilled liquors.
In R-~ce , th<' State Supreme Court found two purposes behind
liquor reHale pnce maintenance: "to promote temperance and
orderly market conditions.'' 21 Cal. 3d, a.t 451 , 579 P. 2d, at
490. 1 a The eourt found little correlation between resale price
maintenance and temperance. It cited a state study showing
a 42 %- incrrase in per capita liquor consumption in California
from 1950 to 1972, while resale price maintenance was in effect.
Id. , at 457-458, 579 P. 2d, at 494, citing California Dept. of
Finance, Alcohol and the State: A Reappraisal of California's
Alcohol Co11trol Program, xi, 15 (1974). Such studies, the
court wrote, "at the very least raise a doubt regarding the·
justification for such laws on the ground that they promote
temperance." lbid. 14
13 The Califorma Court of Appeal found no additional state interests in·
the instant <'a::;e. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 984, 153 Cal. Rptr., at 760-761.
That. court. rejected the ::;uggestion that, the wine price program was designed to protect. the Sta.te's wine industry, !)Ointing out that the statutes
"do not dil:!tinguish between California wines and imported wines." Ibid~ .
H See Seagram & Sons v. Ilostette1', 384 U.S. 35, 39 (1966) (citing study·
concluding that rc:;ale price mn,intenanre in New York State had "nOJ
~ignifi cant effert upon the consumP.tion of alcoholic beverages").
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The Rice opinion identified the primary state interest in
orderly market conditions as "protect[ing] small licensees
from predatory pricing policies of large retailers." !d., at 456,
579 P. 2d, at 493.[ 5 In gauging this interest, the court
adopted the views of the Appeals Board of the Alcoholic
Beverages Control Department, which first ruled on the claim
in Rice. The state agency "rejected the argument that fair
trade laws were ne()essary to the economic survival of small
retailers. . . " lb'id. The agency relied on a congressional
study of the impact on small retailers of fair trade laws enacted
under tlw Miller-Tydings Act. The study revealed that
"states with fan· trade laws had a 55 per cent higher rate of
firm failurPs than free trade stat<>s, and the rate of growth
of small retail stores in free trade states between 1956 and
1972 was 32 per cent higher than in states with fair trade
laws.'' Ibid., eiting S. Rep. No. 94-466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.,
3 (1975). Pointing to the congressional abandonment of fair
trade in the 1975 Consumer Goods Pricing Act, see p. 5,
supra, the Htate Supreme Court found no persuasive justification to colltmue "fair trade laws which eliminate price competition among retailers." 21 Ca.!. 3d, at 457, 579 P. 2d, at
494. Tlw Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion with
respect to the wholesale wine trade. 90 Cal. App. 3d, at 983.
We have no basis for disagreeing with the view of the California courts that the asserted state interests are less substantial than the national policy in favor of competition. That
evaluation of the resale price maintenance system for wine is
reasonable, and is supported by the evidence cited by the State
Supreme Court in Rice. Nothing in the record in this case
suggests that the wine pricing system helps sustain small
retail establishments. Neither the petitioner nor the State
15 The California Supreme Court also stated that orderly market conditions might ''rrdure excessive competition, thereby encouraging temperance." 21 CaL 3d, at 456, 579 P. 2d, nt 493. The concern for temperance,
however, was considrred by the court as an independent state interest
in resale prier maintt'nance for liquor.
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Attorney General in his amicus brief has dem.on!')trated that
the program inhibits the consumption of alcohol by Californians. We need not consider whether the legitimate state
interests in temperance and the protection of small retailers
ever could prevail against the undoubted federal interest in a
competitive economy. The unsubstantiated state concern~
put forward in this case simply are not of the same stature as
the goals of the Sherman Act.
We conclude that the C~tlifornia Court of Appeal correctly
decided that the Twenty,.first Amendment provides no shelter
for the violation of the Sherman Act caused by the State's
wine pricing program. 16 The judgment of the California
Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, is

..

Affirmed.

did not take part in the considera..
tion or decision of this case.
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN

1 6 Since Midcal requested only injunctive relief from the state court.
there is no question before u:s involving liability for damages under Hi
15.
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